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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM

CV. NO. 09-00030 DAE

RICHARD T. ARNOLD,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MANU P. MELWANI, et al.,

Defendants.

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ORDER: (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION;

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(e), the Court finds this matter

suitable for disposition without a hearing. After reviewing the motions and the

supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Richard T.

Arnold’s Motions for Reconsideration (docs. ## 114, 123) and DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion to Vacate (doc. # 164).

BACKGROUND

The instant litigation arises out of a contract dispute between Plaintiff

Richard T. Arnold’s (“Plaintiff”) construction company, Pacific Superior

Enterprises Corp., and Defendant Manu P. Melwani over ownership rights to

payment on a renovation project for Guam Housing and Urban Renewal Authority

Case 1:09-cv-00030 Document 169 Filed 09/20/12 Page 1 of 20

(“GHURA”) residential housing units. (Doc. # 19, Ex. A.) On June 14, 1996,

GHURA filed an interpleader action, CV887-96, in the Superior Court of Guam to

determine ownership rights to the fees for the renovation. (See “SAC,” Doc. # 124

at 2.) Plaintiff’s dispute with Defendant Manu P. Melawani has spurred over a

decade of litigation. Because the Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam have

extensively set forth the factual and procedural history of the conflict, this Court

need not restate those facts here.

On December 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed the instant action in federal

district court, seeking to recover money related to his dispute with Defendant

Melwani that he alleged the Superior Court of Guam had withheld from him in a

“fourteen year . . . unconstitutional prejudgment attachment.” (See “Compl.,”

Doc. # 1 at 1.) Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 11,

2010. (Doc. # 16.) Early in the litigation, Plaintiff moved for the recusal of Chief

Judge Frances Tydingco-Gatewood, which she denied. (See docs. ## 25, 44.)

Plaintiff then sought reconsideration of that ruling, which she also denied.

(Docs. ## 46, 58.) He then appealed the order denying reconsideration to the Ninth

Circuit, but the action was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. (See

docs. ## 62, 69.)

On March 31, 2011, the Court dismissed the FAC pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. # 92.)

However, in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to

amend as to Counts I, II and IV of the FAC. (See Doc. # 92.) However, the Court

dismissed Count III – in which Plaintiff challenged the legality of certain decisions

of the Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam – with prejudice based on the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. See id. The Court then entered

judgment as to Count III on March 31, 2011. (See doc. # 93.)

The Melwani Defendants1 filed a Motion to Amend Judgment on

April 14, 2011, asking that the Court dismiss the entirety of the FAC with

prejudice. (Doc. # 95.) Shortly thereafter, on April 27, 2011, Plaintiff filed three

motions. First, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s prior

March 31, 2011 Order dismissing Count III of the FAC with prejudice.

(Doc. # 98.) Second, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate an August 14, 2000

decision of the Superior Court of Guam granting partial summary judgment as well

as the final judgment entered in favor of Defendant Melwani on May 8, 2001. (See

doc. # 99.) Third, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the judgment of the Superior

Court of Guam in Special Proceedings Case No. 0057-07. (Doc. # 100.)

1 The Melwani Defendants include Manu P. Melawani, Anita Melwani,

Lawrence Melwani, J. Teker, and Robert P. Kutz.

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Approximately one week later, Plaintiff filed a fourth motion, a Notice of a

Constitutional Question, challenging the constitutionality of District of Guam

Local Civil Rule 7.1. (Doc. # 101.)

On August 31, 2011, the Court issued an order denying the Melwani

Defendants’ Motion to Amend Judgment (doc. # 95) and also denying all four of

Plaintiff’s motions (docs. ## 98-101). (Doc. # 112.)

On October 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s March 31, 2011 Order dismissing Count III with

prejudice. (Doc. # 114.) The motion also asked for reconsideration of the Court’s

dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional question in its August 31, 2011 Order. (Id.)

On January 20, 2012, the Melwani Defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion

for Reconsideration. (Doc. # 120.) On January 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Reply to

Melwani Defendants’ Opposition. (Doc. # 122.)

On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the Court’s August 31, 2011 Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration as to

the Court’s dismissal of Count III of the FAC with prejudice (doc. # 98) and

denying Plaintiff’s two Motions to Vacate various judgments of the Superior and

Supreme Courts of Guam (docs. ## 99, 100). (Doc. # 123.)

Shortly thereafter, on February 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Second

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Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. # 124.) Because the SAC named her as a

defendant, Chief Judge Tydingco-Gatewood recused herself from the instant case

on March 28, 2012. (Doc. # 126.) Subsequently, a group of defendants made up

of former members of the Guam judiciary2 brought a Motion to Dismiss and a

Motion to Strike the SAC on June 12, 2012. (Doc. # 133.) They also filed a

Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant the following day, on June 13,

2012. (Doc. # 135.) A group of defendants comprised of current officers of the

Guam judiciary3 substantively joined both motions. (See docs. ## 136-137.) On

August 7, 2012, the Melwani Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction. (Doc. # 159.)

On August 17, 2012, this Court scheduled a hearing on the Motion to

Dismiss and Strike SAC (doc. # 133), the Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious

Litigant (doc. # 135), and the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

(doc. # 159). (Doc. # 161.) The hearing is set for October 19, 2012. (Id.) Finally,

on August 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the Court’s August 31, 2011

2 The group includes Benjamin Cruz, Frances Tydingco-Gatewood, Joaquin

Manibusan, Peter Siguenza, and Mitchell Thompson.

3 The group includes Richard Benson, Michael J. Bordallo, F. Phillip

Carbullido, John Manglona, Catherine Maraman, the Superior Court of Guam, the
Supreme Court of Guam, and Robert Torres.

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Order. (Doc. # 164.) On September 14, 2012, the former and current members of

the Guam judiciary filed Oppositions to Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate.

(Docs. ## 166, 167.) On September 18, 2012, the Melwani Defendants filed a

Joinder in Opposition to Motion to Vacate. (Doc. # 168.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Parties may bring motions for reconsideration pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). While the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure do not expressly provide for a “motion for reconsideration,” such a

motion is usually construed as either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the

judgment or a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a “final judgment, order, or

proceeding.”

A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is only granted in

“highly unusual circumstances” when the district court: (1) is presented with newly

discovered evidence; (2) has committed clear error; or (3) if there is an intervening

change in the controlling law. 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656,

665 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration “may not

be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v.

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Under Rule 60(b), courts may only reconsider a final order on certain

enumerated grounds. These grounds include:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
. . .
(3) fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying
it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.

However, a Rule 60(b) motion is not an avenue to relitigate the same issues and

arguments upon which the Court already has ruled. Brown v. Kinross Gold,

U.S.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288 (D. Nev. 2005); see Merozoite v. Thorp, 52

F. 3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1995).

Additionally, Rules 59(e) and 60(b) do not contemplate

reconsideration of interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (specifying

that Rule 60(b) applies only to “a final judgment, order, or proceeding”).

However, a district court may reconsider an interlocutory order pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows courts to revise “any order or other

decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the

rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . before the entry of judgment.”

A district court also “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider,

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rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen by it to be sufficient” so

long as it has jurisdiction. City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper,

254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001). This plenary power derives from the common

law, and is not limited by the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so

long as it is not exercised inconsistently with those rules. See id. at 886-87.

Several districts in the Ninth Circuit have adopted local rules governing

reconsideration of interlocutory orders. See, e.g., D. Haw. L.R. 60.1 (2009). The

District of Guam has adopted Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), which provides:

A motion for reconsideration of the decision of any motion may be
made only on the grounds of:

(1) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court
before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable diligence could
not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration at the
time of such decision, or,
(2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring
after the time of such decision, or,
(3) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented
to the Court before such decision.

No motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or
written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original
motion.

DISCUSSION

The Court decides the three pending motions which are not set for

hearing, namely: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of certain aspects of

the Court’s March 31, 2011 Order and of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional

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question (doc. # 114); (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s

August 31, 2011 Order (doc. # 123); and (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the

Court’s August 31, 2011 Order (doc. # 164). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court denies Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration (docs. ## 114, 123) and

Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate (doc. # 164).

I.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of (1) the March 31, 2011 Order and

(2) Dismissal of Constitutional Question

Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider for a second time its March 31,

2011 Order dismissing Count III with prejudice. (Doc. # 114.) Plaintiff also seeks

reconsideration of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s constitutional question in its August

31, 2011 Order. (Id.) These two aspects of the Motion for Reconsideration are

discussed separately below.

A.

Dismissal of Count III of FAC with Prejudice

Previously, in its March 31, 2011 Order, this Court dismissed Count

III of the FAC – in which Plaintiff challenged the legality of certain decisions of

the Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam – with prejudice based on the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. (Doc. # 92.) The Court also entered

judgment as to this claim. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration

pursuant to Rule 59(e) on April 27, 2011, which the Court denied. (See

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docs. ## 95, 112.) Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant Motion for

Reconsideration on October 14, 2011, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

60(b)(1), (b)(5) and (b)(6) in his opening paragraph. (See doc. # 114 at 1.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) provides that a court may

relieve a party from a final judgment “on the basis of mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect.” Despite citing this prong of Rule 60(b) in the first

paragraph of his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff does not specifically argue

that there was any kind of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect”

relating to the Court’s March 31, 2011 Order. However, even to the extent that

Plaintiff appears to be asserting “mistake” on the part of this Court regarding the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, he fails to state grounds under Rule 60(b)(1)for

reconsideration of the Court’s order. In a Rule 60(b)(1) motion based on mistake

by the court, the “plaintiff must show that the district court committed a specific

error.” Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Thompson v.

Hous. Auth. of the City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Plaintiff has not shown that this Court committed specific error.

Plaintiff argues that Rooker-Feldman applies only if the federal suit is filed after

the state court renders its final judgment and that there has been no “final”

judgment in the on-going territorial court case. (Doc. # 114 at 23.) However, the

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mere fact that a state court plaintiff has filed his federal suit before his state court

appeals have concluded cannot be enough to open the door for a federal district

court to review the state court decisions. Marciano v. White, 431 Fed. Appx. 611,

613 (9th Cir. 2011). “To hold otherwise would run counter to the [Rooker-

Feldman] doctrine’s underlying principle that review of state court decisions must

proceed through the state appellate procedure and then to the United States

Supreme Court.” See id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005)). In the instant case, Plaintiff is asking the federal court

to reverse various judgments of the Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam. This is

exactly the type of relief that the district court lacks jurisdiction to grant under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291 (“The

Rooker–Feldman doctrine is confined to cases . . . brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.”). This Court cannot sit as an

appellate court over the judgments of the Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam.

See id. at 292. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to identify clear error on the part of this

Court and is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).

In his motion, Plaintiff also cites Rule 60(b)(5) as another ground for

reconsideration. Rule 60(b)(5) permits a party to obtain relief from a judgment or

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order if, among other things, “applying [the judgment or order] prospectively is no

longer equitable.” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009). Plaintiff asserts that

the Court’s March 31, 2011 Order “is no longer equitable,” yet does not argue that

any circumstances have changed to render the order inequitable. (See Doc. # 114

at 12.) Instead, Plaintiff expresses disagreement with Chief Judge Tydingco-

Gatewood’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In employing this

argument, Plaintiff appears to misunderstand the purpose of Rule 60(b)(5). A

party cannot use a Rule 60(b)(5) motion as a “substitute for an appeal” or to

challenge the legal conclusions on which a prior judgment or order rests. Horne,

557 U.S. at 447. Instead, Rule 60(b)(5) allows modification of a judgment only if

“a significant change in either factual conditions or law” renders continued

enforcement “detrimental to the public interest.” Id. (citing Rufo v. Inmates of

Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)). Because Plaintiff has not identified

any significant change in either factual conditions or law, he has not stated

sufficient grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(5).

Plaintiff also invokes Rule 60(b)(6) to no avail. Rule 60(b)(6) is a

“catchall provision” that applies when a party gives a reason for granting relief

from a final judgment or order that is not covered by any of the other reasons set

forth in Rule 60(b). United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.

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2005), overruled on other grounds. Courts may use Rule 60(b)(6) to prevent

“manifest injustice” and “only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a

party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Id.

To prevail, a “party who moves for such relief ‘must demonstrate both injury and

circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from proceeding with . . . the

action in a proper fashion.’” Id. (citing Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d

1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002)).

In the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged any “extraordinary

circumstances” that prevented him from properly representing his interests in the

instant federal action that would warrant reconsideration of this Court’s order.

Despite Plaintiff’s sincere belief in the injustice of the rulings of the Superior and

Supreme Courts of Guam, those rulings are irrelevant to the issue of whether he

was given a fair hearing before this Court. Indeed, Plaintiff has already had two

prior chances to represent his interests before this Court – when the Court first

issued its March 31, 2011 Order and when Plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration of that order the first time. Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(6) provides

Plaintiff no basis for relief from the Court’s March 31, 2011 Order.

B.

Dismissal of Constitutional Question

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration

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of the Court’s August 31, 2011 Order dismissing Plaintiff’s constitutional

challenge to Local Civil Rule 7.1, which he brought under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 5.1.4 Plaintiff requests that the Court “disregard FRCP rule

5.1(a)(1)(A) altogether and rule on the crux of the matter which is whether his two

questions regarding the constitutionality of Rule 7.1 have merit . . .” (Doc. # 112 at

35.) Thus, Plaintiff asks to present a different legal argument as to why Rule 7.1 is

unconstitutional.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes the August 31, 2011 Order

dismissing Plaintiff’s constitutional question is an interlocutory order. As such, a

motion for reconsideration of this order is not governed by Rule 60(b). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b) (specifying that this rule only applies to “a final judgment, order, or

proceeding”). Because Plaintiff does not specify which rule he is invoking to ask

for reconsideration of the Court’s order, the Court will assume that he brings it

pursuant to Rule 54(b) and Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)

provides that a motion for reconsideration may only be brought on grounds of:

(1) a material difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court; (2) the

emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest showing of a

4 Plaintiff challenges the portion of Local Civil Rule 7.1 that gives a party

discretion to file an “Agreement for Hearing Date.”

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failure to consider material facts. See LR 7.1(i). Plaintiff has not shown that any

of these grounds have been met, but merely seeks to present a new argument to the

Court, one which he could have brought previously. Accordingly, he has not met

the requirements for a motion for reconsideration.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration would fare no better

under Rule 60(b), even if the Rule did apply. He has not presented any evidence

showing “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” under Rule

60(b)(1), neither has he demonstrated that “applying [the order] prospectively is no

longer equitable” under Rule 60(b)(5) or that “extraordinary circumstances”

prevented him from properly representing his interests under Rule 60(b)(6). As

such, Rule 60(b) does not provide Plaintiff relief from the Court’s August 31, 2011

Order dismissing his constitutional question.

In sum, the Court denies the entirety of Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration (doc. # 114), including reconsideration of the dismissal of Count

III of the FAC with prejudice and the dismissal of the constitutional question.

II.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s August 31, 2011 Order

On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the Court’s August 31, 2011 Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration as to

the Court’s dismissal of Count III of the FAC with prejudice (doc. # 98) and

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denying Plaintiff’s two Motions to Vacate various Guam Superior and Supreme

Court judgments (docs. ## 99, 100).5 (Doc. # 123.) In each of these motions,

Plaintiff essentially argues that the Court improperly applied the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine and that it should void various judgments of the Superior and Supreme

Courts of Guam.

Although Plaintiff relies on Rule 60(b) throughout his motion, this

reliance is misplaced. Rule 60(b) does not apply to the instant motion for

reconsideration because Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of several interlocutory

orders. Thus, the relevant standard for Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is

found in Rule 54(b) and Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides

that a motion for reconsideration may only be brought on grounds of: (1) a material

difference in fact or law from that presented to the Court; (2) the emergence of new

material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest showing of a failure to consider

material facts. See LR 7.1(i). Plaintiff has not demonstrated any of these grounds,

but merely continues to disagree with the Court’s application of the Rooker-

5 In his Motion for Reconsideration (doc. # 123), Plaintiff also asks the Court

to reconsider its March 31, 2011 Order (doc. # 94) holding Plaintiff’s Motion to
Vacate (doc. # 91) as moot. However, given that Plaintiff subsequently filed an
essentially identical motion which the Court addressed on the merits (see
docs. ## 99, 100, 112), the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration itself
to be moot.

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Feldman doctrine.

Additionally, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), “[n]o motion for

reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in

support of or in opposition to the original motion.” Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration essentially reasserts the same arguments regarding the application

of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the instant case that the Court rejected in both

its March 31, 2011 Order and its August 31, 2011 Order.

Moreover, even if Rule 60(b) applied, this Rule also provides Plaintiff

no relief. Plaintiff invokes Rules 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(4).6 Rule 60(b)(3) provides

the Court may grant relief from judgment for fraud, misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party. To prevail, Plaintiff “must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud,

misrepresentation, or other misconduct and . . . [that] prevented the losing party

from fully and fairly presenting its defense.” Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d

1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004). While Plaintiff attacks various judgments of the

Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam as fraudulent, he does not explain how this

Court’s finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to the instant case was

6 The Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Rules 60(b)(1), (b)(5), (b)(6) to be
duplicative of his prior motion for reconsideration (doc. # 114) and rejects them as
grounds for relief for the same reasons discussed in Section I.

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procured by fraud.

Plaintiff is also not assisted by Rule 60(b)(4). Rule 60(b)(4) allows a

court to relieve a party from a final judgment if the judgment is void. “Rule

60(b)(4) applies only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a

certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a

party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.

Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377 (2010).

Plaintiff has not alleged that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide this

case or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. Plaintiff’s allegations of

impropriety in various proceedings of the Superior and Supreme Courts of Guam

are inapposite because they do bear on whether this Court’s previous orders are

void. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff appears to argue a due process violation

because of an alleged conflict of interest on the part of Chief Judge Tydingco-

Gatewood, he fails to state grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because he

already had the opportunity to be heard on this issue. Early in the litigation,

Plaintiff moved for the recusal of Chief Judge Tydingco-Gatewood, which was

denied. He then sought reconsideration of that ruling, which was also denied, and

he finally appealed the order denying reconsideration to the Ninth Circuit.

Although Plaintiff may disagree with the outcome of his motion to recuse Chief

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Judge Tydingco-Gatewood, his disagreement does not amount to a denial of due

process. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s

August 31, 2011 Order is denied because he has failed to establish proper grounds

for reconsideration.

III.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate the Court’s August 31, 2011 Order

On August 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate the Court’s

August 31, 2011 Order. (Doc. # 164.) Plaintiff’s motion is duplicative of his prior

two Motions for Reconsideration (docs. ## 114, 123). In his Motion to Vacate,

Plaintiff expresses confusion over whether his prior motions for reconsideration

(docs. ## 114, 123) have been mooted by the Second Amended Complaint, and

goes on to reassert the same arguments that he made in these motions. Because the

instant motion makes no new arguments and presents none of the required grounds

for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), the Court denies Plaintiff’s

Motion to Vacate (doc. # 164).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that mere disagreement with this Court’s

prior orders is not grounds for reconsideration. See Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. HT &

T Co., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1269 (D. Haw. 2005). A motion for reconsideration

is not a mechanism to allow parties to relitigate arguments already briefed,

considered, and decided. Moreover, reconsideration may not be based on evidence

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and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged

decision. See id. Plaintiff is advised that repeated filing of motions for

reconsideration will not alter the standards set for reconsideration or make the

Court any more likely to grant a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff is further

advised that, absent extraordinary circumstances, any further motions for

reconsideration of the Court’s March 31, 2011 Order (doc. # 92) or August 31,

2011 Order (doc. # 112) are out of time and will not be considered on the merits.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions

for Reconsideration (docs. ## 114, 123) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate

(doc. # 164).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: Honolulu, Hawaii, September 19, 2012.



__________________________
David Alan Ezra
Senior United States District Judge

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