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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

San Francisco Division

SABIR AL-MANSUR,

v.

Plaintiff,

JUDGE WYNNE CARVILL, et al.,
Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 13-03503 LB
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT
[Re: ECF Nos. 6, 8]

INTRODUCTION

This action is yet another installment in the ongoing legal saga involving Plaintiff Sabir Al-

Mansur and Defendants. See Complaint, ECF No. 1.1 Mr. Al-Mansur formerly owned four
properties in Oakland, California: 2415 Market Street; 2417 Market Street; 2419 Market Street; and
2421 Market Street. In 2011 and 2012, Defendant Gross Mortgage Corporation filed in Alameda
County Superior Court four unlawful detainer complaints against Mr. Al-Mansur with respect to
these four properties.2 Mr. Al-Mansur removed three of these actions to federal court two times, and

1 Citations are to the Electronic Case File (“ECF”) with pin cites to the electronically-

generated page numbers at the top of the document.

2 See Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. RG11602224 (Alameda County

Superior Court Oct. 28, 2011) (regarding the 2421 Market Street property) (the “2421 Market Street
Unlawful Detainer Action”); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. RG11610380
(Alameda County Superior Court Dec. 30, 2011) (regarding the 2419 Market Street property) (the
“2419 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action”); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No.

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER




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he removed the other one to federal court four times.3 The federal court uniformly have remanded
these actions back to state court.4 Mr. Al-Mansur also filed in federal court a complaint against
Defendants Gross Mortgage Corporation, Contractors Capital Corporation, Barry Gross, and Felix
Seidler (collectively, the “Mortgagee Defendants”), in which he alleged Defendants “misapplied
state law” with respect to Gross Mortgage’s unlawful detainer actions and asked the federal court,

RG12654029 (Alameda County Superior Court Oct. 29, 2012) (regarding the 2415 Market Street
property) (the “2415 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action”); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-
Mansur, No. RG12654035 (Alameda County Superior Court Oct. 29, 2012) (regarding the 2417
Market Street property) (the “2417 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action”).

3 See Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-00650 RS, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 9, 2012) (first removal of action regarding the 2419 Market Street property); Gross Mortgage
Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-01102 YGR, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012) (first removal
of action regarding the 2421 Market Street property); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur,
No. C12-03508 YGR, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (second removal of action regarding the
2419 Market Street property); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-04122 YGR,
ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012) (second removal of action regarding the 2421 Market Street
property); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-04335 MEJ, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2012) (third removal of action regarding the 2419 Market Street property); Gross
Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-04681 SBA, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012)
(fourth removal of action regarding the 2419 Market Street property); Gross Mortgage Corporation
v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-00398 EMC, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (first removal of action
regarding the 2417 Market Street property); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-
00399 PJH, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (first removal of action regarding the 2415 Market
Street property); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-02944 YGR, ECF No. 1
(N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) (second removal of action regarding the 2417 Market Street property);
Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-02945 WHA, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Cal. June 26,
2013) (second removal of action regarding the 2415 Market Street property).

4 See Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-00650 RS, ECF No. 15 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 21, 2012); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-01102 YGR, ECF No. 27
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-03508 YGR, ECF
No. 12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2012); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-04122 YGR,
ECF No. 5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-04335
MEJ, ECF No. 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C12-
04681 SBA, ECF No. 32 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2012); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No.
C13-00398 EMC, ECF No. 11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013); Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-
Mansur, No. C13-00399 PJH, ECF No. 19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2013); Gross Mortgage Corporation
v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-02945 WHA, ECF No. 12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013); but see Gross Mortgage
Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-02944 YGR, ECF No. 2 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) (in forma
pauperis application pending).

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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among other things, to vacate the Alameda Superior Court’s judgments in those actions.5 The
federal court dismissed with prejudice Mr. Al-Mansur’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
finding it barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.6

Now, Mr. Al-Mansur has filed another complaint in federal court. Complaint, ECF No. 1. This
time, he not only names as defendants the Mortgagee Defendants, he also names as defendants the
Alameda County Superior Court and three of its judges: Judge Wynne Carvill, Judge Don Clay, and
Judge Ioana Petrou (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”). Id. at 1-6. In this action, Mr. Al-
Mansur alleges that Defendants violated numerous federal laws and his federally-protected civil
rights by continuing to proceed with the unlawful detainer actions with respect to the 2415 Market
Street, 2417 Market Street, and 2419 Market Street properties even though he removed those actions
to federal court. Id. at 1-19. He asks the court to vacate the state court judgments in those unlawful
detainer actions and to award him damages. Id. at 8-9, 11, 12, 14, 15-16, 17, 19-20.

Defendants move to dismiss his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
Motion, ECF No. 6; Joinder, ECF No. 8.7 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the court finds this
matter suitable for determination without oral argument and VACATES the October 3, 2013
hearing. Upon review and consideration of the record in this case and the arguments of the parties,
the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.

STATEMENT

As mentioned above, Mr. Al-Mansur formerly owned the 2415 Market Street, 2417 Market

Street, 2419 Market Street, and 2421 Market Street properties in Oakland, California. In 2011 and
2012, Gross Mortgage Corporation filed unlawful detainer actions against him with respect to those
properties. At various times, Mr. Al-Mansur removed these actions to federal court. According to

5 See Al-Mansur v. Gross, No. C12-05535 SBA, ECF No. 1 (Oct. 26, 2012).

6 See Al-Mansur v. Gross, No. C12-05535 SBA, ECF No. 42 (June 20, 2013).

7 All parties to this action have consented to the court’s jurisdiction. Consent (Judicial

Defendants), ECF No. 7; Consent (Mortgagee Defendants), ECF No. 10; Consent (Mr. Al-Mansur),
ECF No. 11.

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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his complaint, on September 7, 2012, prior to the trial set to take place on September 10, 2012, Mr.
Al-Mansur removed the 2419 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action to federal court “in the hopes
that Judges Don Clay and Wynn Carville’s actions to deprive [him] of his due process and
Constitutional rights could be preserved by the Civil Rights Removal statute[] . . . 28 U.S.C. §[]
1443(1) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, [and] 1988(a).” Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 7. His “removal
and petition were solely for [the] defensive purpose of preserving [the] status quo pending removal.”
Id. Judge Clay and Judge Carville, however, “ignored the removal statute and preceden[t] and
proceeded to trial without [Mr. Al-Mansur’s] presence.” Id. At that time, the federal court had not
yet remanded the action back to state court. Id.

Similarly, on June 26, 2013, prior to the trial set to take place on July 1, 2013, July 29, 2013, and

July 30, 2013, Mr. Al-Mansur removed the 2415 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action and the
2417 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action to federal court “in the hopes that[,] again, Judges
Don Clay and Wynn Carville’s actions to deprive [him] of his due process and Constitutional rights
could be preserved by the Civil Rights Removal statute[] . . . 28 U.S.C. §[] 1443(1) and 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, [and] 1988(a).” Id. at 7-8. His “removal and petition were solely for [the] defensive
purpose of preserving [the] status quo pending removal.” Id. at 8. At the time Mr. Al-Mansur filed
his complaint (July 30, 2013), the federal courts had not yet remanded the actions back to state
court. Id. (The 2415 Market Street Unlawful Detainer has since been remanded.8 )

Mr. Al-Mansur filed his complaint in federal court on July 30, 2013. His six claims, which he

brings against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, are summarized as follows: (1)
Defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to deprive him of his constitutional rights
under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by “failing to intervene” and
stop their own violations of the federal “removal statutes”; (2) Defendants conspired in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985 to deprive him of his “constitutional right to due process under the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments”; (3) Defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to
deprive him of his constitutional rights “by ignoring Federal Congressional mandates and statutes”;

8 See Gross Mortgage Corporation v. Al-Mansur, No. C13-02945 WHA, ECF No. 12 (N.D.

Cal. Sept. 4, 2013)

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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(4) Defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to maliciously subject him to judicial
proceedings for which there was no probable cause in violation of federal “removal statutes” and his
constitutional due process rights; (5) Defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 “to
accomplish and unlawful purpose by an unlawful means”; (6) Defendants conspired in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985 to violate the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, two federal criminal
statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 (prohibiting conspiracies against rights) and 242 (prohibiting the
deprivation of rights under color of law), and his constitutional rights. Id. at 10-19.

As relief for these alleged violations, Mr. Al-Mansur asks the court “for an order vacating void
state court judgments and all orders entered” by Alameda County Superior Court judges in the 2415
Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action, the 2417 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action, and the
2419 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action, “on the ground that the then[-]presiding Superior
Court Judges Wynne Carville, Don Clay, [and] Ioana Petrou lacked judicial jurisdiction, and as such
violated[,] and [were] barred from further proceedings pursuant to[,] the general removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1446(d), that provides that the state court loses jurisdiction upon the filing of a petition for
removal.” Id. at 8; see also id. at 8-9 (“[Mr. Al-Mansur] files this Complaint to vacate the state
court judgment, arguing that the state court trial court was barred from litigating after the removal
was filed by [him], thus the judgment should be reversed. On the basis of this defense, [Mr. Al-
Mansur] contends that this Court should reverse all void judgments against [him] and award [him]
judgment as a matter of law.”). In addition, Mr. Al-Mansur also asks the court to award him
monetary damages “that [he] incurred due to the need to bring this action for injunctive relief,”
statutory damages under “the Unfair Debt Collection practices and the federal and California
statutes,” treble damages “as permitted by law,” prejudgment interest, compensatory and general
damages, exemplary and punitive damages, interest on any damages awarded, attorney’s fees and
costs, and “entry of a Final Judgment” against Defendants jointly and severally. Id. at 19-20.9

On August 20, 2013, the Judicial Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Al-Mansur’s

complaint. Motion, ECF No. 6. They argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his

9 Although Mr. Al-Mansur mentions statutes relating to the collection of debt, he brings no

such claim and, as such, the court does not consider it. See generally Complaint, ECF No. 1.

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ORDER

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claims against them under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that his claims are barred by judicial
immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, that Younger abstention applies, and that he fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 5-8. On August 22, 2013, the Mortgagee Defendants
joined the Judicial Defendants’ motion. Joinder, ECF No. 8. The Mortgagee Defendants say that all
of the Judicial Defendants’ arguments, with the exception of the judicial immunity one, applies to
them as well. Id. at 2. The Mortgagee Defendants also argue that Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims against
them are barred by California Civil Code § 47, that he fails to state a claim for malicious
prosecution, and that conspiracy is not a cause of action but rather is a basis for vicarious liability.
Id. at 2-3. Mr. Al-Mansur filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion. Opposition, ECF No. 12.
Only the Judicial Defendants filed a reply. Reply, ECF No. 13.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Dismissal of a claim is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the

court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. Federal subject-matter jurisdiction must exist
at the time the action is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization,
858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may either attack the sufficiency of the complaint to establish federal

jurisdiction (a facial challenge) or allege a lack of jurisdiction that exists despite the formal
sufficiency of the complaint (a factual challenge). See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.
2000); Thornhill Publishing Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9thh
Cir. 1979); Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). A facial attack asserts lack
of federal jurisdiction based on the complaint alone, and the court must “accept all allegations of fact
in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” See Warren
v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). By contrast, with a factual
challenge, a court need not assume the truth of factual allegations but may hear additional evidence
about jurisdiction and resolve factual disputes when necessary. See Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177
(quotation omitted). If a defendant challenges jurisdiction by presenting evidence, then the party

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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opposing the motion must present sufficient evidence to support the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Savage v. Glendale Union High School, Dist. No. 205, Maricopa County, 343 F.3d
1036, 1040 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

Dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend should only be granted where the jurisdictional
defect cannot be cured by amendment. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052
(9th Cir. 2003).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when it

does not contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle [ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 (internal citations and parenthetical omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. at 550; Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007); Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). This
is particularly true where a plaintiff represents himself pro se. “A document filed pro se is to be
liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.

If the court dismisses the complaint, it should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend
is made “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other
facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.

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Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)).
II. APPLICATION

Because the court must first determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action,

it first considers Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman argument.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the United States Supreme Court, not the lower federal courts, is vested

with appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006)
(per curiam). Accordingly, “[r]eview of such judgments may be had only in [the Supreme] Court.”
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). Under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, a district court also lacks jurisdiction over a claim amounting to a “de facto
appeal” of a state court judgment, which “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision
by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Noel v. Hall,
341 F.2d 1148, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003); see Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. ----, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1297, 179
L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (emphasizing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases “brought by
state-court losers . . . inviting district court review and rejection of the state court’s judgments”)
(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair,
805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (a “United States District Court, as a court of original jurisdiction,
has no authority to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings”). Under
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292-93 (2005), there are four
requirements for application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: first, the federal plaintiff must have
lost in state court; second, the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by the state court
judgment; third, the plaintiff must be asking the district court to review and reject that judgment; and
fourth, the state court judgment must have been rendered before the District Court proceedings
commenced.

When the federal suit is, at least in part, barred by Rooker-Feldman, a federal court “must also
refuse to decide any issue that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court
in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a
state court decision if its success depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided

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the issue before it. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the
Ninth Circuit has found claims inextricably intertwined where “‘the relief requested in the federal
action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.’” Fontana Empire Ctr.,
LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Charchenko v. City of Stillwater,
47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995)); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012). By
contrast, “if a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached in the case to which he was a party . . . then there is
jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.”
Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (internal quotes omitted). Similarly, Rooker-Feldman does not bar
federal jurisdiction over federal claims where a state court declined to address the same claims in
state proceedings. Simes v. Huckabee, 354 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Robinson v.
Ayoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1985) vacated and remanded on other grounds 477 U.S.
902 (1986).

As described above, Mr. Al-Mansur asks the court for, among other things, “an order vacating
void state court judgments and all orders entered” by Alameda County Superior Court judges in the
2415 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action, the 2417 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action,
and the 2419 Market Street Unlawful Detainer Action, “on the ground that the then[-]presiding
Superior Court Judges Wynne Carville, Don Clay, [and] Ioana Petrou lacked judicial jurisdiction,
and as such violated[,] and [were] barred from further proceedings pursuant to[,] the general removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), that provides that the state court loses jurisdiction upon the filing of a
petition for removal.” Id. at 8. This is a de facto appeal of the state courts’ decisions: Mr. Al-
Mansur “asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief
from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Noel, 341 F.2d at 1163-64. The Exxon Mobil
requirements also are met: Mr. Al-Mansur lost in all three state court unlawful detainer actions; he
complains of injuries caused by those courts’ decisions; he asks the court to reject those decisions;
and those decisions occurred before he filed this action in federal court. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S.
at 292-93. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, then, applies and bars Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims to the
extent that he asks the court to void the state courts’ judgments based on legal error.

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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The next question is whether Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims, to the extent he asks for damages and
other relief, are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial
decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. The court finds that they are. All of Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims are
based on the premise that the Judicial Defendants erred by continuing to exercise jurisdiction over
the three unlawful detainer actions even though he had removed those actions to federal court. For
this court to decide whether Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims have merit, it would have to determine whether
the state courts wrongly decided the issues before it. This is squarely within the Ninth Circuit’s
definition of claims that are inextricably intertwined with a de facto appeal from a state court
judgment. See Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859.

In his opposition, Mr. Al-Mansur argues, without specifics, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not apply here because of “extrinsic fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice.”
Opposition, ECF No. 12 at 14 (citing Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)); see
also id., ECF No. 12 at 6-9. In Kougasian, the Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not bar a federal plaintiff from asserting as a legal wrong that an adverse party engaged in
“conduct which prevent[ed] a [federal plaintiff] from presenting his claim in court.” 359 F.3d at
1140 (quoting Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). This is because
the focus of such a claim is not on any legal error committed by the state court, but rather on “a
wrongful act by the adverse party.” Id. at 1141; see also Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950
(9th Cir.2004) ("The legal wrong that [the plaintiff] asserts in this action is not an erroneous decision
by the state court. . . . [Instead, the plaintiff] asserts as a legal wrong ‘an allegedly illegal act . . . by
an adverse party.’”) (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)). The problem with
Mr. Al-Mansur’s argument is that there is no mention in his complaint of any Defendant committing
extrinsic fraud on the court, see generally Complaint, ECF No. 1; indeed, his assertion that the state
court judgments were the product of extrinsic fraud appears for the first time in his opposition, and
even then he fails to identify any specific instance of fraudulent conduct, see Opposition, ECF No.
12 at 14.

The court thus finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all of Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims
against all Defendants and his action must be dismissed because the court lacks subject matter

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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Case3:13-cv-03503-LB Document14 Filed09/20/13 Page11 of 11

jurisdiction over it. See Noel, 341 F.2d at 1163-64. Because amendment would be futile, Mr. Al-
Mansur’s claims against the Judicial Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Nevertheless, on this record and out of an abundance of caution, given Mr. Al-Mansur’s statement
regarding extrinsic fraud in his opposition, his claims against the Mortgagee Defendants are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.10

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. Mr. Al-Mansur’s claims

against the Judicial Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. His claims against the
Mortgagee Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mr. Al-Mansur may file a
First Amended Complaint by October 10, 2013.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 20, 2013

_______________________________
LAUREL BEELER
United States Magistrate Judge

10 Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action, the court does not reach

Defendants’ other arguments (e.g., judicial immunity, Eleventh Amendment bar, Younger
abstention, failure to state a claim), which assume that such jurisdiction exists.

C 13-03503 LB
ORDER

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