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BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
PAUL A. HEMESATH
Assistant United States Attorney
501 I Street, Suite 10-100
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 554-2700
Facsimile: (916) 554-2900


Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America





IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANTHONY SUAREZ,

Defendant.








CASE NO. 2:13-CR-00248-TLN

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE
TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;
FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: December 5, 2013
TIME: 9:30 a.m.
COURT: Hon. Troy L. Nunley

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:



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2.

By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 5, 2013.

By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January

9, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between December 5, 2013, and January 9, 2014, under Local

Code T4.

3.

The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a)

The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case

includes investigative reports and related materials. All of this discovery has been either

produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b)

Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, review the



STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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facts, and consider the charges.

c)

Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d)

e)

The government does not object to the continuance.

Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f)

For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 5, 2013 to January 9,

2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4.

Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial

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must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.





Dated: December 4, 2013

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Dated: December 4, 2013


BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney


/s/ PAUL A. HEMESATH
PAUL A. HEMESATH
Assistant United States Attorney

/s/ Phil Cozens
PHIL COZENS
Counsel for Defendant
ANTHONY SUAREZ


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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 4th day of December, 2013





STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME
PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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