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Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 1 of 73

EXHIBIT 1

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 2 of 73

[ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 22, 2006]

Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 through 05-5116

Nos. 05-5062, 05-5063

________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______________________________

KHALED A.F. AL ODAH, et al.,

Petitioners-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

v.

v.

_______________________________

LAKHDAR BOUMEDIENE, et al.,

Petitioners-Appellants,

GEORGE W. BUSH, et al.,

Respondents-Appellees.

_______________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF THE FEDERAL PARTIES

ADDRESSING THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005

_______________________________

PAUL D. CLEMENT
Solicitor General

PETER D. KEISLER
Assistant Attorney General

GREGORY G. KATSAS
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

DOUGLAS N. LETTER
(202) 514-3602
ROBERT M. LOEB
(202) 514-4332
CATHERINE Y. HANCOCK
(202) 514-3469
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7268
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001




















________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 3 of 73

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

I.

THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT APPLIES TO,
AND RESTRICTS JURISDICTION IN, THESE
PENDING CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

A.

B.

C.

This Act Gives This Court “Exclusive” Jurisdiction
Over Claims By The Guantanamo Detainees “Pending
On” The Date Of Its Enactment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Act Eliminates Habeas Jurisdiction Without Any
Reservation For Pending Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Petitioners’ Other Arguments For Continuing Habeas
Jurisdiction Lack Merit

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

i

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 4 of 73

II.

III.

THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SUSPENSION
CLAUSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

THIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THE MERITS
OF PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL AND AUMF
CLAIMS, WHICH ARE WITHIN ITS EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a)(7)(C)

OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ADDENDUM

ii

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 5 of 73

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797

(D.C. Cir. 2002)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Acree v. Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 48

Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Assessors v. Osbornes, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 567 (1869)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky,

410 U.S. 484 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 48

*Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30, 32, 38

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9 (1987)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

CRLP v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2002)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . 46
__________________________________________________________________

* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with an asterisk.

iii

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 6 of 73

Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 75 (1807)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 31

*Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

*Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Gallardo v. Santini Fertilizer Co., 275 U.S. 62 (1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Gittens v. Menifee, 428 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53, 54

Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

*Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506 (1916) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 33, 34

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939 (1997) . . . . . . . . 32, 33

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 47-49, 53

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

*Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 46

Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

iv

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Koon’s Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

*LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 34, 40

Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

*Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) . . . . . . . . 29-31, 36, 38, 44

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38-40

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507 (8th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Nichols v. Board of Trustees of Asbestos Local 24 Pension Plan,

835 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

North Haven Bd. Of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Department of State,

182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 398 (1878) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

*Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10, 47, 48

Republic National Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80 (1992)

. . . . . . 30

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31, 40

v

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 8 of 73

Rosles v. BICE, 426 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Santos v. Territory of Guam, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 118375

(9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32, 40

Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19 (1988)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U.S. 679 (1887) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 56

*Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48, 50

Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC,

750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) . . . . . . 34, 35

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

*Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51, 52

Constitution:

Fifth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45, 46, 55, 56

Suspension Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 45-50, 53

vi

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Statutes:

5 U.S.C. § 703 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

10 U.S.C. § 113(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 21

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 21

28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10

28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10, 14, 47

28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,

115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

*Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006,

119 Stat. 2680, 2739-45 (2005)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 5, 14

§ 1005(a)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 26

§ 1005(a)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 26

§ 1005(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 27

§ 1005(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 27

§ 1005(b)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

§ 1005(b)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

§ 1005(e)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

§ 1005(e)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

vii

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 10 of 73

§ 1005(e)(2)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 21, 23, 25, 28

§ 1005(e)(2)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

§ 1005(e)(2)(B)(ii)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 25

§ 1005(e)(2)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 22, 55

§ 1005(e)(2)(C)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

§ 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 55, 56

§ 1005(e)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 38-40

§ 1005(e)(3)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

§ 1005(e)(3)(D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 39

§ 1005(h) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 37

§ 1005(h)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 29, 37-39, 41

§ 1005(h)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 21, 24, 28, 36-39, 41, 45

Regulations:

32 C.F.R. § 341.1 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Legislative Materials:

151 Cong. Rec. S12652 (Nov. 10, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-43

151 Cong. Rec. S12752 (Nov. 14, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42, 44

151 Cong. Rec. S14256 (Dec. 21, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 14, 41, 43, 44, 54

152 Cong. Rec. S970 (Feb. 9, 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 43, 54

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Miscellaneous:

Administrative Review Implementation

Directive, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004
/d20040914adminreview.pdf

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9, 27

ARB Summary,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060130arb.pdf . . . . . . . . . . 9

ARB-2 Summary,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060216arb2.pdf . . . . . . . . . 9

CSRT Summary,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf.

. . . . . . . . 8

Department of Defense Directive 5105.02 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal

Judgments, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Note, Developments in the Law--Federal Habeas Corpus,

83 Harv. L.Rev. 1038 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Oaks, Legal History in the High Court--Habeas Corpus,

64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Wilm 77, 97 Eng. Rep. 29

(H.L.1758) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Signing Statement, 2005 WL 3562509 (Dec. 30, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 44

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GLOSSARY

ARB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Administrative Review Board

AEDPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

AUMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Authorization for Use of Military Force

CSRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Combatant Status Review Tribunal

JA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Appendix

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Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 13 of 73

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

___________________________

Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 through 05-5116

Nos. 05-5062, 05-5063

_______________________________

KHALED A.F. AL ODAH, et al.,

Petitioners-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

v.

v.

_______________________________

LAKHDAR BOUMEDIENE, et al.,

Petitioners-Appellants,

GEORGE W. BUSH, et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.

_______________________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF THE FEDERAL PARTIES

ADDRESSING THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005

_______________________________

The government files this Supplemental Brief pursuant to the Court’s order

of January 27, 2006.

Case 1:05-cv-01429-UNA Document 36-2 Filed 03/08/2006 Page 14 of 73

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioners are aliens detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba. Their detention is based on decisions by military Combatant Status

Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that petitioners are enemy combatants against the United

States. Petitioners sought to challenge their detention in the District Court for the

District of Columbia, and they invoked that court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 2241.

The Government filed motions to dismiss the claims of all detainees. In the

orders under review here, the district court in Al Odah granted the motions in part and

denied them in part, and the district court in Boumediene granted the motions in full.

When these appeals were initially briefed and argued, this Court had jurisdiction in

Al Odah under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and it had jurisdiction in Boumediene under 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

On December 30, 2005, while the appeals remained pending, Congress enacted

the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat.

2680, 2739-45 (2005). As explained in this brief, that Act grants this Court exclusive

jurisdiction to review the CSRT decisions to detain petitioners as enemy combatants.

At the same time, the Act eliminates any other jurisdictional basis, including habeas

corpus, for this Court or the district court to consider petitioners’ claims.

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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether Section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act applies to cases

pending on the date of its enactment, including these cases.

2. Whether Section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act violates the

Suspension Clause of the Constitution.

3. If the Act applies here, whether these appeals should be dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction or converted into petitions for review under the Act.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

These appeals involve challenges to the detention of aliens as enemy

combatants outside the sovereign territory of the United States during ongoing armed

conflict. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the

federal habeas corpus statute extends to aliens detained as enemy combatants on a

United States military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the wake of that decision,

more than 200 habeas corpus actions involving more than 300 Guantanamo Bay

detainees have been filed. In these appeals alone, petitioners have raised claims

under the Fifth Amendment, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),

the federal habeas statute, and the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. They have

asserted that any military process used to identify alien enemy combatants abroad

must afford protections akin to those in domestic criminal trials, including private

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lawyers, access to classified information, and exclusionary rules and suppression

hearings. Absent such protections, petitioners have asserted that the federal habeas

statute of its own force entitles detainees to, among other things, sweeping discovery

followed by de novo trials. They have urged the district courts to enjoin

interrogations by military intelligence officers, appoint special masters, and assume

responsibility for conditions at Guantanamo Bay ranging from the speed of internet

communications for habeas counsel to the delivery of mail for detainees. One of the

coordinating counsel for petitioners proudly boasted that this litigation “is brutal” for

ongoing United States military operations at Guantanamo Bay. See 151 Cong. Rec.

S14256, S14261 (Dec. 21, 2005).

Congress responded to this unprecedented litigation crisis with the Detainee

Treatment Act, which became effective on December 30, 2005. Section 1005(e)(1)

of that Act amends the federal habeas corpus statute to provide that “no court, justice,

or judge shall have jurisdiction” to consider either (1) habeas petitions filed by aliens

detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, or (2) any other action

relating to any aspect of the detention of such aliens. Section 1005(e)(2) of the Act

states that this Court “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of

any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly

detained as an enemy combatant,” and it further specifies the scope and intensiveness

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of that review. Section 1005(e)(1) was made immediately effective without

reservation for pending cases, and Section 1005(e)(2) was made expressly applicable

to pending cases.

On January 27, 2006, this Court ordered full briefing and oral argument on the

effect of the Detainee Treatment Act on these cases. In prior briefing, petitioners

have urged that the Act has no effect on these cases, both because it is assertedly

inapplicable to any Guantanamo habeas cases pending on the date of its enactment,

and because it assertedly violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. We

address those issues in this brief. In addition, the Court instructed the parties to

address the appropriate disposition of these appeals, assuming that the Act applies.

PROVISIONS AT ISSUE

The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006

(2005), is included as an Addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On September 11, 2001, the United States endured the most deadly and

destructive foreign attack in its history. That morning, members of the al Qaeda

terrorist network hijacked four commercial airliners and crashed three of them into

targets in the Nation’s financial center and its seat of government. The attacks killed

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almost 3,000 people, injured thousands more, destroyed billions of dollars in

property, and exacted a heavy toll on the Nation’s infrastructure and economy.

The President took immediate action to defend the country and prevent

additional attacks, and Congress swiftly approved his use of “all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines

planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on

September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” Authorization for

Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).

The President ordered United States Armed Forces to subdue both the al Qaeda

terrorist network and the Taliban regime that had harbored it in Afghanistan.

Although our troops have removed the Taliban from power and dealt al Qaeda forces

a heavy blow, armed combat against these enemies unfortunately remains ongoing.

Many courageous Americans have been killed or wounded in combat, and many more

continue to put themselves in harm’s way in order to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban,

and to protect this Nation from further attacks.

During these conflicts, the United States has seized thousands of hostile

fighters. Consistent with the law and settled practice of armed conflict, it has

detained a small proportion of them as enemy combatants. Approximately 490 of

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these enemy combatants are being held at the United States Naval Base at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Each of them was captured abroad and is an alien.

2. Each Guantanamo Bay detainee has received a formal adjudicatory hearing

before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. Those tribunals, established pursuant

to written orders under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, were created

specifically “to determine, in a fact-based proceeding, whether the individuals

detained * * * at the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are properly classified

as enemy combatants and to permit each detainee the opportunity to contest such

designation.” Al Odah JA 1191.

During the CSRT proceedings, each detainee received substantial procedural

protections modeled upon those provided in detention hearings under regulations

implementing the Third Geneva Convention. Among other things, each detainee

received notice of the unclassified factual basis for his designation as an enemy

combatant and an opportunity to testify, call witnesses, and present relevant and

reasonably available evidence. Al Odah JA 1197. Each detainee also received

assistance from a military officer designated as his “personal representative for the

purpose of assisting the detainee in connection with the [CSRT] review process.” Id.

at 1187. Another military officer, the recorder of each tribunal, was required to

present any evidence that might “suggest that the detainee should not be designated

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as an enemy combatant.” Id. at 1203. Each tribunal consisted of three military

officers sworn to render an impartial decision and in no way “involved in the

apprehension, detention, interrogation, or previous determination of status of the

detainees.” Id. at 1194. Each tribunal decision was subject to mandatory review first

by the CSRT Legal Advisor and then the CSRT Director. Id. at 1202. Out of the 558

CSRT hearings conducted, 38 resulted in determinations that the detainee in question

was not an enemy combatant. See CSRT Summary, http://www.defenselink.mil/news

/Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf.

Each detainee not subject to trial before a military commission also receives

an annual hearing before an Administrative Review Board (ARB). The Secretary of

Defense established these tribunals to assess whether the detainee remains a threat to

the United States and its allies in the ongoing armed conflicts with the Taliban and

al Qaeda.

See Administrative Review

Implementation Directive,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d20040914adminreview.pdf. The ARB

is selected by and reports to a “designated civilian official,” who is a Presidentially-

appointed and Senate-confirmed officer in the Department of Defense designated by

the Secretary of Defense. Id.

The ARBs also afford substantial procedural protections. A designated

military officer provides the Board “all reasonably available threat information” in

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the possession of the Department of Defense and any other information indicating

whether it would be in the interest of the United States or its allies to continue to

detain or release the detainee. Id. The detainee receives a written unclassified

summary of this information before the hearing, and may present evidence on his own

behalf. Id. A military officer is assigned to assist the detainee. Id. Unless

inconsistent with national security, the home government of the detainee receives

notice of and may provide information at the hearing. Id. The Board may seek

additional facts and must issue a written recommendation whether detention should

be continued. Id. The designated civilian official makes the final detention

determination. Id. To date, ARB proceedings have resulted in the release or transfer

of 29 detainees

from Guantanamo Bay.

See ARB Summary,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060130arb.pdf; ARB-2 Summary,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060216arb2.pdf.

3. In early 2002, a few Guantanamo detainees filed habeas corpus actions to

challenge their detention as enemy combatants. In Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55,

65-73 (D.D.C. 2002), the district court dismissed two such actions on the ground that,

under Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), neither the federal habeas statute

(28 U.S.C. § 2241) nor the general federal question statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331)

extends habeas corpus jurisdiction to aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the

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United States. This Court affirmed the jurisdictional dismissal. Al Odah v. United

States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Citing Eisentrager, it agreed that “no court

in this country has jurisdiction to grant habeas relief, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to the

Guantanamo detainees.” Id. at 1141.

The Supreme Court reversed this Court on jurisdictional grounds and remanded

the cases to the district court. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Court

reasoned that, on the question of “statutory jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

Eisentrager had implicitly rested on the narrow construction of the habeas statute

adopted in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), and was therefore implicitly

overruled on that question by Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410

U.S. 484 (1973). See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476-79. The Court further reasoned that the

text of the habeas statute, which was conceded to apply extraterritorially to American

citizens at Guantanamo Bay, “draws no distinction between Americans and aliens.”

Id. at 481. Finally, after “hold[ing] that § 2241 confers * * * jurisdiction to hear

petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at the

Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,” the Court adopted a parallel construction of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. Id. at 483-85. The Court concluded its opinion by stressing that it had

decided “only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction,” and it expressly declined

to address “the merits of petitioners’ claims.” See id. at 485.

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4. After the remand in Rasul, numerous other Guantanamo detainees filed their

own habeas petitions. By the end of July 2004, 13 cases involving more than 60

detainees were pending in the district court and consolidated for limited procedural

purposes. Al Odah JA 1239. The Government filed motions to dismiss in each of

these cases, which are the subject of the two pending appeals.

In 11 cases including Al Odah, Judge Green granted in part and denied in part

the motions to dismiss. Al Odah. JA 1228-1302. She concluded that the Fifth

Amendment applies extraterritorially to aliens held at Guantanamo Bay (id. at 1245-

65) and that the CSRT procedures fail to satisfy the Due Process Clause of that

Amendment (id. at 1265-95). She identified three perceived flaws in the CSRT

procedures: first, that detainees were not given private attorneys with access to

classified information; second, that in some cases the CSRT might not have

sufficiently considered whether evidence was the product of coercion; and third, that

the definition of “enemy combatant” used by the CSRTs was potentially vague or

overbroad. Ibid. Given those perceived flaws, she held that the habeas courts have

an “obligation * * * to provide the petitioner with a fair opportunity to challenge the

government’s factual basis for his detention.” Id. at 1295. She further held that the

Third Geneva Convention is judicially enforceable at the behest of individual

detainees and that it protects members of the Taliban but not members of al Qaeda.

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Id. at 1296-97. She dismissed various other constitutional, statutory, and treaty

claims brought by the petitioners. Id. at 1300-01. Finally, she certified her order for

an interlocutory appeal, which this Court accepted.

In two cases including Boumediene, Judge Leon granted the motions to dismiss

in their entirety. Boumediene JA 999-1032. He held that petitioners’ detention is

1

affirmatively authorized by the AUMF and consistent with the President’s

constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief. Id. at 1007-12. He further held that

the Constitution does not protect aliens outside United States sovereign territory,

including aliens held at Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 1012-19. And he held that none of

the statutes, regulations, and treaties cited by petitioners creates judicially enforceable

individual rights. Id. at 1019-26. The Boumediene petitioners took an appeal from

that final judgment.

This Court consolidated the Al Odah and Boumediene appeals for purposes of

oral argument, which was held on September 8, 2005.

5. During the pendency of these appeals, habeas filings have continued to

accelerate. To date, more than 200 cases have been filed, purportedly on behalf of

some 600 detainees. Although some of these filings appear duplicative, and others

1

The second case became moot when its only appellant, petitioner Ridouane

Khalid, was released from Guantanamo Bay and repatriated to France.

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name petitioners who cannot be matched with actual detainees, the number of

detainees with pending petitions is well over 300. The Department of Defense has

been forced to reconfigure its operations at the Guantanamo Naval Base to

accommodate hundreds of visits by private habeas counsel. The detainees have urged

habeas courts to dictate conditions on the Base ranging from the speed of Internet

access afforded their lawyers to the extent of mail delivered to detainees. This habeas

litigation has consumed enormous resources and disrupted the day-to-day operation

of the Guantanamo Naval Base.

Perhaps most disturbing, the habeas litigation has imperiled crucial military

operations during a time of war. In some instances, habeas counsel have violated

protective orders and jeopardized the security of the Base by giving detainees

information likely to cause unrest. Moreover, habeas counsel have frustrated

interrogations critical to preventing further terrorist attacks on the United States.

One of the coordinating counsel for the detainees boasted about this in public: “The

litigation is brutal for [the United States]. It’s huge. We have over one hundred

lawyers now from big and small firms working to represent these detainees. Every

time an attorney goes down there, it makes it that much harder [for the U.S. military]

to do what they’re doing. You can’t run an interrogation * * * with attorneys. What

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are they going to do now that we’re getting court orders to get more lawyers down

there?” See 151 Cong. Rec. S14256, S14260 (Dec. 21, 2005).

6. In response to this litigation crisis, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment

Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-45 (2005).

The President signed the Act into law on December 30, 2005. Section 1005 of the

Act, the provision at issue here, divests the courts of habeas jurisdiction in cases

involving the Guantanamo detainees, but gives this Court exclusive jurisdiction to

review both the CSRT determinations by which the detainees are held as enemy

combatants and any criminal convictions of the detainees rendered by military

commissions.

Section 1005(e)(1) effects the repeal of habeas jurisdiction. It expressly

amends the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to state that “no court, justice, or judge

shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider” two specified categories of cases, except

as provided by the Act itself. The first category of cases encompasses any

“application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by

the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” §1005(e)(1). The second

category of cases encompasses “any other action against the United States or its

agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of an

alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,” if the detainee is currently in military custody or

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has been determined under the review procedures established by the Act to have been

properly detained as an enemy combatant. Id.

Section 1005(e)(2) of the Act replaces habeas jurisdiction with an exclusive-

review mechanism in this Court. It confers upon this Court “exclusive jurisdiction

to determine the validity of any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal

that an alien is properly detained as an enemy combatant.” § 1005(e)(2)(A). Section

1005(e)(2) also specifies the governing “scope of review,” by stating that this Court

may determine whether a final CSRT decision “was consistent with the standards and

procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,” and “to the extent the Constitution

and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and

procedures to make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of

the United States.” § 1005(e)(2)(C).

Section 1005(e)(3) creates an exclusive-review mechanism for Guantanamo

detainees seeking to challenge criminal convictions rendered by military

commissions. It confers upon this Court “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the

validity of any final decision” rendered by a military commission, § 1005(e)(3)(A),

and, in a correlative “scope of review” provision, it authorizes this Court to determine

whether a military commission decision “was consistent with the standards and

procedures specified” in the governing Executive Orders and “to the extent the

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Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such

standards and procedures is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United

States,” § 1005(e)(3)(D).

Section 1005(h), titled “effective date,” contains two provisions. The first

provision states that Section 1005, including its elimination of statutory habeas

jurisdiction, is effective immediately. § 1005(h)(1) (“This section shall take effect

on the date of the enactment of this Act.”). The second provision makes this Court’s

exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to CSRT and military commission decisions

expressly applicable to pending cases. § 1005(h)(2) (“Paragraphs (2) and (3) of

subsection (e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review is governed by one

of such paragraphs and that is pending on or after the date of the enactment of this

Act.”).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Detainee Treatment Act applies to these appeals, is constitutional, and

mandates conversion of the appeals into petitions for review under the Act.

I. The Detainee Treatment Act plainly applies to these appeals. By its terms,

the Act creates an exclusive-review mechanism that permits the Guantanamo

detainees to challenge their CSRT determinations in this Court. § 1005(e)(2). At the

same time, the Act expressly eliminates all other sources of jurisdiction, including

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habeas corpus, by which the detainees might challenge any aspect of their detention.

§ 1005(e)(1). The Act makes the exclusive-review scheme expressly applicable to

claims pending on the date of its enactment, § 1005(h)(2), and it makes the repeal of

alternative sources of jurisdiction effective immediately and without reservation for

pending cases, § 1005(h)(1). In tandem, these provisions govern the pending appeals.

Exclusive-review schemes, like the one created by Section 1005(e)(2), by their

very nature preclude courts from exercising jurisdiction under alternative and more

general grants of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus. Moreover, the exclusive-

review scheme created by Section 1005(e)(2) is expressly applicable to claims

governed by the scheme and pending on the date of its enactment. That alone

forecloses the exercise of habeas jurisdiction in these cases. Petitioners’ contention

that Section 1005(e)(2) governs only challenges to future CSRT decisions is belied

by the text of the Act, which makes the exclusive-review scheme govern challenges

to “any” CSRT decision “pending on” the date of its enactment.

Moreover, without reservation for pending cases, Section 1005(e)(1) of the Act

expressly and immediately eliminates every other jurisdictional basis – including

specifically habeas corpus – through which the Guantanamo detainees might

challenge their detention. Under settled interpretive principles, such jurisdiction-

ousting statutes apply to pending cases. Petitioners err in contending that Section

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1005(e)(1), which addresses only the future exercise of judicial power, and which

does not preclude the Guantanamo detainees from challenging their detention either

under Section 1005(e)(2) or through the ARBs, would be impermissibly retroactive

if given immediate effect in pending cases.

Petitioners also err in contending that the combination of Section 1005(e)(1)

and Section 1005(e)(2), each of which independently precludes the continuing

exercise of habeas jurisdiction in these cases, somehow accomplishes exactly the

opposite. All of petitioners’ arguments fail on their own terms. Moreover, their

assertion that Congress intended for its exclusive-review scheme to govern only the

possibly-null set of future CSRT determinations, and to be wholly inapplicable to the

hundreds of pending Guantanamo habeas cases, is nonsensical given the

circumstances surrounding the Act’s passage.

II. The Act is fully consistent with the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.

As aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States, petitioners have

no constitutional rights under the Suspension Clause or otherwise. But even if they

did, the elimination of habeas review would still be permissible because Section

1005(e)(2) provides an adequate substitute remedy through which petitioners can

challenge their detention as enemy combatants. Decisions about the scope of habeas

corpus, or any substitute, ordinarily are for Congress. Section 1005(e)(2) permits this

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Court to determine not only whether the CSRT followed its own procedures, but also

whether the use of such procedures is consistent with the Constitution and federal

law. Given the extensiveness of the CSRT procedures, and the historical traditions

governing the detention of enemy combatants during armed conflict, that review is

more than constitutionally sufficient.

III. Because the Act applies to these cases, this Court can exercise no

jurisdiction other than that afforded by the exclusive-review provisions of Section

1005(e)(2). To avoid the wasteful exercise of dismissal and re-filing, the Court can

and should recast the pending appeals as petitions for review under Section

1005(e)(2) – a disposition expressly anticipated by Congress. The Court should then

proceed to decide the issues raised by petitioners that fall within the scope of its

review under Section 1005(e)(2), including Fifth Amendment and AUMF claims that

have already been fully briefed and argued. Finally, because neither this Court nor

the district court has continuing jurisdiction over the pending habeas petitions, the

Court should vacate the judgments of the district court in those cases and remand the

cases with instructions to dismiss.

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ARGUMENT

I.

THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT APPLIES TO, AND RESTRICTS
JURISDICTION IN, THESE PENDING CASES

It is hornbook law that jurisdiction must exist throughout the pendency of

litigation. “‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.

Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function

remaining to the Court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’”

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex Parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)). Moreover, “‘[e]very federal appellate

court has a special obligation to “satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but

also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.”’” Id. at 95 (quoting Arizonans

for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997) (in turn quoting Mitchell v.

Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934))).

The Detainee Treatment Act plainly ousts the courts of jurisdiction in these

pending cases, except as provided in the Act itself. In independent but mutually

reinforcing provisions, the Act removes preexisting sources of jurisdiction in two

ways: by creating an exclusive-review scheme under which the Guantanamo

detainees may challenge their CSRT determinations directly in this Court; and by

expressly eliminating all other sources of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus, in

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cases involving the Guantanamo detainees. The exclusive-review scheme is

expressly applicable to pending cases, and the provision eliminating other sources of

jurisdiction contains no reservation for pending cases. Together these provisions

require dismissal to the extent that the pending appeals rest on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and

1292(b), and they preclude any continuing exercise of district court jurisdiction in

these cases.

A.

This Act Gives This Court “Exclusive” Jurisdiction Over
Claims By The Guantanamo Detainees “Pending On” The
Date Of Its Enactment

1. By its terms, Section 1005(e)(2) of the Detainee Treatment Act states that

this Court “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final

decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as

an enemy combatant.” § 1005(e)(2)(A). That “exclusive” jurisdiction plainly covers

the habeas actions giving rise to these appeals: in contending that their detention is

unlawful, petitioners necessarily challenge the “validity” of the CSRT decisions that

each of them “is properly detained as an enemy combatant.” Moreover, the Act

makes this “exclusive” jurisdiction expressly applicable to pending cases: Section

1005(h)(2) states that Section 1005(e)(2) “shall apply with respect to any claim whose

review is governed by” Section 1005(e)(2) “and that is pending on or after the date

of the enactment of this Act.” By its very nature, this scheme of “exclusive” review

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precludes resort to other grants of jurisdiction such as the habeas statute or the

general federal question statute.

Exclusivity is particularly appropriate given the precise and reticulated nature

of Section 1005(e)(2), which is specific to Guantanamo detainees held as enemy

combatants pursuant to CSRT decisions, and which contains its own detailed

limitations provisions and standards of review. It is well-settled that such an

exclusive-review scheme, where applicable, precludes the exercise of jurisdiction

under more general grants of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus. See, e.g., 5

U.S.C. § 703 (“form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review

proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the

absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions

for * * * writs of * * * habeas corpus”); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.

200, 207-09 (1994) (“exclusive” jurisdiction under federal Mine Act precludes

assertion of district court jurisdiction); FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466

U.S. 463, 468 (1984) (Hobbs Act) (“The appropriate procedure for obtaining judicial

review of the agency’s disposition of these issues was appeal to the Court of Appeals

as provided by statute.”); Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004)

(Ҥ 2241 is ordinarily reserved for instances in which no other judicial remedy is

available”); Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Because judicial

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review was available * * * the district court was not authorized to hear this § 2241

habeas petition.”). Indeed, the same principles apply even if Congress does not

explicitly state that the more specific review mechanism is exclusive. See, e.g.,

United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 205-08 (1982) (Medicare review scheme

precludes exercise of Tucker Act jurisdiction); Telecommunications Research &

Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“even where Congress has not

expressly stated that statutory jurisdiction is ‘exclusive’ * * *, a statute which vests

jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in all

cases covered by that statute”) (footnote omitted).

2. In prior briefing, petitioners have urged that Section 1005(e)(2) governs

review only of CSRT decisions rendered after, rather than before, the date of its

enactment. Petitioners note that, although Section 1005(e)(2) encompasses review

of “any final decision of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal,” § 1005(e)(2)(A), it

is qualified by a limitations provision restricting that jurisdiction, in pertinent part,

to aliens “for whom a Combatant Status Review Tribunal has been conducted,

pursuant to applicable procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,”

§ 1005(e)(2)(B)(ii). Petitioners further note that the Act requires the Secretary to

submit the governing CSRT and ARB procedures to Congress not later than 180 days

after its enactment, § 1005(a)(1)(A), and that it specifies particular protections for the

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submitted procedures, §§ 1005(a)(2), 1005(a)(3), 1005(b). From all of this,

petitioners conclude that Section 1005(e)(2) applies only to those future CSRT

decisions that afford the new statutory protections.

Petitioners’ argument is wholly unconvincing. To begin with, it is inconsistent

with Section 1005(h)(2), which makes this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review

challenges to CSRT decisions expressly applicable to “any claim * * * that is pending

on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” That language extends Section

1005(e)(2) not only to future challenges to future CSRT decisions, but also to present

challenges to past CSRT decisions “pending on” the date of enactment. Petitioners’

contrary construction, which would limit the Act to review of future CSRT decisions,

would improperly deprive the “pending on” language of any meaningful effect. See

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000) (“a statute should not be construed so as to

render any provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous”). This understanding

is reinforced by the temporal-scope provision in Section 1005(b), which imposes a

specific requirement for the procedures submitted to Congress (§ 1005(b)(1)), but

states that the requirement only “applies with respect to any proceeding beginning on

or after the date of the enactment of this Act” (§ 1005(b)(2)). Pet