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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 1 of 15

I? THE U?ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA










v.



Plaintiff,





JOSE MANUEL VEGA FRANQUI, et al.,
















SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, et al.,




















Defendants.












Case No. 1:06-CV-00734-RBW

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PLAI?TIFFS’ RESPO?SE TO LIBYA? DEFE?DA?T’S REPLY TO

PLAI?TIFFS’ OPPOSITIO? TO DEFE?DA?T’S MOTIO? TO DISMISS
THE COMPLAI?T A?D ACCOMPA?YI?G MEMORA?DUM OF LAW



COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, Joshua M. Ambush, of the Law

Offices of Joshua M. Ambush, LLC, and hereby institute Plaintiffs’ Response to Libyan

Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and

Accompanying Memorandum of Law, and in support thereof, respectfully state as follows:

1. The new amendment to the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act defeats

Defendants’ allegations that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is stale or time-barred.


2. Plaintiffs have shown sufficient, conclusive facts for this court to establish

jurisdiction over Libyan Defendants.

3. The exhibits for Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint and Accompanying Memorandum of Law (“original motion”) were
mailed to Defendants’ Counsel, but due to technical difficulties, were
inadvertently not e-filed with the original motion. Thus, the exhibits have been
attached to this Response as Exhibit 1, and should be incorporated herein and in
the original motion, as if fully set forth in this Response.


4. In support of this Response to Libyan Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Plaintiffs respectfully refer this
Court to the attached Memorandum of Law and proposed Order.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joshua M. Ambush

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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 2 of 15

____________________________________
Joshua M. Ambush (Md. Bar # 27025)
Law Offices of Joshua M. Ambush, LLC
Hilton Plaza
1726 Reisterstown Road
Suite 206
Baltimore, Maryland 21208
410-484-2070
410-484-9330 (facsimile)
[email protected]




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Response to Libyan
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and
Accompanying Memorandum of Law was delivered via electronic filing and first class mail
postage prepaid, to Thomas J. Whalen, Esquire, Mark A. Johnston, Esquire, Eckert Seamans
Cherin & Mellott, LLC, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C.
20006; Wendy West Feinstein, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, U.S. Steel Tower, 44th
Floor, 600 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, this 14th day of February, 2008.


/s/ Joshua M. Ambush
_____________________________



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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 3 of 15

I? THE U?ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA










v.



Plaintiff,





JOSE MANUEL VEGA FRANQUI, et al.,
















SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, et al.,




















Defendants.












Case No. 1:06-CV-00734-RBW

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MEMORA?DUM OF LAW I? SUPPORT OF PLAI?TIFFS’ RESPO?SE
TO LIBYA? DEFE?DA?T’S REPLY TO PLAI?TIFFS’ OPPOSITIO?

TO DEFE?DA?T’S MOTIO? TO DISMISS THE COMPLAI?T



Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, Joshua M. Ambush, of the Law Offices of Joshua M.

Ambush, LLC, respectfully submit this Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Response

to Libyan Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint.

I. I?TRODUCTIO?



Libyan Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint repeats the same purportedly dispositive reasons to dismiss the complaint, as Libyan

Defendants provided in its previous Motion to Dismiss: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction because

Libya is allegedly immune from suit under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28

U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.; and (2) the Plaintiffs’ claims in the Complaint, all of which allegedly

arose in 1972, are stale and time barred.

Plaintiffs disagree, as Plaintiffs have shown sufficient, conclusive facts for this Court to

establish jurisdiction over the Defendants. It is irrefutable that Plaintiffs’ claims are no longer

stale or time-barred. In fact, Defendants’ claims in this regard are now moot.



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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 4 of 15

II. PLAI?TIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE ?OT TIME-BARRED DUE TO THE ?EW

AME?DME?T OF THE FSIA, H.R. 4986, SECTIO? 1083



On January 29, President Bush signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 4986. Included in H.R. 4986 was Section 1083, otherwise titled as

the “Terrorism Exception to Immunity” amendment. See EXHIBIT 2. This law was based on

legislation introduced in 2007, the JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM ACT,

S. 1944, 110th Cong. (2007), and was based on the 1996 Flatow Amendment to the FSIA.

The relevant portion of the “Terrorism Exception to Immunity” amendment, H.R. 4986,

§1083, reads, in pertinent part:

An action may be brought or maintained under this section if the
action is commenced, or a related action was commenced under
section 1605(a)(7) (before the date of the enactment of this section)
… not later than the latter of—

(1) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or

(2) 10 years after the date on which the cause of action arose.


NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008, H.R. 4986, § 1083 (2008)

(emphasis added). According to the legislative history, the purpose of §1083 was to ensure that:

Any judgment or action brought under section 1605(a)(7) … after
the effective date of such provisions relying on either of these
provisions as creating a cause of action, which has been adversely
affected on the grounds that either or both of these provisions fail
to create a cause of action against the state, and which is still
before the courts in any form … shall, on motion … be given
effect as if it had originally been filed pursuant to section
1605A(d) …


JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM ACT, S. 1944, 110th Cong. (2007).



Previously, the vague wording of the FSIA required a subjective interpretation by this

Court. The prior version of the FSIA stated:



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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 5 of 15

No action shall be maintained under subsection (a)(7) unless the
action is commenced not later than 10 years after the date on which
the cause of action arose. All principles of equitable tolling,
including the period during which the foreign state was immune
from suit, shall apply in calculating this limitation period.


28 U.S.C. §1605(f). Defendants have disputed the fact that equitable tolling applied to the

statute of limitations period. See Libya’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants Motion

to Dismiss the Complaint at 1 (hereinafter referred to as “Libya’s Reply” or “Defendants’

Reply”).

Previously, Plaintiffs argued that Congress intended the ten-year statutory period for

claims under the FSIA’s terrorism exception to begin to run only upon the waiver of sovereign

immunity. See Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Libyan Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

Accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 53 (hereinafter referred to as

“Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities”). Thus, Plaintiffs argued that the statute of

limitations should be tolled from between May 30, 1972, until April 24, 2006, when the

Defendants were stripped of their sovereign immunity. Id. at 63. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argued

that they filed their Complaint after a reasonable time, but still within the 10-year statute of

limitations period. Id. at 62-63.

Libyan Defendants disagreed, and devoted over 13 pages to their argument that (a)

Plaintiffs’ cause of action arose on May 30, 1972; (b) equitable tolling did not suspend the

running of the statute of limitations; (c) the FSIA statute of limitations was intended to protect

defendants from litigating stale claims arising 34 years later; and (c) Plaintiffs’ claims were time-

barred even if equitable tolling suspended the statute of limitations, because Plaintiffs’ claims

were not filed within a reasonable time-frame. See Libya’s Reply at 9-21.



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Due to the enactment of H.R. 4986, §1083, Defendants’ arguments on this matter are

now moot. The clear language of §1083, which amends the FSIA, establishes that any action

brought during the time-frame listed in §1083 is not considered stale or time-barred, despite

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary. See Libya’s Reply at 9-21.

Section 1083 provides that an action is considered timely filed as long as it is filed by

April 24, 2006.1 Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ claims that the immunity period should be removed

from the statute of limitations calculation, the vague principles of equitable tolling outlined in

the FSIA are no longer implicated under §1083. Thus, the adverse decisions relied upon by

Defendants, which applied equitable tolling principles to statute of limitations arguments, are

now inapplicable to the case at bar. See, e.g., Buonocore v. Great Socialists People’s Libyan

Arab Jamahiriya, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49031 (D.D.C. 2007); Vine v. Republic of Iraq, 459

F.Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2006); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.1999); Phillips

v. Heine, 984 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir.1993); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 453

(7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).

As Plaintiffs timely filed their action on April 21, 2006, inside of ten years from April 24,

1996, their claims are neither stale nor time-barred, and must “be given effect as if [originally]

filed pursuant to section 1605A(d).” Id. Moreover, Defendants claims that Plaintiffs had no

impediment toward bringing their claims for at least a four year period prior to the enactment of

the terrorism exception to the FSIA, see Libya’s Reply at 19, are now irrelevant.

Section 1083 permits Plaintiffs’ filing at any time prior to April 24, 2006. Even if the

cause of action arose, as Defendants claim, four years prior to the terrorism exception to the

FSIA, Plaintiffs could still file at any time prior to April 24, 2006.


1 The latter of 10 years after the date on which the cause of action arose (assuming the cause of action arose either
on May 30, 1972 or on April 24, 1996, would render the amended dates to May 30, 1982, or April 24, 2006), or 10
years after April 24, 1996 (i.e., April 24, 2006), is clearly 10 years after April 24, 1996.



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Therefore, assuming that the cause of action arose either, as Defendants argue, on May

30, 1972, or, as Plaintiffs would have it, on April 24, 1996, and notwithstanding the fact that

Defendants timely filed their complaint on April 21, 2006, Plaintiffs’ filing must still be

considered timely under the “Terrorism Exception to Immunity” amendment, §1083.

III. LIBYA? DEFE?DA?TS ARE ?OT IMMU?E FROM SUIT U?DER THE FSIA

a. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Libyan Defendants Because Libya Was
Added To The State Sponsors Of Terrorism List As A Result Of The Lod
Airport Massacre



Libyan Defendants dismiss the significant fact that Plaintiffs “devoted nearly 30 pages of

their opposition to the issue of jurisdiction.” See Libya’s Reply at 1. Defendants repeatedly

provided detailed and factual evidence to establish that Libyan Defendants were added to the

State Sponsored Terrorism list as a result of the Lod Airport Massacre. This Court should not

dismiss Plaintiffs’ factual showings out of hand, as Defendants have done here.

As Plaintiffs stated previously, “the complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff’s

favor, and [the court] will grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from

the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994).

Accordingly, “[t]he court must treat the plaintiffs’ factual allegations – including mixed

questions of law and fact – as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.”

Coles v. Harvey, 2007 WL 63666 (D.D.C.2007) (citing Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61,

64, 67 (D.C.Cir.2003); Holy Land Found. For Relief and Dev. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165

(D.C.Cir.2003).

Although Plaintiffs do not need to establish all of the precise facts on which they base

their claims, Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown enough facts to survive Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 93



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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 8 of 15

(D.C.Cir.2002). Despite any challenges by the Defendant in Defendants’ Reply, regarding the

legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations, this Court should accept Plaintiffs’

factual allegations as true and determine whether such facts bring the case within any of the

exceptions to foreign-state immunity invoked by Plaintiffs. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C.Cir.1990).

As Plaintiffs previously stated, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Libya engaged in a

broad policy of support of international terrorism, occurring long before the incident at Lod

Airport, and continuing through the date Libya was added to the state-sponsored terrorism list.

The evidence conclusively shows that both Libya and Syria provided “material support or

resources” to the PLO, PFLP, and their co-conspirators, the JRA, and these terrorist groups were

the perpetrators of the heinous acts of terrorism at Lod Airport. Libya and Syria were later

designated to the list under the FSIA’s provision of “unless later so designated as a result of such

act.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that these facts conclusively establish that Libyan Defendants were added

to the State Sponsored Terrorism list as a result of the Lod Airport Massacre. Thus, this court

should find that it has jurisdiction over the Defendants.

b. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Libyan Defendants Despite Any

Misinterpretation Of The Statute By Libyan Defendants



Libyan Defendants continue to misconstrue the “plain” language of § 1605(a)(7),

distinguishing between Libyan Defendants’ incorrect usage: “as a result of the act,” see Libya’s

Reply at 3-4 (emphasis added), instead of the proper phrasing which requires that the foreign

state must have been designated a state-sponsor of terrorism at the time the act occurred, unless

later so designated as a result of such act. See, U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7)(A) and (B) (emphasis

added).



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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 9 of 15

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all arguments previously made in its Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. As Plaintiffs stated previously, Defendants argue

that the state-sponsored terrorism exception only applies if “the foreign state was designated a

state-sponsor of terrorism at the time of the [enactment of the Export Administration] Act [of

1979 or as a result of such [specific] act [of terrorism]. In 1972, at the time this cause of action

arose, Libya was not impliedly designated a state-sponsor of terrorism. Therefore, Defendants

argue that the “court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s case… and the

sovereign has immunity from trial.” Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 5.

Libyan Defendants correctly stated in their Reply that “[i]n interpreting the FSIA, we

look to the plain meaning of the language employed by Congress. When determining the plain

meaning of language, we may consult dictionary definitions.” Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas

(Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1087-88 (9th Cir.2007). Words in a statute should have their

“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended them to

bear some different import.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000). Thus, Defendants

misconstrue the plain language of the FSIA, incorrectly reading it as “the act” instead of “such

act,” an important distinction. See Libya’s Reply at 3-4 (emphasis added).

According to basic principles of the English lexicon, the word “the,” as used by

Defendants,’ is a limiting term. “The” limits the usage of the clause following “the” to the

singular. For instance, “the baseball.” Baseball is singular. In contrast, the word “such,” as

used in the FSIA, is an adjective. See Dictionary.com, Definitions: Such (2008), available at

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/such. “Such” is defined as “[i]dentical with, being the

same as what has been mentioned. Alike, similar, of the like kind.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY



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1432 (6th ed. 1991). Usage of “such” enables a user to broadly describe multiple events in the

plural form. For instance, “like such act.”

Defendant’s interpretation of the term “as a result of the act,” Libya’s Reply at 3-4

(emphasis added), creates the false impression that Plaintiff’s claims are barred absent an express

written statement to the effect that Libya was designated a state-sponsor of terrorism for directly

perpetrating the Lod Airport massacre. Plaintiffs urge the court to reject the notion that state

sponsors of terrorism were designated on the basis of reference to a specific “list” that included

some, but excluded other terror attacks, and a foreign state’s sovereign immunity, or loss thereof,

was dependant upon whether the terror attack in question was or was not “on the list”.

c. The Roeder Decision is Inapplicable To The Case At Bar. Regardless, Roeder

Has Been Effectively Overturned by § 1083.



Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all arguments previously made in its Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. As Plaintiffs stated previously, the Roeder

decision is inapplicable to the case sub judice. The Roeder decision was a narrow interpretation

of specific legislation enacted by Congress, which directed U.S. courts to decline to hear such

cases, and read in pertinent part:

if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism … at the time the act occurred, unless later so designated
as a result of such act or the act is related to Case ?umber
1:00CV03110 (ESG) in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.


28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (emphasis added).


According to the Roeder court, Plaintiffs in Roeder failed to meet either of the two

criteria established in the statute. Iran was not designated a state-sponsor of terrorism at the

time of the Iranian hostage crisis, and Iran was not later so designated as a result of the Iranian

hostage crisis. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) and (B) (emphasis added).



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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 11 of 15

Therefore, as Judge Sullivan stated in Roeder:



the Anti-Terrorism Act,

Neither
the Flatow Amendment,
Subsection 626(c), or Section 208 contain the type of express
statutory mandate sufficient to abrogate an international executive
agreement. Furthermore, … the legislative histories of these
statutes contain no clear statements of Congressional intent to
specifically abrogate the Algiers Accords. Therefore, …[u]nless
and until Congress expresses its clear intent to overturn the
provisions of a binding agreement between two nations that has
been in effect for over twenty years, this Court can not interpret
these statutes to abrogate that agreement.


Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.D.C.2002). Absent a clear intent by

Congress to overturn the Algiers Accords, the Roeder Court refused to grant jurisdiction to

Plaintiffs over Iranian Defendants.

In stark contrast to the situation regarding Iran, no such limitations were indicated when

Libya was designated one of the original state sponsors of terrorism. In point of fact, Libya was

not designated a state-sponsor of terrorism for its actions subsequent to the Lod Airport

Massacre. The statutory language plainly and clearly indicates Congressional intent that any

material sponsorship of terrorism by Libya, which may have proximately caused terrorist acts

such as the Lod Airport massacre, which were later grounds for Libya to be placed on the state

sponsored terrorism list, is sufficient to grant this court subject matter jurisdiction.

However, Congress, in passing H.R. 4986, § 1083, struck the applicable portion of the

FSIA which directed U.S. courts to decline to hear such cases. See NATIONAL DEFENSE

AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008, H.R. 4986, § 1083 (2008) (stating that “[s]ection

1605 of title 28, United States Code, is amended … in subsection (a) ... by striking paragraph

(7)”). Now, under §1083, U.S. Courts have jurisdiction to hear claims prosecuted against Iran by

victims of the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis. Clearly, Congress intended for Roeder to effectively be



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overturned by H.R. 4986. Therefore, Roeder cannot be considered for purposes of adjudicating

the matter at bar.

d. The President Contemplated Libya’s Involvement In The Lod Airport Attack

When the U.S. Placed Libya On The List of State Sponsors Of Terrorism In
1979



Libyan Defendants question “how could the President have contemplated Libya’s

involvement in the May 30, 1972 attack at Lod Airport when it placed Libya on the list of State

Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979 if Libya’s alleged role in the attack was not revealed until 2002?”

See Libya’s Reply at 21. Libyan Defendants claim that Plaintiffs could not argue “that the attack

on Lod Airport was part of a pattern of conduct which the president considered in placing Libya

on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979, [but] on the other hand, that plaintiffs could

not have filed their claims until after 2002 when Libya’s alleged material support for the attack

was discovered.” Id.

However, Defendants are mistaken. These two propositions are not “completely

inconsistent with one another.” Id. In fact, the two statements propounded by Defendants are

quite distinct from each another. As Defendants previously stated in its Memorandum,

Many documents in this particular case still remain classified, and
the full extent of Libyan and Syrian Defendants involvement in
Lod remains to be seen. Indeed, Plaintiffs were only able to secure
the majority of the classified documents, as referenced in this
Motion, in 2002 or later, as they were classified and unavailable to
the public. Thus, with the current resources available, only now
are Plaintiffs sufficiently able to demonstrate the findings they
have made in this Motion … These now-declassified documents
have enabled Plaintiffs to bring this lawsuit, at a reasonable time.


Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 62.

The historical facts, contrary to Libyan Defendant’s assertions, are not at odds with the

fact that the President considered the Lod Airport attack as part of a pattern of conduct which the



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president considered in placing Libya on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979. As

Plaintiffs established throughout the numerous exhibits in its Memorandum of Points and

Authorities, the information needed to assess whether to add Libyan Defendants to the list of

State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979 was readily available to the CIA, FBI, and numerous other

government agencies, including the President of the United States.

Defendants fail to recognize that the mere fact that this information was confidential and

classified in 1979 effectively precluded Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel (rather than the

President) from securing access to these documents until the documents became declassified.

Thus, in response to Libyan Defendants’ query; “how could the President have contemplated

Libya’s involvement in the May 30, 1972 attack at Lod Airport when it placed Libya on the list

of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979 if Libya’s alleged role in the attack was not revealed until

2002?”, Libya’s alleged role in the attack was not revealed until 2002, to public sources.

Upon securing this now-declassified information, Plaintiffs were able to “devot[e] nearly

30 pages of their opposition,” see Libya’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants Motion

to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, to conclusively establish that the President contemplated the Lod

Airport massacre as part of a pattern of conduct which the president considered in placing Libya

on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1979.

IV. CO?CLUSIO?


WHEREFORE for the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in Plaintiffs’ Opposition

to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Plaintiffs hereby request that this Court deny

Libyan Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Joshua M. Ambush
____________________________________



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Joshua M. Ambush (Md. Bar # 27025)
Law Offices of Joshua M. Ambush, LLC
Hilton Plaza
1726 Reisterstown Road
Suite 206
Baltimore, Maryland 21208
410-484-2070
410-484-9330 (facsimile)
[email protected]




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law in Support
of Plaintiffs’ Response to Libyan Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was delivered via electronic filing and first class mail postage
prepaid, to Thomas J. Whalen, Esquire, Mark A. Johnston, Esquire, Eckert Seamans Cherin &
Mellott, LLC, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Twelfth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20006;
Wendy West Feinstein, Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC, U.S. Steel Tower, 44th Floor,
600 Grant Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, this 14th day of February, 2008.


/s/ Joshua M. Ambush
_____________________________





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Case 1:06-cv-00734-RBW Document 29 Filed 02/14/2008 Page 15 of 15

I? THE U?ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA




v.



Plaintiff,





JOSE MANUEL VEGA FRANQUI, et al.,
















SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, et al.,











Defendants.



















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Case No. 1:06-CV-00734-RBW



ORDER

UPON CONSIDERATION of the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Response to Libyan Defendant’s

Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and

Accompanying Memorandum of Law, it is this _____ day of ___________, 2008, by the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia,

ORDERED, that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is DENIED.

___________________________
Judge Reggie B. Walton
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia






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