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Case 2:11-cv-00516-CJB-SS Document 1 Filed 03/03/11 Page 1 of 38

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA





MAGISTRATE:

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* JUDGE:
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
Plaintiff

V.

BP EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION,
INC.; BP CORPORATION NORTH
AMERICA, INC.; BP AMERICA, INC.;
BP P.L.C.; ANADARKO PETROLEUM
CORPORATION; ANADARKO E&P
COMPANY LP; TRANSOCEAN
HOLDINGS LLC; TRITON ASSET
LEASING GmbH; TRANSOCEAN
DEEPWATER, INC.; TRANSOCEAN
OFFSHORE DEEPWATER DRILLING,
INC. AND MOEX OFFSHORE 2007 LLC
Defendants

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COMPLAINT FOR PENALTIES AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

NOW INTO COURT, comes James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Attorney General of the State of

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Louisiana, appearing herein on behalf of the State of Louisiana (Louisiana or “the State”) who

respectfully represents as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1.



This civil action arises from the blowout that occurred as the mobile offshore drilling unit

(“MODU”) Deepwater Horizon was performing temporary abandonment procedures on the

Macondo Well on April 20, 2010, catching the rig on fire and causing the rig to sink on April 22,

2010. The well blowout, explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon resulted in the

unauthorized discharge of oil, gas and other pollutants from the wellhead, through Deepwater

Horizon’s blowout preventer (BOP), lower marine riser package (LMRP) and a riser pipe, all of

Case 2:11-cv-00516-CJB-SS Document 1 Filed 03/03/11 Page 2 of 38

which were connected to the Macondo Well, into the Gulf of Mexico and ultimately into and

upon the waters and coastline of the State of Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as the “Incident”).

The oil spill is the largest marine oil spill in history with an approximate release of 4.9 million

barrels of oil, methane gas and other pollutants.

2.



The oil, gas and other pollutants discharged from the Macondo Well and from Deepwater

Horizon and its equipment (hereinafter referred to as the “Gulf Oil Spill”) invaded Louisiana’s

waters and adjoining coastline, severely damaging Louisiana’s natural resources such as wetlands,

shorelines, habitat, and wildlife, endangering the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of

Louisiana. These impacts continue. Louisiana has been, and will continue to be, profoundly

impacted by the Deepwater Horizon disaster and has incurred, and will continue to incur,

significant costs and damages.

3.



The State of Louisiana files this civil action seeking declaratory relief as to certain

Defendants’ unlimited, joint and several liability and responsibility for all removal costs and

damages to the State of Louisiana under the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., (“OPA”)

and the Louisiana Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act, La. R.S. 30:2452 et seq. (“OSPRA”).

4.



The Defendants against which the State of Louisiana seeks declaratory judgment under

OPA and OSPRA are BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP Corporation North America, Inc., BP

America, Inc., BP p.l.c. (unless stated otherwise, collectively referred to as “BP”), Anadarko

Exploration & Production LP (“Anadarko Exploration”), Anadarko Petroleum Corporation

(“Anadarko Petroleum”) (Anadarko Exploration and Anadarko Petroleum, unless stated otherwise,



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collectively shall be referred to as the “Anadarko Defendants” or “Anadarko”), and MOEX

Offshore 2007 LLC (“MOEX”).

5.



The State of Louisiana also asserts claims against all Defendants herein for civil penalties

and costs under the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, La. R.S. 30:2001 et seq., for the

unauthorized discharge of vast quantities of oil, gas and other pollutants which entered the waters of

the State of Louisiana and adjoining coastline of Louisiana as a result of the Gulf Oil Spill

beginning on or about April 20, 2010 and continuing through the present and into the future.

PARTIES

6.



The State of Louisiana is a sovereign state of the United States. Louisiana brings this action

on its own behalf to protect the State’s economic and environmental resources and revenue, and as

parens patriae on behalf of the citizens of Louisiana who have been, and will continue to be,

impacted by the Gulf Oil Spill. Louisiana has standing, as parens patriae, to seek relief from

impacts of the Defendants’ acts and omissions upon the State as well as Louisiana’s citizens.

7.



Under OPA and OSPRA, the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office (“LOSCO”), along

with other State Natural Resource Trustees, are authorized to undertake a process for assessing,

pursuing and resolving natural resource damages resulting from an oil spill. 33 U.S.C. § 2706; La.

R.S. 30:2480. The State Natural Resource Trustees are the Louisiana Department of Environmental

Quality (“LDEQ”), the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (“LDWF”), the Louisiana

Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) and “other agencies of the state of Louisiana

designated by the governor according to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 as state natural resource



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trustees.” LAC 43:XXIX.101(A). By letter dated May 20, 2010, from Governor Bobby Jindal to

President Barack Obama, Governor Jindal appointed the Louisiana Coastal Protection and

Restoration Authority (“CPRA”) as the lead trustee agency for the purposes of the Gulf Oil Spill.

(See Exhibit A: Letter from Governor Bobby Jindal to President Barack Obama, May 20, 2010).

That letter also designated LOSCO as lead administrative trustee and LDEQ, LDWF and LDNR as

additional trustees. LOSCO, CPRA, LDEQ, LDWF and LDNR are collectively referred to herein

as the “State Trustees.”

8.





The State of Louisiana and the State Trustees, through the Louisiana Attorney General,

are authorized and obligated to take affirmative action in order to protect those resources that are

held in trust for the benefit of the citizens of Louisiana. The claims for declaratory relief sought

herein against Defendants are asserted so that the State may properly and adequately protect,

assess and recover for those public resources injured by Defendants, as well as for any other

damages allowed pursuant to OPA.

9.





BP Exploration & Production, Inc. (“BP E&P”) is a foreign corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and is licensed to and is doing business in the

State of Louisiana. BP E&P conducts its deepwater drilling and completion operations through its

Gulf of Mexico Strategic Performance Unit (“GoM SPU”).

10.





BP Corporation North America, Inc. is a foreign corporation domiciled in the State of

Indiana, with its principal place of business in the State of Illinois, and which is licensed to do

business and doing business in the State of Louisiana and this District.



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11.





BP America, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the State

of Illinois and is licensed to do business and is doing business in the State of Louisiana and this

District. BP America, Inc. is the direct parent company of BP Exploration & Production, Inc.

12.





BP p.l.c. is a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in London, England,

and is doing business in the State of Louisiana and this District. BP p.l.c. has conducted continuous

and systematic activities within the United States and this District for at least the last ten years,

directly and through its wholly owned and controlled subsidiaries. Those activities are partly

responsible for the cause of the Incident as described herein. It was reasonably foreseeable that BP

p.l.c.’s activities would lead to the possibility of being sued in this District.

13.





Anadarko E&P Company, LP is a foreign business organized and existing under the laws of

the State of Delaware and is doing business in the State of Louisiana and in this District.

14.





Anadarko Petroleum Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of

the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in the State of Texas and is doing

business in the State of Louisiana and in this District.

15.





MOEX Offshore 2007, LLC is a foreign business organized and existing under the laws of

the State of Delaware and is doing business in the State of Louisiana and in this District.







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16.





Transocean Holdings LLC is a limited liability company organized and existing under the

laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal office located in the State of Texas, and is doing

business in the State of Louisiana and in this District.

17.





Triton Asset Leasing GmbH is a limited liability company organized and existing under the

laws of the Swiss Confederation, with its principal office in Zug, Switzerland, and is doing business

in the State of Louisiana and in this District. Triton Asset Leasing GmbH has conducted continuous

and systematic activities within the United States and this District for at least the last ten years.

Those activities are partly responsible for the cause of the Incident as described herein.

18.





Transocean Deepwater, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the

State of Delaware, with its principal office located in the State of Texas, and is doing business in the

State of Louisiana and in this District.

19.





Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal office located in the State of Texas, and is doing

business in the State of Louisiana and in this District.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

20.





Jurisdiction is proper in this Court under 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b), which grants the United

States District Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under the Oil

Pollution Act, without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy, and



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33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(2) which authorizes this Court to enter a declaratory judgment on liability

for removal costs or damages that will be binding on any subsequent action or actions to recover

removal costs or damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 further grants this Court the authority to declare the

rights of the parties hereto.

21.





The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the State’s civil penalty claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because these claims are so related to other claims in the action within this

Court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III

of the United States Constitution. The Court also has jurisdiction over the United States’ civil

penalty claims brought in this MDL. (See Complaint of the United States, Rec Doc. 1 in 10-cv-

04536)

22.





Venue is proper in the Eastern District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)(2) and La.

R.S. 30:2025 because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the State’s claims

occurred in this District and substantial damage occurred in that part of the State encompassing this

District.



FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The Defendants


23.





Management Service (MMS)1 through Lease Sale #206 for Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (the

BP E&P is the holder of Lease No. OCS-G 32306 granted by the United States Minerals

“Lease”). The Lease became effective on June 1, 2008. This Lease allowed the Defendants to


1 Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar changed the name of the Mineral Management Service on June 21, 2010, to the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation & Enforcement.



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drill for oil and perform oil production-related operations at the Macondo Prospect. BP

Corporation North America, Inc. was registered with MMS as the financial guarantor for BP

E&P.


Pursuant to a series of agreements, including an Assignment of Record Title Interest in

24.



Federal OCS Oil and Gas Lease, and as evidenced by the Macondo Prospect Offshore Deepwater

Operating Agreement, or Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”), filed with and approved by MMS,

BP E&P maintained a 65% ownership and operation stake in the Lease, or “Macondo Prospect,”

and assigned ownership stakes of 25% to Anadarko and 10% to MOEX. BP E&P is the

designated “operator and local agent (designated operator) with full authority to act in the

lessee’s behalf in complying with the terms of the lease and applicable regulations” pursuant to a

“Designation of Operator” for the Macondo Prospect.

25.





On or about May 22, 2009, the MMS approved BP E&P’s application for permit to drill

(APD) exploratory well No. 1 on the Macondo Prospect: the “Macondo Well”.

26.



On or around October 2009, the Defendants began drilling the Macondo Well using the

Transocean Marianas which was owned by Triton Asset Leasing GMBH, Transocean Holdings,

LLC, and/or Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc. (collectively referred to herein as

“Transocean” or the “Transocean Defendants”) and operated pursuant to one or more contractual

agreements between BP E&P and Transocean.







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27.



On or around February 2010, the MODU Deepwater Horizon, a dynamically positioned,

semi-submersible drilling rig owned and operated by the Transocean Defendants, replaced the

Transocean Marianas and the exploratory drilling operations of the Macondo Well continued

through April 9, 2010. Immediately thereafter, procedures for the temporary abandonment of the

Macondo Well were begun, and were in progress at the time of the Incident.

28.





The Deepwater Horizon rig included various pieces of operating equipment such as sub-

sea equipment and appurtenances, including, but not limited to, a blowout preventer (“BOP”), a

lower marine riser package (“LMRP”), and a marine riser and associated piping (“riser pipe”).

All of this equipment was attached to the wellhead, and was part of the facility at the time of the

Incident.

BP p.l.c. –Single Business Enterprise

29.





BP p.l.c. is a global energy company operating in eighty countries, with its headquarters

in London, England. Although BP has a myriad of corporate subsidiaries, in reality it operates

itself as a single business enterprise, through “groups” organized by industry segments. These

include Exploration & Production, Refining & Marketing, and Alternative Energy. Each group

includes a large number of corporate subsidiaries around the world, and some corporate

subsidiaries’ activities are included in more than one group.

30.





In all substantive respects, the corporate structure of BP’s subsidiaries is disregarded. BP

p.l.c. directs and controls the overall operations of its subsidiaries through its group management



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structure. For example, BP p.l.c. implemented a corporate-wide operating management system

(“OMS”) which, according to BP, “provides a single framework for all BP operations to follow,

covering all areas from process safety, to personal health, to environmental performance.” BP

also creates Group Practices (“GP”) or Group Defined Practices (“GDP”) and Engineering

Technical Practices (ETP), which require detailed operations and procedures across all BP

entities. For example, the Exploration & Production group has issued GPs for Well Operations,

Zonal Isolation, Working with Pressure, and Well Control.

31.





BP E&P is part of BP p.l.c.’s Exploration & Production group. As such, all of its drilling

and completion operations were directed and controlled by BP p.l.c. through, among other things

the OMS, and the issuance of GPs, GDPs and ETPs.

32.





Upon information and belief: (1) the corporate chain of ownership of BP E&P, through

BP America, Inc. and other entities up to BP p.l.c. gives BP p.l.c. actual working control of these

subsidiaries; (2) BP E&P, BP America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. share common directors or officers

and/or have promoted officers of these subsidiaries to officer and/or director positions at BP

p.l.c.; (3) BP p.l.c. exercises unified administrative control of its subsidiaries, including BP E&P

and BP America, Inc., through groups whose business functions are similar or supplementary;

(4) the directors and officers of BP E&P and BP America, Inc. act independently in the interest

of BP p.l.c.; (5) BP p.l.c. finances BP E&P and BP America, Inc.; (6) BP p.l.c. (or its

predecessor in name) caused the incorporation of BP E&P and BP America, Inc.; (7) BP E&P,

BP America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. use each other’s property, services, and personnel as their own;

(8) BP E&P and BP America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. share common employees; (10) BP E&P, BP



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America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. render services to each other by the employees of one corporation on

behalf of the other corporation; (11) BP E&P, BP America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. share common

offices; (12) BP E&P, BP America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. share centralized accounting; (13) BP

E&P, BP America, Inc. and BP p.l.c. file consolidated U.S. income tax returns; and (14) there is

excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate corporations.

The Defendants’ Wrongful Conduct


33.





The Incident and the resulting unauthorized discharge of oil, gas and other pollutants into

the waters and onto the land of Louisiana were caused by the acts, omissions, fault, negligence,

gross negligence, reckless, willful and wanton behavior, and/or breach of federal and state law

and regulations, by the Defendants, which renders them liable jointly and severally to Louisiana

for all of its damages as set forth below.

34.





The Defendants knew of the dangers associated with deep water drilling and failed to

take appropriate measures to prevent damage to Louisiana’s marine and coastal environments

and estuarine areas, and the State’s Coastal Zone.

35.





The Macondo Well was difficult to drill, especially in light of its location in 5,000 feet of

water. Before April 20, 2010, the well had experienced several lost circulation events and kicks.

One such event on March 8, 2010 nearly resulted in a catastrophic blowout of the well. As the

drilling went deeper, the tolerance between pore pressure and fracture gradient became

extremely tight, increasing the risk of a blowout. All Defendants knew, or should have known,

of these problems and should have taken precautions to prevent the Incident.





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36.





The Defendants failed to observe and/or comply with federal regulations and/or industry

standards including, but not limited to, federal regulations and/or industry standards regarding

the design, installation, maintenance, surveillance, repair, observation and operation of drilling

equipment and/or operations. These regulations and industry standards include 30 C.F.R. § 250

et seq., as well as American Petroleum Institute (API) recommended practices including API RP

65 and API RP 75.

37.



At the time of the Incident, the Macondo Well was months behind schedule and

significantly over budget. Defendants made and/or authorized a number of reckless decisions

concerning well design, cementing, and integrity testing in the interest of speed and cost savings,

at the expense of safety and industry best practices.

38.



BP E&P’s casing design for the Macondo Well was flawed. Before the Incident BP E&P

knew that the casing used in the Macondo Well might collapse under the high pressures

encountered in the well. Just a few weeks before the Incident, BP E&P changed the original

casing design to use a “long string” casing for the final casing string rather than a “liner/tieback”

design, which would have provided more barriers against a well blowout. BP E&P knew that the

long string design was a risky option for the Macondo Well, given the problems that had already

been encountered with the well.

39.



Before cementing the well for temporary abandonment, BP E&P elected to use only six

centralizers (which are used to center the casing in the well to avoid cement channeling), despite

notice from Halliburton, the cement contractor, that using less than 21 centralizers could cause a

severe gas flow problem.



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40.



In order to save time, BP E&P decided to forego a “bottoms up” circulation of drilling

mud before cementing the well. This would have allowed for testing the mud for gas influx,

release of gas pockets, and removal of debris from the bottom of the well so that the cement

would not become contaminated. A “bottoms up” circulation likely would have indicated the gas

flow problem that caused the Incident in time to prevent it.

41.



Because of the tight downhole pressure conditions of the Macondo Well, Halliburton

recommended the use of nitrified foam cement slurry to seal the formations in the well. BP E&P

knew, or should have known, that Halliburton’s foam cement slurry design would be unstable

and could cause nitrogen breakout. Nevertheless, BP E&P decided to use the cement slurry

before receiving the lab tests which would have indicated the instability. Given the instability of

the cement slurry design, BP E&P should have mixed fluid loss additives in the slurry mix to

prevent formation losses, but did not do so.

42.



As part of the cementing process, BP E&P used an improper base oil spacer mix just

ahead and behind the cement slurry that, coupled with the small volume of cement used, may

have contaminated the cement slurry. BP E&P knew, or should have known, that the cement

design and implementation had a very low probability of ever becoming an effective barrier to

well flow.

43.



The spacer used in the cement job was a combination of Forma-set and Form-a-squeeze

loss containment material (LCM) pills. This was leftover material that government regulations

prohibited from discharge directly into the Gulf. However, if these materials are circulated in the

well, a loophole in the regulations allowed them to be dumped overboard. BP E&P intentionally



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used these materials as a spacer in order to save the cost of having to transport them to shore and

properly dispose of them, all the while knowing that they were not designed for that application

and that cement contamination could result.

44.



After the cement job, BP E&P and Transocean ran a negative pressure test, designed to

test the integrity of the cement. The negative pressure test was abnormal. Transocean personnel

advised the well site leader that the abnormal readings were due to the “bladder effect” and that

the test results were normal. The “bladder effect” is an unknown phenomenon and both BP E&P

and Transocean had actual and/or constructive knowledge before the Incident that a negative

pressure test indicated that the cement had failed to seal the hydrocarbon-bearing formation.

Nevertheless, BP E&P and Transocean elected to ignore the abnormal test results without

shutting in the well.

45.



BP E&P had a Schlumberger team on the rig to perform a cement bond log (CBL) to test

the integrity of the cement. In spite of the abnormal negative pressure test results, BP E&P sent

the Schlumberger team home without doing the CBL. MMS regulations (30 CFR 250.428)

require the running of a CBL when there is an indication of an inadequate cement job, such as

the abnormal negative pressure test. The cement bond log test would have conclusively

determined the integrity of the cement job, and BP E&P knew that it should have been

performed and elected to violate Federal regulations requiring it.

46.



As part of its casing design and well plan, BP E&P decided not to deploy the long string

casing hanger lockdown sleeve for the long string casing before cementing the well. This

lockdown sleeve would have locked the top of the long string casing at the wellhead, thereby

providing an extra layer of protection against a blowout. The long string wellhead seal at some



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point was likely lifted out of place by pressure from below, resulting in a flow path for

hydrocarbons to escape into the Gulf of Mexico.

47.



As long as the BOP, LMRP and Marine Riser are attached to the wellhead, a conduit

directly to the rig exists through which well data will be obtained in real time. As long as a

direct conduit from the well to the rig exists, constant monitoring to ensure well control is

maintained is required. Transocean is responsible, regardless of the other operations that were

occurring, for ensuring that well control is maintained at all times. In the critical hours before

the blowout, Transocean and BP E&P decided to offload drilling mud to a waiting vessel, which

caused rig workers to become distracted and fail to properly monitor well conditions.

Additionally, the mud offloading process prohibited certain rig workers from monitoring the

Sperry Sun data. The mud offloading should have been delayed until after the well was finally

secured.

48.



Warning signs of well flow were being transmitted to the rig, to Halliburton’s Houston

office and BP E&P’s Houston office in real time for almost an hour before hydrocarbons reached

the rig, alerting rig workers to shut down the well. Nevertheless, the rig workers apparently

ignored these warning signs until it was too late. Moreover, during that critical hour before the

well blowout, there was no one at the Halliburton or BP E&P offices to monitor this data and

issue the appropriate warnings. This data was also available on any BP E&P employee’s laptop

computer yet none of them were monitoring that data.

49.



When drilling mud started gushing onto the rig floor, the vessel crew diverted the flow

from the well into the mud-gas separator (MGS), a device used to separate gas out of the

drilling fluid and vent it safely into the air in the event of a kick. The MGS vent was designed



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for small gas releases and the massive amount of gas flowing through it vented down onto the

deck of the rig, causing the explosion and fire on the rig. Another larger alternative diverter pipe

was available, which would have vented the gas overboard, making it less likely to have ignited.

The rig crew should have employed that option, but failed to do so.

50.



On information and belief, the initial explosion on the Deepwater Horizon on the night of

April 20, 2010, was caused when an engine in the rig’s engine room sucked in the gas vapors

from the MGS vent pipe, causing the engine to overspeed. Gas sensors designed to help avoid

explosions by shutting down these engines and closing air intake manifolds when flammable gas

is present were not operational on the night of the Incident. Gas alarms which would have

alerted the crew to shut down the rig had been intentionally disarmed.

51.



The rig’s Emergency Disconnect System (EDS), which was designed to separate the

vessel from the Marine Riser in case of an emergency, failed to activate, allowing gas to continue

flowing through the riser and fueling the fire on the Deepwater Horizon, resulting in her sinking

two days later.

52.



MMS regulations and industry standards required a blowout preventer as the last line of

defense to a well blowout. The regulations and industry standards mandated a minimum

configuration of annular preventers and blind sheer rams to shut off the well in the event of a

blowout. They also required backup systems and controls, as well as periodic maintenance, to

ensure that the BOP functioned when necessary.

53.





The Deepwater Horizon’s BOP and its control systems were not properly configured,

improper modifications were made to them, and they were not properly functioning at the time of



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the Incident. In addition, required inspections and maintenance on the BOP was not performed.

Rig audits of the Deepwater Horizon in September 2009 and April 2010 placed BP E&P and

Transocean on notice of these deficiencies, yet these Defendants did nothing to correct them in

time to prevent the Incident.

54.



In 2000, a chemical plant in Grangemouth, Scotland, owned and operated by a BP p.l.c.

subsidiary had a number of chemical releases and fires. A subsequent investigation by the U.K.

authorities attributed the accidents to systemic failures in BP’s safety management system. In

2005, a catastrophic explosion occurred at the Texas City, Texas refinery owned and operated by

BP America, Inc. An independent report by the Baker Commission cited BP for systemic

failures in its safety management systems. In 2006, an oil pipeline leak occurred in Alaska at a

BP America, Inc. facility. Once again, an independent report by Booz, Allen, Hamilton cited BP

for systemic failures in its safety management systems.

55.



After each of the foregoing events, BP p.l.c. announced that it was enacting sweeping

reforms to its safety management systems. As each succeeding incident occurred, these alleged

reforms did not prevent the next disaster.

56.



The latest iteration of BP p.l.c.’s safety management system is called the Operating

Management System (OMS). BP p.l.c. intended to implement its OMS in all of its divisions or

groups, including the GoM SPU division of BP E&P, before the design and drilling of the

Macondo Well. The OMS included implementation of Group Defined Practices which affected

the design and operation of the Macondo Well.







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57.



A critical element of BP’s OMS is the concept of continuous improvement of procedures

and practices. As stated by BP p.l.c. “Our performance improvement cycle is at the heart of

OMS, driving and sustaining change and improvement in local business processes. It

incorporates the concept of continuous improvement (CI), which provides the tools and frame of

mind needed to engage the entire organization in tackling challenges and ensuring that problems

are eliminated and operations run at maximum efficiency.”

58.



After the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP E&P conducted an internal investigation of the

causes of the Incident. The investigation specifically did not address systemic problems as

potential causes of the Incident. Nevertheless, recommendations by the investigative report

indicated significant failures in BP E&P’s OMS before the Incident. Had OMS been properly

implemented by BP p.l.c. at BP E&P, the problems pointed out in the recommendations of the

investigative report should have been addressed and cured before the design and drilling of the

Macondo Well, and the Incident would have been less likely to occur.

59.



BP p.l.c.’s OMS contained inherent weaknesses which did not ensure an adequate safety

management system. BP p.l.c. took on the obligation to implement OMS across its subsidiaries,

but did not insure that they properly did so. The inherent weaknesses in BP p.l.c.’s OMS and the

failure to properly implement and supervise the OMS contributed, in part, to the cause of the

Incident.

60.



The GoM SPU’s OMS document created a detailed Central Team Model responsible for

well design and management centered around two core groups: Engineering and Operations.

However, just months before the Incident, the GoM SPU rearranged its management structure.



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This led to confusion in critical decisions made affecting the management of the Macondo Well

which resulted, in part, in the Incident.

61.



According to BP E&P it gave or made available to its co-owners, Anadarko and MOEX,

documents that showed the well design and changes to the well design. BP E&P also identified

major well control events encountered during drilling operations and personnel from the co-

owners engaged in periodic communications with BP about well design and other issues related

to the well.

62.



On information and belief, Anadarko and MOEX were aware of design choices for the

well, including the decision to use a so-called “long string casing”, and how many centralizers

were being used to stabilize the long string, rather than the safer alternative of hanging a liner to

the lower end of the casing with a “tieback.”

63.



The operating agreement among BP E&P, Anadarko and MOEX: (1) required that copies

of all APDs, IADC daily reports, core data, logs, surveys, all digitally recorded data, well test

results, bottomhole pressure surveys, hydrocarbon analyses, drilling prognoses, and forty-eight

(48) hours’ advance notice of logging, coring, or testing operations be provided to Anadarko and

MOEX; (2) gave Anadarko and MOEX the right to request copies of any HSE audits conducted

of the drilling operations on the subject well; (3) gave Anadarko and MOEX the right of access

to activities and operations and access to Operator’s HSE files as provided for in this Operating

Agreement; (4) gave Anadarko and MOEX the right to request the Operator to present to the

Non-Operators, at a meeting called in accordance with the Operating Agreement, a sufficient

overview of its Health, Safety and Environmental Management systems to evidence compliance

with an effective Health, Safety & Environmental Management Plan or Plans, in accordance with



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API RP75, or an equivalent standard, including Operator’s internal policies, for all operations

conducted under the Operating Agreement; (5) required Anadarko and MOEX to give

cooperation and support to the Operator to:


a) design and manage activities or operations to standards intended to achieve

sustained reliability and promote the effective management of HSE risks;


b) apply structured HSE management systems and procedures consistent with those
generally applied in the petroleum industry to effectively manage HSE risks and
pursue sustained reliability of operations under this Agreement; and

c) conform with locally applicable HSE related statutory requirements that may

apply.

64.





The foregoing contractual rights and obligations placed Anadarko and MOEX in the

position of being able to oversee all of the operations at the Macondo Well and to intervene to

prevent the Incident from occurring. Anadarko and MOEX failed to properly exercise their

rights or obligations under the operating agreement which caused, in part, the Incident.

65.



Prior to the Incident, all Defendants had actual and/or constructive knowledge of

significant problems related to the Deepwater Horizon’s equipment, its maintenance, and the

negligent design and operation of the Macondo Well.

66.



One or more of the foregoing actions or inactions constitute violations of federal

regulations, particularly 30 C.F.R. § 250, et seq.

67.



The Defendants’ failure to observe and/or comply with federal regulations and/or

industry standards include, but is not limited to, federal regulations and/or industry standards



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regarding the design, installation, maintenance, surveillance, repair, observation and operation of

the Defendants’ equipment and/or drilling operations.



The Disaster and its Impact on Louisiana

68.



BP initially reported a leak of approximately 1,000 barrels a day on April 24, 2010.

However, this figure was grossly underestimated and was replaced by exponentially growing

figures on a repeated basis. Ultimately, after analysis of video footage of the oil leak, a

government panel determined that the oil was flowing out of the well at a rate of at least 20,000

to 40,000 barrels a day, or 1.7 to 2.5 million gallons a day.

69.



Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal declared a state of emergency on April 29, 2010,

requesting additional resources from the federal government to assist the State in preparations for

the impacts of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Governor Jindal’s declaration was based upon

the “predicted impact of oil along the Louisiana coast leaking from the Deepwater Horizon

which threatens the state’s natural resources, including land, water, fish, wildlife, fowl and other

biota, and likewise threatens the livelihoods of Louisiana’s citizens living along the coast which

increases the economic impact of this incident.”

70.



Repeated efforts to curtail or stop the flow of oil leaking from the Macondo Well failed

until approximately 87 days after the initial explosion, with an estimated discharge of 4.9 million

barrels making this the largest oil spill in history.





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71.





On or around April 30, 2010, oil began washing up on the shoreline of Venice, Louisiana

and nearby beaches. On May 6, 2010, federal, state and BP officials confirmed that oil was

found on the beach at Chandeleur Islands, a small group of uninhabited barrier islands northeast

of the Mississippi Delta.

72.





On May 31, 2010, the Secretary of the LDEQ issued to BP Exploration and Production,

Inc. a Consolidated Compliance Order and Notice of Potential Penalty, which ordered BP to

immediately take any and all measures necessary to eliminate the unauthorized discharge of oil

and other pollutants into waters and property located in the State of Louisiana, and to remediate

all oil contaminated media to the extent practicable. Similar compliance orders were issued to

the Transocean defendants on October 12, 2010.

73.





Oil, gas and other pollutants from the spill have, in one or more forms, invaded, and

continue to invade, Louisiana’s reedy freshwater, brackish and saline wetlands, and continue to

impact new areas of Louisiana coastline. Louisiana’s marshes, wetlands, shores, ecology,

economy, tourism, fisheries, waters, and wildlife have been and will continue to be profoundly

impacted by the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Southern Louisiana has 40% of the nation’s

coastal wetlands. These wetlands provide a range of goods and services, including flood control,

water purification, storm buffer, wildlife habitat, nursery grounds for aquatic life, and

recreational areas. Hundreds of miles of shoreline have been impacted by the oil spill.

Additional impacts will continue as the oil washes ashore and further saturates the wetlands it

has reached.



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74.





In response to the spill, Louisiana closed a considerable amount of fishing areas within its

territorial waters, which has further impacted the approximately 27,000 Louisianans employed

by the seafood industry. Louisiana’s shellfish industry has been especially damaged, as the State

has been forced to close oyster beds along over one hundred miles of coastline. At considerable

expense, Louisiana continually samples oysters from open beds - along with other seafood - to

ensure that the public is protected.

75.





In addition to Louisiana’s fishery closures, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) began prohibiting all commercial and recreational fishing, including

catch and release, in federal waters between the mouth of the Mississippi River to waters off

Florida’s Pensacola Bay on May 2, 2010. As the oil continued to spread, NOAA expanded the

area closed to fishing on a regular basis.

76.



Louisiana has a $3 billion fishing industry and is the source of a third of the seafood

consumed in the United States, according to the Louisiana Seafood Marketing and Promotion

Board, a state-run agency. The negative impact of this spill on Louisiana fishermen, processors,

charter boat operators, home ports and supporting infrastructure, such as cold storage, marinas,

boatyards, suppliers, repair yards and transportation businesses, will be long-lasting and

profound.

77.



Other natural resources have been injured or destroyed as a result of this spill, including

birds, sea turtles, and marine mammals, as well as the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the State



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of Louisiana, including the biota, benthic communities, marine organisms, coral, fish, and water-

column habitat.

78.





The State of Louisiana has suffered, and will continue to suffer, extensive damage to its

natural resources as well as to its real and personal property, loss of subsistence use of its natural

resources, loss of taxes, rents, royalties and fees due to the injury to, loss or destruction of its real

property, personal property and natural resources. Further, Louisiana, through its agencies, has

incurred substantial costs in responding to this disaster and providing increased and additional

public services.

79.





The State of Louisiana has incurred substantial removal and response costs. Pursuant to

33 U.S.C. § 2701(30), “removal activities” include not only removal of oil from water and

shorelines, but also “the taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate

damage to the public health or welfare, including but not limited to fish, shellfish, wildlife, and

public and private property, shorelines and beaches.” See also, La. R.S. 30:2454(25)(identifying

removal costs).

80.





The State of Louisiana has sustained, and will continue to sustain, “removal costs” and

“damages” as defined by the OPA and OSPRA.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Against BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants

Declaratory Judgment That Defendants Are Jointly, Strictly and Severally

Liable For Costs and Damages under OPA



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81.



Paragraphs 1 through 80 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

82.



This Count is alleged against the BP, Anadarko and MOEX entities identified as

Defendants herein in paragraphs 9 through 15 above.

83.



The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a federal court to declare the rights and other legal

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration in an actual controversy within its

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

84.



The facts and circumstances alleged herein present an actual and existing controversy

between the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants and the Plaintiff.

85.





OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., as enacted in 1990, establishes a strict liability scheme

which holds responsible parties strictly liable for damages and removal costs related to oil spills.

OPA also provides that each responsible party for a vessel or facility from which oil is discharged

“into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable

for the removal costs and damages . . . that result from such incident.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).

86.





Responsible parties for an offshore facility include the lessee or permittee of the area in

which the facility is located or the holder of a right to use and easement granted under applicable

state law or the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., for the area in

which the facility is located. Responsible parties also include any person owning, operating, or



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demise chartering the vessel. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32).

87.





As a result of the various contractual and other agreements alleged and identified herein,

and the corporate relationships among the parties, the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are

responsible parties within the meaning of OPA, and are jointly and severally responsible to the

State of Louisiana for removal costs and damages, as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2), including

(1) all removal costs; (2) damages to natural resources; (3) damages to real or personal property; (4)

subsistence use of natural resources; (5) net loss of revenues to a state or political subdivision

thereof; (6) lost profits and earning capacity; and (7) damages for net costs of providing increased or

additional public services during or after removal activities.

88.





Louisiana has incurred, and will continue to incur, removal costs related to the unauthorized

discharge or threat of discharge of oil, gas and other pollutants and the costs related to preventing,

mitigating, and minimizing oil pollution which has impaired or threatens to impair Louisiana’s

waters, coast line, and natural resources.

89.





The BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are strictly liable for damages to natural

resources belonging to, held in trust by, managed by, controlled by or appertaining to the State of

Louisiana. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(2). Natural resources are broadly defined and include “land, fish,

wildlife, biota, air, water, groundwater, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging

to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by…any State.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 2701(20). The measure of natural resource damages is the cost of restoring, rehabilitating,

replacing or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged natural resources; the diminution in value of



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those natural resources pending restoration; plus the reasonable costs of assessing those damages.

33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1).

90.





The BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are strictly liable to Louisiana for damages

associated with injury to, or economic losses resulting from the destruction of real or personal

property owned or leased by the State. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B).

91.





The BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are strictly liable to Louisiana for lost revenues

associated with the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to the injury,

destruction, or loss of real property or natural resources. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D).

92.



The BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are strictly liable to Louisiana for net costs of

providing increased or additional public services during or after removal activities, including

protection from fire, safety, or health hazards caused by the discharge of oil. 33 U.S.C. §

2702(b)(2)(F).

93.





The actions and inactions of the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants, as described

above constitute gross negligence and/or willfull misconduct and/or constitute violations of

Federal safety, construction or operating regulations. Therefore, the BP, Anadarko and MOEX

Defendants’ liability pursuant to OPA is unlimited pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (c)(1)(A) and 33

U.S.C. § 2704 (c)(1)(B).







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94.



Plaintiff requests that this Court enter a Declaratory Judgment finding that the BP,

Anadarko and MOEX Defendants have unlimited joint, several and strict liability under OPA for

the State of Louisiana’s removal costs and damages resulting from the Deepwater Horizon

disaster, and that Plaintiff is entitled to relief as set forth above, and such further relief as may be

deemed appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 28 U.S.C. § 2202, et seq.

95.





Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq., and Rule 57 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(2), Plaintiff seeks a

judicial declaration, which shall be binding on subsequent actions by Plaintiff to recover

damages and removal costs, that the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are responsible

parties under OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. and are liable for all removal costs and

damages arising out of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

COUNT II

Against BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants

Declaratory Judgment That Defendants Are Jointly, Strictly and Severally

Liable For Costs and Damages under OSPRA



96.



Paragraphs 1 through 95 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

97.



This Count is alleged against the BP, Anadarko and MOEX entities identified as

Defendants herein in paragraphs 9 through 15 above.





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98.





The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a federal court to declare the rights and other legal

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration in an actual controversy within its

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

99.





This suit is ripe for adjudication as there exists a real controversy between the State of

Louisiana, which has been damaged because of the oil spill, and the BP, Anadarko and MOEX

Defendants.

100.



Louisiana has suffered significant injury to its natural resources and has incurred and will

continue to incur costs related to removal of the oil as well as economic damages associated with

the disaster.

101.

OPA does not preempt states from imposing additional requirements or liability for the

discharge of oil. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2718(a)(1) and 2718(c)(1).

102.



The Louisiana Legislature recognized Louisiana’s unique exposure to oil spills when it

enacted OSPRA, La. R.S. 30:2451, et seq.; La. R.S. 30:2452(A). In passing OSPRA, the

Legislature expressly recognized the constitutional duties of the State of Louisiana to “protect,

conserve and replenish the natural resources of [Louisiana].” La. R.S. 30:2453(A) (citing La.

Const. art. IX Sec. 1). Louisiana’s constitutional duty of protecting the environment is based on

the public trust doctrine which is recognized in the State Constitution. Article IX, Section 1 of

the Louisiana Constitution provides:



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The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful,
scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health,
safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement
this policy.

OSPRA applies “in the event that an unauthorized discharge of oil or the substantial threat of an

unauthorized discharge of oil to state waters results in injury to natural resources.” LAC

43:XXIX.101(A).

103.



Responsible parties under OSPRA include “[t]he owner or operator of a vessel or

terminal facility from which an unauthorized discharge of oil emanates or threatens to emanate.”

La. R.S. 30:2454(22)(a). Responsible parties also include any person “who causes, allows, or

permits an unauthorized discharge of oil or threatened unauthorized discharge of oil.” La. R.S.

30:2454(22)(c).

104.

The BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants were each owners and/or operators of the

Macondo Well and the Deepwater Horizon rig and as such are responsible parties under OSPRA.

See La. R.S. 30:2454(20).

105.



Additionally the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants each caused, allowed or

permitted the unauthorized discharge of oil from the Macondo Well and Deepwater Horizon rig.

As such, they are responsible parties under OSPRA. See La. R.S. 30:2454(22)(c).







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106.



OSPRA defines “discharge of oil” broadly to include “an intentional or unintentional act

or omission by which harmful quantities of oil are spilled, leaked, pumped, poured, emitted, or

dumped into or on coastal waters of the state or at any place where, unless controlled or

removed, they may drain, seep, run, or otherwise enter coastal waters of the state.” La. R.S.

30:2454(7).

Under the provisions of OSPRA, the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants as

107.





responsible parties, are strictly, jointly, and severally liable for this oil spill.

108.

Plaintiff request that this Court enter a Declaratory Judgment finding that the BP,

Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are jointly, severally and strictly liable under OSPRA for the

State of Louisiana’s removal costs and damages resulting from the Deepwater Horizon disaster,

and that Plaintiff is entitled to relief as set forth above.

COUNT III

Against All Defendants

Civil Penalties for Violations of the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act

109.

Paragraphs 1 through 108 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

This Count is alleged against all Defendants identified herein.

110.







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111.

La. R.S. 30:2072 provides that the waters of the state of Louisiana are among the State's

most important natural resources and their continued protection and safeguard is of vital concern

to the citizens of this State.

112.

La. R.S. 30:2076(A)(1) prohibits the discharge into any waters of the State of any waste

or any substance of any kind that will tend to cause water pollution in violation of any rule,

order, or regulation. La. R.S. 30:2076 (A)(3) prohibits the violation by an person of any rule or

regulation adopted under the Louisiana Water Control Law, La. R.S. 30, Subtitle II, Chapter 4 or

under authority of that Subtitle.

113.

Defendants caused and/or allowed the unauthorized discharge of oil, gas and other

pollutants into the waters and onto the coastline of the State of Louisiana. Defendants’

unauthorized discharge of pollutants constitute continuing violations of La. R.S. 30:2075, La.

R.S. 30:2076(A)(1)(a) and (A)(3) and LAC 33:IX.1701.B.

114.



La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(1)(a) authorizes the assessment of civil penalties against each

Defendant of not more than thirty two thousand five hundred dollars ($32,500) for each day of

violation of the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act. A penalty of up to $50,000 may be

assessed against each Defendant for each day of violation of a compliance order issued by

LDEQ. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(2). However, when any such violation is done intentionally,

willfully, or knowingly or results in a discharge or disposal which causes irreparable or severe

damage to the environment or if the substance discharged is one which endangers human life or



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health, such person may be liable for an additional penalty or not more than one million dollars

($1,000,000) for each penalty event. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(1)(a); LAC 33:I.703; LAC 33:I.705.

For violations lasting more than one 24-hour day, each such day of violation may be treated as a

separate penalty event. LAC 33:I.703.A.

115.



The presence of oil, gas and other pollutants in Louisiana coastal waters continues to this

day, and has caused severe damage to the environment, endangering human life and health, and

is likely to continue to do so for an unspecified period of time, in violation of Louisiana law.

116.



As a result of Defendants violations, each Defendant is liable under La. R.S. 30:2025 for

a civil penalty of not more than $32,500 for each day of violation ($50,000 for each day of

violation of a compliance order issued by LDEQ), and for an additional penalty of not more than

$1,000,000.00 for each day of violation.

117.

The State of Louisiana further requests an award of costs incurred in this litigation,

including attorney fees, to the extent recoverable under the Louisiana Environmental Quality

Act.







COUNT IV

Against All Defendants

Recovery of Response Action Costs



118.

Paragraphs 1 through 117 are realleged and incorporated herein by reference.

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119.

This Count is alleged against all Defendants identified herein.

120.

The State has incurred response action costs associated with the discharge. Many of

these costs have not been paid by Defendants to date.

121.

As of February 15, 2011, the State has incurred at least $ 342,612 in unpaid response

costs. The State will continue to incur response costs in the future.

122.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 30:2025, Defendants are liable to the State for response action costs

the State incurs in responding to the discharge.

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

123.

The full extent of the costs expended and damages suffered by the State of Louisiana is

not yet known. The investigation of other potential claims and parties continues, as does the

assessment of environmental and economic damages as well as the performance of removal

activities. The State of Louisiana reserves its right as provided by law, including but not limited

to 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(2), to amend this Complaint and/or file subsequent complaints under OPA

or any other theory of law, statutory or otherwise, to assert claims for removal costs, damages,

penalties or any other legal and/or equitable remedies, against the Defendants named herein

and/or any other additional parties.

WHEREFORE, the State of Louisiana respectfully prays that this Court enter judgment

PRAYER FOR RELIEF



34







Case 2:11-cv-00516-CJB-SS Document 1 Filed 03/03/11 Page 35 of 38

in its favor and against Defendants, and that the Court:

1.

Enter an order declaring that the BP, Anadarko and MOEX Defendants are

responsible parties pursuant to OPA and OSPRA, and are jointly, severally, and

strictly liable, along with all other responsible parties, for unlimited removal costs

and damages resulting from the Deepwater Horizon disaster pursuant to the

Declaratory Judgment Act and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

Enter judgment against each Defendant and award the State of Louisiana civil

penalties of not more than $32,500 for each day of violation, up to $50,000 for

each day of violation of a compliance order and an additional penalty of not more

than $1,000,000.00 for each day of violation with legal interest from the date of

judicial demand until paid.

3.

Enter judgment against all Defendants and award the State of Louisiana its unpaid

response action costs in the amount of at least $ 342,612 with legal interest from

the date of judicial demand until paid.

4.

Enter judgment against all Defendants and in favor of the State of Louisiana,

ordering Defendants to reimburse the State for all reasonable costs it may incur

responding to the oil spill described herein.

5.

6.

Retain jurisdiction of this action to ensure compliance with its orders.

Award Plaintiff’s costs incurred in pursuing this action, including attorney fees as

allowed by law; and

7.

Order such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate.







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Case 2:11-cv-00516-CJB-SS Document 1 Filed 03/03/11 Page 36 of 38


Dated this 3rd day of March, 2011.

Respectfully submitted,










JAMES D. “BUDDY” CALDWELL
LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL

James Trey Phillips
First Assistant Attorney General
Megan K. Terrell
Assistant Attorney General
Section Chief –Environmental
State of Louisiana
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
Telephone: (225) 326-6708

HENRY DART,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW P.C.

/s/ Henry T. Dart
Henry T. Dart
Grady J. Flattmann
510 N. Jefferson St.
Covington, LA 70433
Telephone: (985) 809-8093
Special Counsel for Plaintiff
Attorney General, State of Louisiana

SHOWS, CALI, BERTHELOT &
WALSH, LLP

/s/ E. Wade Shows
E. Wade Shows
628 St. Louis Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
Telephone: (225) 346-1461
Special Counsel for Plaintiff
Attorney General, State of Louisiana






KANNER & WHITELEY, LLC

/s/ Allan Kanner
Allan Kanner
Elizabeth B. Petersen
David A. Pote
701 Camp Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
Telephone: (504) 524-5777
Special Counsel for Plaintiff
Attorney General, State of Louisiana


USRY, WEEKS, &
MATTHEWS, APLC

/s/ T. Allen Usry
T. Allen Usry
1615 Poydras St.
Suite 12
New Orleans, LA 70112
Telephone: (504) 592-4641
Special Counsel for Plaintiff
Attorney General, State of Louisiana

MARTEN LAW FIRM, PLLC

/s/ Bradley M. Marten
Bradley M. Marten
Linda R. Larson
1191 Second Avenue
Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 292-2600
Special Counsel for Plaintiff
Attorney General, State of Louisiana






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DEFENDANT WAIVER OF SERVICE SOUGHT:

BP Exploration and Production
Through their Registered Agent
CT Corporation System
5615 Corporate Blvd.
Suite 400B
Baton Rouge, LA 70808

BP Corporation North America Inc.
Through their Registered Agent
The Prentice-Hall Corp. System
320 Somerulos Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802

BP America Inc
Through their Registered Agent
C T Corporation System
5615 Corporate Blvd.
Suite 400B
Baton Rouge, LA 70808

BP p.l.c.
International Headquarters
1st James’s Square
London
SW1Y 4PD

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation
Through their Registered Agent
C T Corporation System
5615 Corporate Blvd.
Suite 400B
Baton Rouge, LA 70808

Anadarko E&P Company, LP
Through their Registered Agent
C T Corporation System
5615 Corporate Blvd.
Suite 400B
Baton Rouge, LA 70808

MOEX Offshore 2007 LLC
9 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1220
Houston, TX 77046, USA




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Case 2:11-cv-00516-CJB-SS Document 1 Filed 03/03/11 Page 38 of 38

Transocean Holdings LLC
4 Greenway Plaza, Suite 700
Houston, TX 77046

Triton Asset Leasing GmbH
c/o Managing Director, Robert Bowden
Turmstrasse 30
Zug, ZG 6300 Switzerland, Europe

Transocean Deepwater, Inc.
4 Greenway Plaza
Houston, TX 77046

Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling
4 Greenway Plaza
Houston, TX 770406












[K&W 5694]



38