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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JASON PRAVETTONE and
DANIELLE PRAVETTONE,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CARGOTEC OYJ, a foreign profit corporation,
CARGOTEC USA, INC., a foreign profit
corporation, HAB Inc., d/b/a CARGOTEC
USA, Inc., a foreign profit corporation,
and OLSERGS GROUP, individually and
d/b/a OLSBERGS HYDRAULICS AB,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Case No. 13-11716

HON. AVERN COHN

GRANTING DEFENDANT CARGOTEC OYJ’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PERSONAL JURISDICTION (Doc. 7)

AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT OLSBERGS HYDRAULICS AB AND OLSBERGS GROUP

D/B/A OLSBERGS HYDRAULICS AB’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

PERSONAL JURISDICTION (Doc. 6)

I. Introduction

This is a products liability case. Plaintiff Jason Pravettone is suing multiple

defendants asserting product liability claims for design and manufacturing defects,

breach of warranties, and failure to warn/inadequate warnings relating to a mobile

crane. The complaint alleges that plaintiff was injured while operating a crane with a

remote control. Plaintiff says that the crane and/or the remote control did not perform

properly, causing plaintiff to be struck with the load, fall, and sustain serious injuries.

Plaintiff’s wife, Danielle Pravettone, has asserted a claim for loss of consortium.

Before the Court are separate motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

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filed by Cargotec Oyj and Olsbergs Hydraulics AB and Olsbergs Group d/b/a Olsbergs

Hydraulics AB. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted.

II. Background

A. General

On January 19, 2010, plaintiff was working for his employer, Square Deal

Building Supply. He was operating a HIAB crane1 with a remote control loading pallets

of shingles onto the roof of a home. Plaintiff was positioned on the roof and wore the

remote control in a “vest-like” manner to place two pallets of shingles on the roof. During

the unloading process, the crane and/or its remote control “malfunctioned or was

inadvertently activated” which caused the crane arm to move the load, striking plaintiff

and knocking him off of the roof, resulting in injuries.

Plaintiff named the following defendants:

Cargotec Oyj
Cargotec USA, Inc.
HIAB, Inc. d/b/a Cargotec USA, Inc.
Olsbergs Group, individually
Olsbergs Group, d/b/a Olsbergs Hydraulics AB

B. Jurisdictional/Liability Allegations

As to Cargotec Oyj, the complaint alleges that

Cargotec Oyj was a foreign, profit corporation with its global headquarters
located at Porkkalantaku 5, FI-0051, Helsinki, Finland. The complaint also
alleges that Cargotec Oyj designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed
and/or sold HIAB cranes and/or remote control units across the United
States, including in the County of Macomb, State of Michigan, and
therefore Cargotec Oyj was at all times relevant to this lawsuit doing
business in the County of Macomb Sate of Michigan.

1A HIAB crane is known in the industry as a loader crane. It is generally

described as a hydraulically powered articulated boom/ arm fitted to a truck or trailer
and is used for loading/unloading.

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Complaint at ¶ 2.

The allegations as to Olsbergs Group are substantially the same:

Olsberg Group (“Olsbergs”) was and is a foreign, profit corporation . . . had its
principle place of business in Eksjo, Sweden; Olsbergs designed, manufactured,
marketed, distributed, and sold HIAB cranes and/or remote control units in
States, including in the County of Macomb, State of Michigan, and therefore
Olsbergs was at all times relevant to this lawsuit doing business in Michigan.

Id. at ¶ 5.

As to Olsbergs Hydraulics AB, the complaint alleges:

Olsbergs Hydraulics AB was and is a foreign, profit corporation . . . had its
principle place of business in Eksjo, Sweden; Olsbergs Hydraulics AB
designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold HIAB cranes
and/or remote control units in States, including in the County of Macomb,
State of Michigan, and therefore Olsbergs was at all times relevant to this
lawsuit doing business in Michigan.

Id. at ¶ 6.2

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

When bringing an action in federal court, the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that jurisdiction exists. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th

Cir. 1991) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct.

780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936)). The district court has discretion to either; “decide the

motion upon the affidavits alone; it may permit discovery in aid of deciding the motion;

or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions.”

Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458.

When the Court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing the plaintiff need only

2The complaint makes virtually the same jurisdictional allegations as to all of the

defendants. That is, that each defendant “designed, manufactured, marketed,
distributed, and sold HIAB cranes and/or remote control units” in the United States and
Michigan.

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make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Kroger Co. v. Malease Foods

Corp., 437 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2006). “[W]e do not weigh the facts disputed by the

parties but instead consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

although we may consider the defendant's undisputed factual assertions.” Conn v.

Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir.2012) (emphasis added). Here, the motions will

be decided based upon the complaint and the affidavits submitted.

Importantly, when a court resolves the issue as to whether it has personal jurisdiction on

the basis of written submissions alone, the plaintiff “may not rest on [her] pleadings to

answer the movant's affidavits, but must set forth, by affidavit and otherwise ... [set

forth] specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Serras v. First Tennessee

Bank National Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989). If the pleadings and

affidavits set forth the facts with sufficient particularity, a court must ignore contrary

assertions by a defendant. Id. at 1215.

IV. Personal Jurisdiction

All defendants have challenged the assertion that the Court has properly

exercised personal jurisdiction over them. In a diversity case—as here—a court must

determine if personal jurisdiction is appropriate by examining the law of the state in

which the district court sits and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002). In

Michigan, there are two “long-arm” statutes which authorize an exercise of personal

jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. General personal jurisdiction exists over any

corporation that is incorporated in Michigan, consents to jurisdiction, or engages in a

continuous and systematic business activity within the state. Mich. Comp. Laws §

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600.711. Limited personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant who has

developed certain minimum contacts with the forum state but only over the claims which

arise from or relate to those contacts. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715; Theunissen v.

Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1460 (6th Cir. 1991). All defendants contend that both

general and limited personal jurisdiction is lacking. The Court will address each

defendant in turn below.

V. Cargotec Oyj

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

Regarding general personal jurisdiction under M.C.L. § 600.711, Cargotec Oyj

asserts that plaintiffs have not alleged that it is incorporated under Michigan law or that

it has consented to an exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. The Court agrees.

Cargotec Oyj has attached the Declaration of Outi Aaltonen, General Counsel of

Cargotec Oyj. He affirmatively states that Cargotec Oyj is not incorporated in the State

of Michigan; rather Cargotec Oyj exists by virtue of the laws of the country of Finland.

(Aaltonen Declaration at ¶¶ 2, 13) In addition, Cargotec Oyj has not consented to and

does not consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. (Id. at ¶ 40) Therefore,

this Court does not have general jurisdiction over Cargotec Oyj under M.C.L.

§600.711(1) and (2). Additionally, Cargotec Oyj does not carry on “continuous and

systematic” activities in the State of Michigan so as to be “present” in Michigan. (Id. at ¶

40). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated or otherwise cast doubt on Cargotec Oyj’s

assertions as to its lack of activity in Michigan. Therefore, there is no general

jurisdiction under M.C.L. § 600.711(3).

B. Limited Personal Jurisdiction

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Limited personal jurisdiction is analyzed under Michigan’s “long arm” statute,

M.C.L. § 600.715. Limited personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a defendant who

has certain minimum contacts with the forum over claims that arise from or relate to

those contacts. Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1459–61. Under the Michigan statute, limited

personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a corporation that has one of the following

relationships with the state:

(1) The transaction of any business within the state.
(2) The doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the
state resulting in an action for tort.
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real or tangible personal property
situated within the state.
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at
the time of contracting.
(5) Entering into a contract for services to be performed or for materials to be
furnished in the state by the defendant.

M.C.L. § 600.715. A single contact with the forum state may suffice for personal

jurisdiction if it is directly and substantially related to the plaintiff's claim. Red Wing

Shoe Co., Inc. v. Hockerson–Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir.1998).

The due process requirements parallel to some extent the terms of the statute. The

Sixth Circuit has developed a three part analysis to determine whether sufficient

minimum contacts exist to confer jurisdiction:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in
the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause
of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the
defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant reasonable.

Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d at 890 (internal quotation omitted). Under the first prong,

“purposeful availment” means that a defendant's “contacts proximately result from the

actions by the defendant that create a substantial connection with the forum State.”

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Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528

(1985) (emphasis in original). This purposeful availment requirement “ensures that a

defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or

attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id. at

475.

Here, plaintiffs have not made a showing that Cargotec Oyj “purposefully availed”

itself of the privilege of doing business in Michigan. As noted above, Cargotec Oyj has

not transacted any business in Michigan. It has not “deliberate[ly] under[taken] to do

our cause[d] an act or thing to be done in Michigan.” Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers

Insurance Co., 404 Mich. 134, 153, 273 N.W.2d 811 (1978) (defining purposeful

availment). As Aaltonen’s Declaration makes clear, Cargotec Oyj is a foreign company

incorporated under the laws of Finland, with its principal place of business in Helsinki,

Finland. (Aaltonen Declaration at ¶¶ 2, 13) Cargotec Oyj is not presently, and has

never been, licensed to do business in the State of Michigan, and has never sought any

qualification to conduct business within this State. (Id. at ¶ 16) Cargotec Oyj does not

have, and has never had, any direct affiliated corporate entity that maintains an office or

conducts business in this State. (Id. at ¶ 20) Cargotec Oyj does not have, and has

never had, a designated agent for service of process in the State of Michigan. (Id. at ¶

15) Cargotec Oyj does not maintain, and has never maintained, any offices, bank

accounts, telephone listings, assets, or personal or real property in the State of

Michigan. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-25) Cargotec Oyj does not and has never owned any stock,

security, or negotiable or non-negotiable instrument in the United States. (Id. at ¶ 26)

Cargotec Oyj does not have, and has never had, any directors, officers, employees, or

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agents who are assigned to duty in Michigan, or who participate in the purchase, sale,

distribution, resale, financing, or service of goods or services in Michigan. (Id. at ¶¶

17-19) Cargotec Oyj does not send, and has never sent, representatives to the State of

Michigan for service or repair of any products, to assist in the assembly or installation of

any products, or to attend business meetings. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-32) Cargotec Oyj does not

sell products over the Internet to customers in the United States or in the State of

Michigan, and does not solicit, and has never solicited, business or advertised in

Michigan. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29) Cargotec Oyj does not have, and has never had, any

directors, officers, employees, business agents or representatives that are or were

involved in the sale or marketing of products sold in Michigan. (Id. at ¶ 19) Cargotec Oyj

does not have any financial ties to the State of Michigan. (Id. at ¶ 34) Simply stated,

Cargotec Oyj has no presence in the State of Michigan and has no contacts whatsoever

with the State of Michigan; it is in fact a Finland holding company that has no

connection with Michigan.

In response to Cargotec Oyj’s motion, plaintiffs contend that they need to

conduct jurisdictional discovery and therefore say that the motion is premature. The

Court disagrees. Based on the record, as one court has said in rejecting a similar

argument “the lack of jurisdiction is clear and discovery would serve no purpose.”

Macomb County Board of Commissioners v. Stellarone Bank, 2010 WL 891247, *4

(E.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2010). See also Carribean Broadcasting Sys. Ltd. v. Cable &

Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1089–90 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying a long-arm statute

similar to Michigan's and collecting decisions denying discovery where the plaintiff has

failed to present any jurisdictional facts or “colorable basis for jurisdiction” in response to

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a motion to dismiss and supporting affidavit or where the plaintiff relies on “mere

speculation” or unsupported “hope” that discovery will uncover inaccuracies in a

defendant's affidavit.) Plaintiffs have not put forward any jurisdictional facts, but rather

simply speculate that discovery could establish personal jurisdiction. This is insufficient

reason to deny Cargotec Oyj’s motion.

VI. Olsbergs Hydraulics AB’s and Olsbergs Group d/b/a Olsbergs Hydraulics AB

A. Proper Defendant

“Olsbergs Group d/b/a/ Olsbergs Hydraulics AB” is a non-entity. As explained in

the Declaration of Jan-Erik Steen, Olsbergs Group has never had a certificate of

standing, articles of incorporation or any corporate form, any tax status owners or

operations, or been a registered business in Sweden or any other jurisdiction. As such,

it is DISMISSED. The proper defendant is Olsbergs Hydraulics AB (Olsbergs).

B. Waiver

As an initial matter, plaintiffs contend that Olsbergs waived the right to contest

personal jurisdiction because counsel filed a general appearance in this case. Olsbergs

argue that plaintiffs have relief on a “misleading technicality.” Because waiver is a

threshold issue, the Court will address it first.

Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the general attorney appearances, filed for

Olsbergs on April 16, 2013 by the law firm of Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone,

P.L.C. (Miller Canfield), constitutes a waiver of Olsbergs’ personal jurisdiction

challenge.3 In support, plaintiffs cite Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514 (6th Cir.

3The Court puts aside the fact that this argument is inconsistent with the plain

language of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(h)- -entitled “Waiving and Preserving Certain
Defenses”--which does not mention entries of appearance and nothing to indicate that

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2011). In Gerber, the Sixth Circuit held that the defendants waived their personal

jurisdiction defense because defendants had filed a general appearance nearly three

years before filing the jurisdictional motion to dismiss. Id. at 518-19. Within those three

years, the Sixth Circuit highlighted the extent of the defendants’ participation in the

proceedings prior to filing the motion to dismiss, which included: filing a motion to stay

litigation pending arbitration; filing a motion to vacate a default judgment previously

entered against defendants; filing an opposition motion to plaintiff's motion for

mediation; participation in a case management conference with the court; filing a motion

for an extension of time to file discovery responses; filing a motion to enforce a

settlement agreement; serving Rule 26 discovery responses; and participating in a

pre-trial conference with the court. Id. In finding that defendants waived the right to

challenge personal jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit states that “[o]nly those submissions,

appearances and filings that give ‘P]laintiff a reasonable expectation that [Defendants]

will defend the suit on the merits or cause the court to go to some effort that would be

wasted if personal jurisdiction is later found lacking’ . . . . result in waiver of a personal

jurisdiction defense.” Id. at 519 (citing Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia

Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010)). The Sixth

Circuit found that the defendants’ filing of the general appearance alone was sufficient

to meet the above criteria when viewed under the circumstances.

The Court is not inclined to interpret the holding in Gerber to stand for the

proposition, as plaintiffs suggest, that the that the filing of a general appearance is

filing a “general” rather than "special" appearance could waive a personal jurisdiction
defense.

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dispositive on whether a personal jurisdiction defense is waived. Indeed, the Sixth

Circuit has recently confirmed that Gerber does not call for the return of the mechanical,

pre-Rule 12, “special” appearance requirement in evaluating whether a general

appearance waives the defense of personal jurisdiction. In King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d

650, 659 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit explained

We recently clarified the test for finding forfeiture of a personal-jurisdiction
defense through conduct: we ask whether a defendant’s conduct prior
to raising the defense has given the plaintiff “a reasonable
expectation” that the defendant will defend the suit on the merits or
whether the defendant has caused the court to “go to some effort
that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later found lacking.”
Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mobile
Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex,
P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010)). We consider all of the relevant
circumstances. Hamilton, 197 F.3d at 61. Recognizing that service of
process is simply the means by which a defendant receives notice of an
action and is formally brought within a court's jurisdiction, whereas
personal jurisdiction concerns the fairness of requiring a defendant to
appear and defend in a distant forum, we agree with the Second Circuit
that, as between the two defenses, it is relatively easier to find forfeiture of
a service defense. See id., 197 F.3d at 60; Datskow v. Teledyne, Inc.,
899 F.2d 1298, 1303 (2d Cir.1990).

King, 694 F.3d at 659 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

In King, the fact that the defendant undertook “voluntary, active, and extensive”

participation in the case, including discovery, until the motion for summary judgment

stage--led the Sixth Circuit to find defendant waived the right to contest personal

jurisdiction. Thus, the test for waiver is not based on the technicality of the appearance

filing. Id. at 660-61. Rather, the test is whether the plaintiff had a “reasonable

expectation” that the defendant, based on its conduct, would defend the suit on the

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merits or that the court expended wasted effort. Id.4

Applying the “reasonable expectation” test, Olsbergs have not waived a personal

jurisdiction defense. As explained in the Affidavit of W. Mack Faison, Exhibit A to

Olsbergs’ reply, on April 16, 2012, Olsbergs’ retained local counsel, Miller Canfield,

along with Baker & McKenzie LLP, contacted Steve Brock, counsel for plaintiffs. In

accordance with Local Rule 7.1, Olsbergs’ counsel informed Brock that Olsbergs did not

consent to personal jurisdiction and was not filing an answer, but was instead filing a

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Later that same day, Olsbergs,

through Miller Canfield, sought timely removal to federal court from state court (Macomb

County Circuit Court). Following Local Rule 83.20(f),5 which requires that “local counsel

must enter an appearance in the case,” Miller Canfield filed appearances on that same

day of April 16. Olsbergs filed its Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss with this Court the

following week, on April 23, 2013. Moreover, the Court held a status conference with

the parties on April 26, 2012, at which the pending motions were discussed, including

setting a briefing schedule for plaintiffs’ response and defendants’ reply. Counsel for

Olsbergs also requested a stay of merits discovery until the jurisdictional issue was

4Plaintiffs also cite M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, No. 11-2167

(6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished) Putting aside that the opinion is unpublished and
therefore not precedential, King, which is published, confirms that the test under Gerber
is based on the plaintiff's “reasonable expectation” that the defendant, based on its
conduct, will defend the suit on the merits. See King, 694 F.3d at 659. Moreover, M &
C is distinguishable from this case on the facts: the M & C litigation had lasted more
than twenty years before the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was filed. Id. at
slip op 2-5. Here, the time frame was one week. Under the facts of this case, plaintiffs
simply cannot maintain that Olsbergs would defend the suit on its merits.

5E.D. Mich. LR 83.25 does not distinguish between types of appearances,

suggesting that various types of conduct, such as filing a pleading, can constitute an
appearance.

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resolved. Under these circumstances, Olsbergs did not waive the right to contest

personal jurisdiction simply because Miller Canfield filed a general appearance.

C. Personal Jurisdiction

Turning to the merits of the motion, the first question is whether general or limited

personal jurisdiction is present. It is not. As explained in the Declaration of Christina

Henriksson (Exhibit B to Olsbergs Motion), Olsbergs is not incorporated in Michigan and

does not consent to jurisdiction in Michigan. (Henriksson Declaration at ¶¶ 1, 17).

Olsbergs, as a foreign corporation, has no direct contacts with Michigan, much less a

“continuous and systematic” relationship with Michigan. Olsbergs is located in Sweden,

has no offices in the United States (Id. at ¶ 16). It is not registered to do business in

Michigan and has never had any registered agents or employees in Michigan. (Id. at ¶

17). It has no sales representatives in the United States, including Michigan. (Id. at ¶

18). It is a Swedish company that sells exclusively to European entities (Id. at ¶¶ , 8,

10). It has never conducted, transacted, or solicited business in Michigan. (Id. at ¶¶ 13,

19, 20). It has never made a direct sale within the United States, including Michigan.

(Id. at ¶ 7). Moreover, Olsbergs has never advertised in Michigan or make its products

for sale in Michigan through the internet. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 20). It does not own any real

estate in Michigan. (Id. at ¶ 21).

Pertinent to this case, Olsbergs admits that manufactured a remote control

system.6 However, it sold the system to co-defendant HIAB, a Finnish company, for

assembly into HIAB cranes at HIAB’s manufacturing facility in Spain. Olsbergs has no

6Attached as Exhibit A is an excerpt from Olsbergs website which describes its

remote control system.

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knowledge what county, much less a specific state, the final cranes were to be

distributed. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11, 12, 13). Olsbergs says it has never addressed a warranty

claim in the United States and has sent no employees to the United States. (Id. at ¶

24). Any warranty claims against it are handled by HIAB in Finland or through HIAB’s

factory in Spain. (Id. at ¶ 8). This case marks the first time Olsbergs learned of an

allegation of a defective crane, carrying an Olsbergs component part, being operated in

Michigan. (Id. at ¶ 24).

As the above makes clear, the Court does not have general or limited personal

jurisdiction over Olsbergs. Olsbergs is a component-part manufacturer who placed its

product into the stream of commerce which eventually ended up in a finished product

that made its way to Michigan. It is no different from the defendant in Asahi Metals

Industry Co., Ltd v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102(1987). In Asahi Metals,

the defendant was a Japanese company who manufactured valve stems in Japan and

sold them to several tire manufacturers. One such tire manufacturer was a company in

Taiwan. Defendant shipped its part to Taiwan where it was incorporated into a finished

tire product and sold by the Taiwanese company to companies all over the world,

including the United States and California. At some point, a products liability lawsuit

was filed in California against the Taiwanese company following a motorcycle accident

allegedly caused by a defective tire. The Taiwanese company sought to bring

defendant into the lawsuit for indemnification purposes. The issue before the Supreme

Court was whether personal jurisdiction existed over defendant in California. The

Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction over defendant was lacking. Relevant to

this case, the Supreme Court explained:

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The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is
not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. .
. . But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will
sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of
placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed
toward the forum State.

Asahi Metals, 480 U.S. at 112.7

Here, as in Asahi Metals, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Olsbergs

would not be reasonable or consistent with due process. Moreover, no amount of

discovery is going to change the fact that personal jurisdiction is lacking.

VII. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Cargotec Oyj’s and Olsbergs’ motions to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction are GRANTED. Cargotec Oyj and Olsbergs are

DISMISSED as parties in the case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2013

S/Avern Cohn
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of
record on this date, July 30, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Sakne Chami
Case Manager, (313) 234-5160

7That is not to say that the personal jurisdiction in today’s commercial world may
be changing. In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011), Justice
Ginsberg in a dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan, asked: “Is it not
fair and reasonable, given the mode of trading of which this case is an example, to
require the international seller to defend at the place its products cause injury?” J.
McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2800 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (footnote omitted).

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