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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,






Plaintiff,

vs.

RYAN GENE HANSEN,


Defendant.

No. CR13-3010-MWB



ORDER REGARDING

MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

SUPPRESS



I. 

II. 



___________________________

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................................. 2 
A. 
Procedural Background ........................................................... 2 
B. 
Factual Background ............................................................... 4 

LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 6 
A. 
Standard Of Review ................................................................ 6 
B. 
Objections To Report And Recommendation ................................ 12 
1.  Was Deputy Radmaker’s noncompliance with Iowa law

deliberate and intentional? ............................................. 12 
Does Leon’s Good Faith Exception Apply? ......................... 15 

2. 

III.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 16 










I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A.

Procedural Background



On March 27, 2013, an Indictment was returned against defendant Ryan Gene

Hansen, charging him with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance

or mixture containing methamphetamine which contained 50 grams or more of pure

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 846, and

possessing with intent to distribute a substance or mixture containing methamphetamine

which contained 5 grams or more of pure methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). Defendant Hansen filed a motion to suppress in which

he seeks to suppress evidence seized as a result of the placement of a Global-

Positioning-System (“GPS”) tracking device on his automobile, evidence found during

a search of his automobile on March 16, 2013, and any statements he made to law

enforcement officers on that date. Hansen contends that the installation of the GPS

devices was unlawful because it occurred after the expiration of the initial warrant

authorizing that installation. Second, he argues that both the warrant authorizing

installation of the GPS device on his automobile and the warrant extending the

deployment of the GPS device were unlawful because the law enforcement officer

applying for the warrants was not authorized to do so under Iowa law. Third, Hansen

argues that, under Iowa law, the warrants could not authorize the gathering of

information outside of Kossuth County, the county where they were issued. Fourth, he

contends that the warrants were invalid because they were not supported by probable

cause. Finally, Hansen argues that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary

rule, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), should not apply because law

enforcement officers could not have acted in good faith reliance on the warrants.



The prosecution filed a timely resistance to Hansen’s motion. Hansen’s motion

to suppress was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand, pursuant



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to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). On June 5, 2013, Judge Strand conducted an evidentiary

hearing and subsequently filed a Report and Recommendation in which he recommends

that Hansen’s motion to suppress be denied. In his Report and Recommendation, Judge

Strand concluded that the initial warrant, authorizing installation of the GPS device on

Hansen’s automobile, was executed within ten days of its issuance and therefore was

not void at the time of its execution. Judge Strand also found that, under Iowa law,

once a GPS device is installed by a law enforcement officer, it may be monitored

regardless of whether the target vehicle leaves the county of issuance or the state of

Iowa. Judge Strand further concluded that the deputy who applied for both the warrant

authorizing installation of the GPS device on Hansen’s automobile and the warrant

extending the deployment of the GPS device was unauthorized to do so under Iowa law.

As a result, Judge Strand found that both warrant applications were made, and both

warrants were issued, in violation of Iowa law. However, Judge Strand further

determined that the deputy’s failure to comply with state law did not result in prejudice

and was not intentional and deliberate. Thus, Judge Strand determined that the

procedural violation of Iowa law did not trigger the exclusionary rule and that the

validity of the warrants was governed by Fourth Amendment standards. Applying

those standards, Judge Strand found that probable cause supported issuance of the GPS

warrants. Alternatively, Judge Strand concluded that if the GPS warrant applications

were not supported by probable cause, the Leon good-faith exception to the

exclusionary rule applies because the law enforcement officer obtaining the warrants

acted in reasonable reliance on the state magistrate's determination of probable cause

for issuance of the warrants. Therefore, Judge Strand recommended that Hansen’s

motion to suppress be denied.



Defendant Hansen has filed objections

to Judge Strand’s Report and

Recommendation. The prosecution filed a timely response to Hansen’s objections. I,



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therefore, undertake the necessary review of Judge Strand’s recommended disposition

of Hansen’s motion to suppress.





B.

Factual Background

In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Strand made the following factual

findings:


On December 17, 2012, Deputy Jacob Radmaker
received information from a confidential informant. The
informant stated Mykey Wolf of Algona, Iowa, was going to
buy an ounce of crystal methamphetamine (“ice”) for $2000
to $2200 from a male coming from Minnesota and that the
transaction was to take place at Wolf’s residence. The
informant stated
from Minnesota
previously lived in Kossuth County, used to drive a white
Dodge Durango and recently was released from prison.

the male coming


On December 19, 2012, the informant told Radmaker
the name of the male coming from Minnesota was Ryan and
that Ryan was driving a white Chrysler 300 with 22-inch
rims. The informant stated Ryan drove to the Wolf
residence from Minnesota in the Chrysler, arrived around
04:30 on December 19, 2012, and sold Wolf an ounce of
“ice” for $2300. The informant also stated Ryan usually
carries six to ten ounces of “ice” when he comes down from
Minnesota and was selling it all over.


On December 28, 2012, the informant forwarded to
Radmaker a text that, according to the informant, had been
sent to the informant by Ryan. The text stated: “Well its
been 2300 for an O so 9’bs for 2500.” Radmaker
interpreted this to be a statement that the price for nine “8-
balls” of methamphetamine would be $2500.


Radmaker compared information from the informant
with other information known to or discovered by Radmaker
to conclude that the suspected drug dealer was Ryan
Hansen. Hansen is from the Algona area, previously drove



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a white Dodge Durango Iowa license plate 453BNS, had
been recently released from prison and was then driving a
white 2007 Chrysler 300 with 22-inch rims Iowa license
plate 478ZZC. Radmaker testified that Hansen’s vehicle is
very unique because of the large rims and other aftermarket
modifications. Indeed, Radmaker stated that there is no
other vehicle like it in the area.


Radmaker and Larson determined that installing and
monitoring a GPS device on Hansen’s vehicle would be
useful to their investigation. The Kossuth County Sheriff’s
Office had never previously sought a search warrant for
authorization to install and monitor a GPS device. Larson
testified that this situation presented the office’s first
opportunity to use such a device after the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones[, 132 S.
Ct. 945 (2012)].


On January 8, 2013, Radmaker submitted an
application (including an affidavit) for a search warrant to
install and deploy a GPS tracker on Ryan Hansen’s vehicle
(described throughout as a white 2007 Chrysler 300 with
Iowa license plate #478ZZC). See Ex. 1. This application
will be referred to herein as the “first application.” On the
same day, an Iowa judicial magistrate approved the search
warrant application and issued the requested warrant
(hereafter the “initial GPS warrant”). The magistrate
documented, by an endorsement, sworn additional oral
testimony from Radmaker. Id. On either January 18 or 19,
2013 (the date of installation is disputed), Larson installed
the GPS tracking device on the subject vehicle. From
January through March 4, 2013, Radmaker monitored and
documented receipt of data from the GPS tracking device.

On March 4, 2013, Radmaker submitted another

application (again including an affidavit) for a search
warrant to extend the installation and deployment of the GPS
tracker on Ryan Hansen’s vehicle. See Ex. 2. This
application will be referred to herein as the “second
application.” On the same day, the same magistrate



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approved the second application and issued the requested
warrant (hereafter the “renewed GPS warrant”). The
magistrate again documented, by an endorsement, sworn
additional oral testimony from Radmaker. Id. From March
4, 2013, through March 16, 2013, Radmaker monitored and
documented receipt of data from the installed GPS tracking
device on the requested vehicle.


Both applications, including the affidavits, described
the vehicle at issue as a white 2007 Chrysler 300, IA license
# 478ZZC. The first application also included a photograph
of the vehicle, which Radmaker obtained from Hansen’s
Facebook page. However, both warrants contain an internal
inconsistency concerning the license plate number. The first
paragraph of each states there is proof that said vehicle (with
the license plate number noted above) has been or will be
used in furtherance of drug trafficking. However, the
second paragraph of each authorizes installation of the GPS
tracker on a vehicle with that same description but with Iowa
license plate number 150YLC. See Exs. 1 and 2.
Radmaker testified that he made this error while drafting the
proposed warrants and that license plate number 150YLC
has nothing to do with this investigation.


On March 16, 2013, several law enforcement officers
conducted a traffic stop of Ryan Hansen’s vehicle, locating
and seizing evidence. After being advised of his Miranda
rights, Hansen allegedly made incriminating statements.

Report and Recommendation at 3-5 (footnotes omitted). Upon review of the record, I

adopt all of Judge Strand’s factual findings.



II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Standard Of Review

I review the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation pursuant to the

statutory standards found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1):



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A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of
the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or
recommit
judge with
instructions.

the magistrate

the matter

to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) (stating identical requirements); N.D.

IA. L.R. 72, 72.1 (allowing the referral of dispositive matters to a magistrate judge but

not articulating any standards

to review

the magistrate

judge’s report and

recommendation). While examining these statutory standards, the United States

Supreme Court explained:

Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article
III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the
statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo
if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review
by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party,
under a de novo or any other standard.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). Thus, a district court may review de novo

any issue in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation at any time. Id. If a

party files an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, however,

the district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In the absence of an objection, the district court is not required

“to give any more consideration to the magistrate’s report than the court considers

appropriate.” Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.



De novo review, of course, is nondeferential and generally allows a reviewing

court to make an “independent review” of the entire matter. Salve Regina College v.

Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (noting also that “[w]hen de novo review is



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compelled, no form of appellate deference is acceptable”); see Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S.

614, 620-19 (2004) (noting de novo review is “distinct from any form of deferential

review”). The de novo review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

however, only means a district court “‘give[s] fresh consideration to those issues to

which specific objection has been made.’” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,

675 (1980) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

6162, 6163 (discussing how certain amendments affect 28 U.S.C. § 636(b))). Thus,

while de novo review generally entails review of an entire matter, in the context of §

636 a district court’s required de novo review is limited to “de novo determination[s]”

of only “those portions” or “specified proposed findings” to which objections have

been made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154 (“Any party that

desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask.”

(emphasis added)). Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated de

novo review would only be required if objections were “specific enough to trigger de

novo review.” Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989). Despite this

“specificity” requirement to trigger de novo review, the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals has “emphasized the necessity . . . of retention by the district court of

substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate.”

Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As a result, the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals has been willing to “liberally construe[]” otherwise general pro se

objections to require a de novo review of all “alleged errors,” see Hudson v. Gammon,

46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995), and to conclude that general objections require “full

de novo review” if the record is concise, Belk, 15 F.3d at 815 (“Therefore, even had

petitioner’s objections lacked specificity, a de novo review would still have been

appropriate given such a concise record.”). Even if the reviewing court must construe

objections liberally to require de novo review, it is clear to me that there is a distinction



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between making an objection and making no objection at all. See Coop. Fin. Assoc.,

Inc. v. Garst, 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (“The court finds that the

distinction between a flawed effort to bring objections to the district court’s attention

and no effort to make such objections is appropriate.”). Therefore, I will strive to

provide de novo review of all issues that might be addressed by any objection, whether

general or specific, but will not feel compelled to give de novo review to matters to

which no objection at all has been made.

In the absence of any objection, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has

indicated a district court should review a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793,

795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting when no objections are filed and the time for filing

objections has expired, “[the district court judge] would only have to review the

findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”); Taylor v. Farrier, 910 F.2d 518, 520

(8th Cir. 1990) (noting the advisory committee’s note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) indicates

“when no timely objection is filed the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear

error on the face of the record”); Branch, 886 F.2d at 1046 (contrasting de novo

review with “clearly erroneous standard” of review, and recognizing de novo review

was required because objections were filed). I am unaware of any case that has

described the clearly erroneous standard of review in the context of a district court’s

review of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which no objection has

been filed. In other contexts, however, the Supreme Court has stated the “foremost”

principle under this standard of review “is that ‘[a] finding is “clearly erroneous” when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States

v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Thus, the clearly erroneous standard



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of review is deferential, see Dixon v. Crete Medical Clinic, P.C., 498 F.3D 837, 847

(8th Cir. 2007) (noting a finding is not clearly erroneous even if another view is

supported by the evidence), but a district court may still reject the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation when the district court is “left with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed,” U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395.

Even though some “lesser review” than de novo is not “positively require[d]” by

statute, Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150, Eighth Circuit precedent leads me to believe that a

clearly erroneous standard of review should generally be used as the baseline standard

to review all findings in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation that are not

objected to or when the parties fail to file any timely objections, see Grinder, 73 F.3d

at 795; Taylor, 910 F.2d at 520; Branch, 886 F.2d at 1046; see also FED. R. CIV. P.

72(b) advisory committee’s note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need

only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept

the recommendation.”). In the context of the review of a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, I believe one further caveat is necessary: a district court always

remains free to render its own decision under de novo review, regardless of whether it

feels a mistake has been committed. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 153-54. Thus, while a

clearly erroneous standard of review is deferential and the minimum standard

appropriate in this context, it is not mandatory, and I may choose to apply a less

deferential standard.1



1The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the context of a dispositive matter
originally referred to a magistrate judge, does not review a district court’s decision in
similar fashion. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals will either apply a clearly
erroneous or plain error standard to review factual findings, depending on whether the
appellant originally objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See
United States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, we review
a district court’s factual findings for clear error . . . . Here, however, the record
reflects
the magistrate’s report and

that [the appellant] did not object

to



10

As noted above, Hansen has filed objections to Judge Strand’s Report and

Recommendation. I, therefore, undertake the necessary review of Judge Strand’s

recommended disposition of Hansen’s motion to suppress.








recommendation, and therefore we review the court’s factual determinations for plain
error.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Looking, 156 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir.
1998) (“[W]here the defendant fails to file timely objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, the factual conclusions underlying that defendant’s appeal
are reviewed for plain error.”). The plain error standard of review is different than a
clearly erroneous standard of review, see United States v. Barth, 424 F.3d 752, 764
(8th Cir. 2005) (explaining the four elements of plain error review), and ultimately the
plain error standard appears to be discretionary, as the failure to file objections
technically waives the appellant’s right to appeal factual findings, see Griffini v.
Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating an appellant who did not object to
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation waives his or her right to appeal
factual findings, but then choosing to “review[] the magistrate judge’s findings of fact
for plain error”). An appellant does not waive his or her right to appeal questions of
law or mixed questions of law and fact by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation. United States v. Benshop, 138 F.3d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir.
1998) (“The rule in this circuit is that a failure to object to a magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation will not result in a waiver of the right to appeal ‘”when the
questions involved are questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact.”’” (quoting
Francis v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1986), in turn quoting Nash v. Black,
781 F.2d 665, 667 (8th Cir. 1986))). In addition, legal conclusions will be reviewed de
novo, regardless of whether an appellant objected to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 498 F.3d 799, 801 n.2 (8th Cir.
2007) (“In cases like this one, ‘where the defendant fails to file timely objections to the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the factual conclusions underlying that
defendant’s appeal are reviewed for plain error.’ We review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo.” (citation omitted)).









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B.

Objections To Report And Recommendation

1. Was Deputy Radmaker’s noncompliance with Iowa law deliberate

and intentional?



Hansen’s central objection is directed at Judge Strand’s analysis under United

States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990). In Freeman, the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals held that a “fundamental” violation of a state procedural rule for

obtaining a search warrant required suppression of evidence but that a “non-

fundamental” procedural violation of such a rule required suppression only where:

“(1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that the search might
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the
Rule had been followed, or

(2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard
of a provision in the Rule.”

Id. at 350 (quoting United States v. Luk, 859 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting in

turn United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir.1980)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).



Hansen objects to Judge Strand’s finding that Kossuth County Deputy Sheriff

Jacob Radmaker’s noncompliance with Iowa law, in applying for the warrants, was not

deliberate and intentional. Hansen notes that under Iowa law only a “special state

agent” may apply for a warrant authorizing placement of a GPS device, see IOWA

CODE § 808B.5(12), and it is uncontested that Deputy Radmaker was not a “special

state agent.”2 See IOWA CODE § 808B.1(10). Thus, Hansen argues that Deputy



Code provides that:

2 With respect to warrants authorizing the installation of GPS devices, the Iowa


A special state agent may make application to a judicial officer for the
issuance of a search warrant to authorize the placement, tracking, or
monitoring of a global positioning device, supported by a peace officer's



12

Radmaker’s noncompliance with Iowa law in applying for the warrants must be

considered deliberate and intentional. I disagree. From my de novo review of the

record, I find that there is no evidence that Deputy Radmaker acted in intentional and

deliberate disregard of Iowa law when he applied for the GPS warrants. To the

contrary, the record supports the conclusion that Deputy Radmaker thought he was

complying with the law when he applied for the warrants. It is undisputed that the

investigation here presented the sheriff department’s first application for a GPS warrant

after the United States Supreme Court held, in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,

949 (2012), that the installation and monitoring of a GPS device constituted a “search”

under the Fourth Amendment. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. Kossuth County Chief

Deputy Sheriff Nick Larson testified that while the sheriff’s department had used GPS

devices before the Jones decision, it had not applied for warrants to do so. There is no

evidence in the record that either Chief Deputy Larson or Deputy Radmaker knew that,

under Iowa Code § 808B.5(12), only a special state agent could apply for a GPS

warrant. Rather, the evidence, including the form of the warrant applications,

demonstrates that Deputy Radmaker assumed, incorrectly, that a warrant application to

install GPS devices was governed under the same rules and requirements as other



oath or affirmation, which includes facts, information, and circumstances
tending to establish sufficient grounds for granting the special state agent's
application, and probable cause for believing the grounds exist. Upon a
finding of probable cause to issue such a warrant, the judicial officer shall
issue a warrant, signed by the judicial officer with the judicial officer's
name of office, directed to any peace officer, commanding that the peace
officer place, track, or monitor the global positioning device.


IOWA CODE § 808B.5(12). “Special state agent” is defined as “a sworn peace officer
member of the department of public safety.” IOWA CODE § 808B.1(10).




13

search warrant applications, and that he was authorized to apply for and execute the

GPS warrants.



The facts here are very similar to those in Freeman. That case involved a

special agent for the Missouri Department of Revenue. The special agent was

authorized under Missouri law to investigate possible violations of state law related to

automobile tampering, but was not a state “peace officer.” Freeman, 897 F.2d at 346-

47. Under Missouri law, only peace officers and prosecuting attorneys may apply for

search warrants. Id. at 347 n.2. Despite the lack of state authority to do so, the special

agent applied for a search warrant, submitting a supporting affidavit establishing

probable cause for the search. Id. at 347. The search warrant application identified the

applicant as a special agent with the state Department of Revenue, but it did not

indicate that the special agent was not a peace officer. Id. A state judge issued a

warrant directed to “any peace officer in the state of Missouri.” Id. With the assistance

of a state police officer and a county deputy sheriff, the special agent executed the

search warrant and seized evidence as a result. Id. The defendant moved to suppress

on the ground that the special agent was not statutorily authorized to apply for or

execute a search warrant. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s motion and the

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that “the magistrate found that [the

special agent], although unauthorized to apply for and execute a search warrant, carried

out the application and execution in good faith, believing that he possessed authority to

do so.” Id. at 350. I similarly find here that Deputy Radmaker acted in good faith in

applying for the GPS warrants, believing that he possessed the authority to do so.

Thus, I find that Deputy Radmaker did not deliberately and intentionally violate

§ 808B.5(12) in applying for the GPS warrants, and suppression of the evidence is not

required. Hansen’s objection is denied.





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2.

Does Leon’s Good Faith Exception Apply?



Hansen also argues that, if I find that Deputy Radmaker deliberately and

intentionally violated § 808B.5(12) in applying for the warrants, I should also find that

Deputy Radmaker’s actions do not qualify for the good faith exception found in United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).



In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that evidence obtained pursuant

to a subsequently invalidated search warrant need not be excluded from the

prosecution's case in chief if the executing officers acted in objectively reasonable

reliance on the issuing court's determination of probable cause and technical

sufficiency. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23. Leon's good-faith exception does not apply:

false

“(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant
contained a
statement made knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for its truth, thus
misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the issuing judge
‘wholly abandoned his judicial role’ in issuing the warrant;
(3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant is ‘so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’; and (4) when
the warrant is ‘so facially deficient” that no police officer
could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.’”

United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.

Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)). Because, for the

reasons discussed above, I have found that Deputy Radmaker did not deliberately and

intentionally violate § 808B.5(12) in applying for the warrants, I decline Hansen’s

invitation to speculate on the applicability of the Leon good faith exception under a

different set of facts.





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III. CONCLUSION



Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, I, upon a de novo review of the

record, accept Judge Strand’s Report and Recommendation and deny defendant

Hansen’s motion to suppress.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2013.


























______________________________________
MARK W. BENNETT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

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