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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

Case No.: C09-1557 (MJP)













NOTED FOR HEARING:

March 18, 2010, 10:00 a.m.

v.

Plaintiff,

DORAL BANK PUERTO RICO, on Behalf of Itself
and All Others Similarly Situated,





WASHINGTON MUTUAL ASSET ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION; DAVID BECK; DIANE NOVAK;
THOMAS LEHMANN; STEPHEN FORTUNATO;
DONALD WILHELM WAMU CAPITAL
CORPORATION; MOODY’S INVESTORS
SERVICES, INC.; THE MCGRAW-HILL
COPMANIES, INC.; FIRST AMERICAN
CORPORATION and FIRST AMERICAN
EAPPRAISEIT, LLC,



Defendants.










The Honorable Marsha J. Pechman




REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF APPOINTMENT OF

DORAL BANK PUERTO RICO AS LEAD PLAINTIFF AND APPROVAL

OF ITS SELECTION OF LEAD COUNSEL AND IN FURTHER OPPOSITION TO

THE COMPETING MOTION SUBMITTED BY THE GREATER

PENNSYLVANIA CARPENTERS PENSION FUND

No. C09-1557-MJP

TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, Washington 98101
TEL. 206.682.5600 ? FAX 206.682.2992


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TABLE OF CONTENTS



I. Doral Bank, the Presumptive Lead Plaintiff, Has Sufficiently Shown It Meets

Rule 23’s Requirements .......................................................................................................... 1


II. PA Carpenters Has Failed to Rebut the Presumption in Favor of Doral

Bank with Proof of the Any Alleged Inadequacy ................................................................... 2


III. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 8





































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CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Baughman v. Pall Corp.,

250 F.R.D. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ...............................................................................................2

Blackie v. Barrack,

524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) .....................................................................................................3

Cortese v. Radian Group Inc., S.A., et al.,

No. 07-3773 (MAM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6958 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) ..........................8

Ferrari v. Impath, Inc.,

No. 03 Civ. 5667, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13898 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004).........................3, 8

In re Bally Total Fitness Sec. Litig.,

No. 04-cv-3530, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2005) .................................8

In re Cavanaugh,

306 F.3d. 726 (9th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................1

In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,

264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001)...............................................................................................2, 3, 8

In re Crayfish Co. Sec. Litig.,

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10134, No. 00 Civ. 6766, 2002 WL 1268013 (S.D.N.Y. June
6, 2002) ......................................................................................................................................1

In re Doral Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.,

No. 05-MD-01706 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006) ............................................................................7

In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig.,

754 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1990) .............................................................................................4

In re Michaels Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig.,

No. 03-cv-246, Slip Op. (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2003) ..................................................................5

In re Network Associates, Inc., Sec. Litig.,

76 F. Supp.2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ........................................................................................8

In re Surebeam Corp Sec. Litig.,

No. 03-cv-1721, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25022 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2003) ..............................7

Levie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

496 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Ill. 2007) .........................................................................................8


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Lipetz v. Wachovia Corp,

No. 08-cv-6171, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1008279 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2008) .............................1

Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc.,

No. 07-cv-5101, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32764 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) ..............................8

Montoya v. Herley Indus.,

No. 06-2596, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83343 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2006) ....................................8

Nelson v. Woods, et al.,

No. 07-cv-1807 (MJP) (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2007) ..................................................................5

Schonfield v. Dendreon Corp.,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2008) .......................................................2

Sczesny Trust v. KPMG LLP,

223 F.R.D. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ...............................................................................................2

Sofran v. LaBranche & Co. Inc.,

220 F.R.D. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ...............................................................................................3

Strougo v. Brantley Capital Corp.,

243 F.R.D. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ...............................................................................................3

United States v. Levis,

No. S1 08 Cr. 181 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010) ..................................................................7

Vladimir v. Bioenvision,

No. 07-cv-6416, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93470 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2007) ..............................3

Weinberg v. Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc.,

216 F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ...............................................................................................1

Weltz v. Lee,

199 F.R.D. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ...............................................................................................1

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS

15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a) ...................................................................................................................1, 2, 3


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In accordance with the Court’s Minute Order dated March 11, 2010, Plaintiff Doral Bank

Puerto Rico (“Doral Bank”) respectfully submits this reply memorandum of law in further

support of its motion for appointment of Lead Plaintiff and approval of its selection of Lead

Counsel, and in further opposition to the competing motion submitted by the Greater

Pennsylvania Carpenters Pension Fund (the “PA Carpenters”) and their counsel, Coughlin Stoia

Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP (“Coughlin Stoia”).

I.

Doral Bank, the Presumptive Lead Plaintiff, Has Sufficiently

Shown It Meets Rule 23’s Requirements

The PA Carpenters concede that, under the dictates of the Private Securities Litigation




Reform Act (“PSLRA”), Doral Bank, as a result of a financial interest that dwarfs that of PA

Carpenters, is the presumptive lead plaintiff. See PA Carpenters Memorandum of Law in

Further Support and in Opposition (“PA Carpenters Opp. Mem.”) at 2. See also Doral Bank

Memorandum of Law in Further Support and in Opposition (Doral Bank Opp. Mem.”), at 2; In

re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d. 726, 730 (9th Cir. 2002) (the presumptive lead plaintiff is “the one who

has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class and otherwise satisfies the

requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(a)(B)(iii)(1).



At this stage of the case, a presumptive lead plaintiff “must make only a preliminary

showing that the adequacy and typicality requirements under Rule 23 have been met.” Lipetz v.

Wachovia Corp, No. 08-cv-6171, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1008279, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2008),

In re Crayfish Co. Sec. Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10134, No. 00 Civ. 6766, 2002 WL

1268013, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2002); Weltz v. Lee, 199 F.R.D. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In

fact, a “wide ranging analysis under Rule 23 is not appropriate [at the lead plaintiff stage of the

litigation] and should be left for consideration of a motion for class certification.” Weinberg v.

Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 248, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Moreover, “both the

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statutory structure and the legislative history suggest that the court’s initial inquiry as to whether

the movant with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements need not be

extensive” and “should be confined to determining whether such movants have stated a prima

facie case of typicality and adequacy. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 264 (3d Cir.

2001). All the presumptive lead plaintiff must do at this stage is demonstrate: (1) its interests

are in common with, and not antagonistic to, those of the proposed class; and (2) its counsel are

qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation. See Schonfield v. Dendreon

Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2008).



Doral Bank has already made the requisite showing time and again. See Doral Bank

Opp. Mem. at 6; Doral Bank Opp. Mem. at 2-3; See also Doral Bank Memorandum of Law in

Support (Doral Bank Mem. in Support”), at 8-9. Doral Bank’s interests in prosecuting this

litigation are identical to those of the other class members wishing to obtain the appropriate relief

for Defendants’ participation in material misstatements and omissions in connection with the

issuance of billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities sold to the Class. Thus, Doral has

more than satisfied its burden at this stage of the litigation.

II. PA Carpenters Failed to Rebut the Presumption in Favor


of Doral Bank with Proof of Any Alleged Inadequacy


As set forth above, in order to rebut the presumption of lead plaintiff under the PSLRA, it

is definitively clear that evidentiary proof of inadequacy must be presented. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (“The presumption described in subclause (I) may be rebutted only upon proof

by a member of the purported plaintiff class…”) (emphasis added); see also, Baughman v. Pall

Corp., 250 F.R.D. 121, *18-19 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Schonfield, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76816, at

*12-13 (W.D. Pa Oct. 4. 2007); Sczesny Trust v. KPMG LLP, 223 F.R.D. 319, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y.

2004) (“[C]onclusory assertions of inadequacy are, however, insufficient to rebut the statutory

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presumption under the PSLRA without specific support in evidence of the existence of an actual

or potential conflict of interest or a defense to which [the potential lead plaintiff] would be

uniquely subject”); Vladimir v. Bioenvision, No. 07-cv-6416, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93470

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2007); Strougo v. Brantley Capital Corp., 243 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y.

2007) (“Speculation and conjecture from one interested party is not enough to prove a nefarious

collaboration.”); Sofran v. LaBranche & Co. Inc., 220 F.R.D. 398, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

(emphasizing that the PSLRA requires proof of inadequacy and not mere speculation). A

competing movants’ conjecture and exaggerated factual allegations are insufficient to rebut the

presumption in favor of Doral as the most adequate plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-

4(a)(3)(B)(iii); Ferrari v. Impath, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 5667, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13898, at *6

(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2004) (“innuendo and inferences” are insufficient to rebut presumption).

Thus, the question is not “whether another movant might do a better job of protecting the

interests of the class than the presumptive lead plaintiff; instead the question is whether anyone

can prove that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not do a ‘fair and adequate’ job.” In re

Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268 (refusing to overturn the presumption based on unsupported allegations

that lead counsel had been retained through “pay-to-play” practices).

Initially, PA Carpenters seek to disqualify Doral Bank as the presumptive lead plaintiff

on the basis that Doral Bank is an “insider in the subprime mortgage and securitization markets.”

PA Carpenters Opp. Mem. at 2. However, to insinuate that a presumptive lead plaintiff’s

experience or expertise in an area of finance is sufficient grounds for disqualification is similar to

the failed attempts of pre-PSLRA defendants to disqualify sophisticated lead plaintiffs as

atypical. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975) (“differences in

sophistication, etc., among purchasers have no bearing in the impersonal market fraud context”);


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In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 802 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting argument that

simply because of its status as a sophisticated investor the proposed lead plaintiff was atypical of

the class and subject to unique defenses).



Next, PA Carpenters label Frank W. Baier (“Baier”) as a former Doral Corp. Director

who was also a Washington Mutual “insider,” leaving Doral Bank in 2008 to “concentrate on his

role as Special Advisor to Washington Mutual’s President and Chief Executive Officer” and

spending “2008 in the upper echelon of Washington Mutual’s decision making apparatus.” See

PA Carpenters Opp. Mem. at 3, 8. These facts, as represented to the Court by counsel for PA

Carpenters, could not be further from the truth.1



PA Carpenters’ offer of “proof” for the veracity of these statements is Doral Corp.’s

September 12, 2008 and May 18, 2009 Forms 8-K filed with the SEC which, contrary to PA

Carpenters’ argument, show that:

On September 12, 2008, Frank W. Baier resigned from the Board of Directors of
Doral Financial Corporation in order to serve as Special Advisor to the newly
appointed Chief Executive Officer of Washington Mutual, Inc., and where he
remained for a period of less than one month; and

On May 13, 2009, Frank W. Baier was reappointed to Doral Corp’s Board of
Directors.


See O’Mara Decl. Exs. 7 and 8 (emphasis added).



Thus, PA Carpenters attempt to “spin” Mr. Baier’s 22-day stint at Washington Mutual,

Inc. during the bank’s last ditch attempts to recover from a downward spiral that ultimately

resulted in the company’s bankruptcy as a debilitating conflict. Furthermore, this 22-day period

occurred after Washington Mutual’s devastating losses and potential failure was disclosed to the

1
Specifically, the PA Carpenters’ implication that Baier spent an entire year in
“Washington Mutual’s decision making apparatus” is misleading and plainly false. Doral
Corp.’s own Forms 8-K, O’Mara Decl. Exs. 7-8, make clear that Baier did not “spend 2008” at
Washington Mutual, but instead spent less than one month there.

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public, and occurred as the bank was about to be seized by the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision

in September 2008.2



Further compounding their already inaccurate factual assertions, the PA Carpenters assert

that “[a]s a former Washington Mutual insider, Mr. Baier is likely to have had access to insider

information as well as confidential and/or proprietary information” which purportedly

disqualifies Doral as lead plaintiff. The PA Carpenters ask the Court to make an illogical leap

with this allegation. They offer no proof that Baier was privy to any relevant information

deriving from his 22 days advising the new CEO more than one year after the last mortgage-

backed security offering that is the subject of this suit was issued. Moreover, the PA Carpenters

also offer wholly inapplicable case law in support. In In re Michaels Stores, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.

03-cv-246, Slip Op. (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2003), the lead plaintiff movant, himself a former

employee of the defendant proven to have access to non-public information was found

inadequate to serve as lead plaintiff. However, the rationale of Michaels is stretched impossibly

thin when PA Carpenters suggest that an employee of a movant, in this case a $10 billion-asset

financial institution, and not the movant itself, could in effect disqualify an entire organization

because of his previous and largely irrelevant employment history and absent any indication he

had access to relevant and timely insider information.



Next, PA Carpenters attack Doral Bank’s adequacy based on the purported fact that

Marangal I. Domingo (“Domingo”) is currently serving as the Bank’s treasurer. PA Carpenters

Opp. Mem. at 3. As “proof” that Domingo’s position makes Doral Bank inadequate, PA

2
In fact, the first mortgage-backed securities case against Washington Mutual, filed on
August 4, 2008, was already several weeks before Baier left Doral Bank to assist Washington
Mutual’s newly appointed CEO through the final stages of the bank’s life. See New Orleans
Employees’ Retirement System and MARTA/ATU Local 732 Employees Retirement Plan v.
Washington Mutual bank, et al., Case No. 08-2-26210-3 SEA (Sup Ct. Wa. King Co. Aug. 4,
2008).

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Carpenters cite a September 11, 2006 SourceMedia news article describing Domingo as a former

Executive Vice President for Finance and Strategy for Countrywide’s banking subsidiary who

worked at Washington Mutual, Inc. during the late 1990’s through January 2004. As shown

below, PA Carpenters’ claim again amounts to nothing more than erroneous accusations and

insinuations devoid of any proof.



First, Domingo’s time at Washington Mutual pre-dated the origination of the loans

underlying the securities at issue in this action as well as the related Boilermakers National

Annuity Trust Fund v. WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR1, et al., No.

09-cv-0037 (MJP) (W.D. Wa) (the “Boilermakers Action”). In fact, virtually all of the loans

involved in these two actions were originated in 2006 and 2007, long after Domingo’s

involvement with Washington Mutual ended. See generally, WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through

Certificates, Series 2007-OA5, Form 424B5 Prospectus Supplement, May 22, 2007, at s-126

(stating that the year of initial monthly payments was 2006 and 2007).3 In addition, Domingo

left Doral in March 2009. See Barangaro Decl. in Further Support and in Opposition, dated

March 8, 2010 (“Barangaro Decl.”), at 4. Thus, he is not Doral Bank’s “current treasurer” as the

PA Carpenters contend.



PA Carpenters’ next claim Doral is inadequate because its former treasurer, Mario S.

Levis’ (“Levis”), was indicted for securities and wire fraud that was allegedly committed during

2002 and 2005. The PA Carpenters describe Mr. Levis’ wrongdoing as “Doral’s dissemination

of false and misleading statements concerning mortgage pass-through certificates.” See O’Mara


3
The relevant pages of the WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-OA5
Prospectus Supplement are attached as Exhibit (“Ex.”) A to the Declaration of Steven J. Toll in
Further Support and in Opposition (“Toll Decl.”), dated March 16, 2010. Counsel has reviewed
the prospectus supplements for each of the certificate offerings and can confirm that each of the
prospectus supplements make virtually the same representation.

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Decl. Exs. 5-6 (emphasis added). Once again, there are numerous holes in the PA Carpenters’

attacks.



First, at no point in the 32-page indictment, annexed as Exhibit 5 to the O’Mara Decl.,

does the term “mortgage pass-through certificates” or any equivalent even appear. See O’Mara

Decl., Ex. 5. That is because the indictment, as well as In re Doral Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., No.

05-MD-01706 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006), cited by PA Carpenters as “proof” that Doral Bank

“engaged in mortgage-related abuses similar to what is alleged [in the instant action],” in no way

dealt with mortgage loan securitizations similar to those at issue herein. As previously stated in

Doral’s Opposition Mem., United States v. Levis, No. S1 08 Cr. 181 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,

2010) and In re Doral both concerned alleged GAAP violations by Doral Corp. related to its

recording of interest to be paid on mortgages sold by the company – known as an interest-only

strips (“IO Strips”) – as a gain on the sale of the mortgages. PA Carpenters’ use of terms like

“mortgage-related” and “securitization practices” cannot transform those matters into anything

relevant to the current action. See PA Carpenters Response Mem. at 5. The current action

concerns alleged misstatements and omissions related to underwriting guidelines in the creation

of mortgage-backed securities by WaMu in violation of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities

Act of 1933, and has nothing to do with the proper accounting methods for recording interest

income. As already stated above, no amount of baseless insinuations or misleading accusations

can transform entirely irrelevant issues into “proof” of inadequacy.



The cases upon which the PA Carpenters rely are equally inapposite. For example, in In

re Surebeam Corp Sec. Litig., No. 03-cv-1721, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25022 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 31,

2003), one of an aggregated group of four individual plaintiffs was found to be inadequate

because the President and principal representative was subject to over sixty current complaints to


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securities regulators.” Surebeam, 2003 Dist. LEXIS 25022, at *22. Unlike Surebeam, Doral

Bank is not the subject of any current complaints or investigations.4 In In re Bally Total Fitness

Sec. Litig., No. 04-cv-3530, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, *19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2005), the

court rejected the presumptive lead plaintiff when competing movants offered documentary

proof that the presumptive lead plaintiff, as an “in-and-out trader” who purchased and sold all of

its stock during the class period long before the alleged fraud was revealed would not be able to

prove loss causation. In re Bally, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *17-18. In holding the

presumptive lead plaintiff to be inadequate, the Court found that, not only was the issue of loss

causation vital to any securities action under the PSLRA, but also that the defendant had

submitted a brief in response to lead plaintiff motions stating its intention to assert such a

defense. Id. at *18. Unlike In re Bally, PA Carpenters here have not identified any defense

resulting from these purported conflicts, that would be unique to Doral Bank. Instead, as stated

above, it only alleges non-existent conflicts unsupported by any evidentiary proof and not tied to

any actual, or relevant issue that could cause a conflict.5


4
For the same reasons, the PA Carpenters reliance on In re Network Associates, Inc., Sec.
Litig., 76 F. Supp.2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999) is similarly inapplicable. In Network Associates, the
presumptive lead plaintiff was, at the time of their motion, under investigation for criminal fraud.
This is simply not the case with Doral Bank, who no-longer employs any of the individuals who
were at anytime involved with any alleged wrongdoing. See also, Levie v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 944, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (allowing appointment of a lead plaintiff who had
been sanctioned by the National Association of Securities Dealers); Montoya v. Herley Indus.,
No. 06-2596, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83343, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2006) (allowing the
appointment of a lead plaintiff who had settled fraud charges with the SEC),
5
Courts have soundly rejected lead plaintiff challenges based upon innuendo and
supposition. In re Cendant, 264 F.3d at 268 (rejecting lead plaintiff challenge based on
unsupported accusations that the presumptive lead plaintiff and proposed lead counsel had
engaged in pay-for-play practices); Mohanty v. Bigband Networks, Inc., No. 07-cv-5101, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32764, *21-22 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) (rejected lead plaintiff challenge
against a foreign entity based on unsupported assertions that the foreign government might not
enforce a U.S. judgment); Ferrari, No. 03-cv-5667, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13898, at *6
(rejecting lead plaintiff challenge based on baseless insinuations of conflicts and self-dealing by
directors of the presumptive lead plaintiff)

REPLY MEMO OF LAW IFSO APPOINT. OF LEAD PLTF. & APPROVAL
OF LEAD COUNSEL & IN OPP. TO COMPETING MOTION
No. C09-1557-MJP

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III. Conclusion

Doral Bank, as the presumptive lead plaintiff with the largest financial interest, has

sufficiently shown its claims are typical of those of the Class and it is adequate to represent the

class. PA Carpenters has failed to present any proof rebutting this presumption, instead choosing

to fill the void with bald assertions and unreasonable insinuations that do not demonstrate

otherwise. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in their memoranda of law in support of

their motion to appoint lead plaintiff, Doral Bank respectfully submits that the Court should

reject the competing motion by the PA Carpenters and enter the previously submitted Proposed

Order appointing Doral Bank as Lead Plaintiff and approving the Bank’s choice of counsel,

Cohen Milstein, as Lead Counsel in the Action.

DATED: March 16, 2010








Respectfully submitted,





COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC

/s/ Christopher Lometti
Christopher Lometti (pro hac vice)
Joel P. Laitman (pro hac vice)
Daniel B. Rehns (pro hac vice)
Kenneth M. Rehns
150 East 52nd Street, 30th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Tel: 212-838-7797
Fax: 212-838-7745
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]

Steven J. Toll
Julie Reiser, WSBA #27485
1100 New York Ave, N.W.
Suite 500 West
Washington D.C. 20005




REPLY MEMO OF LAW IFSO APPOINT. OF LEAD PLTF. & APPROVAL
OF LEAD COUNSEL & IN OPP. TO COMPETING MOTION
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Tel: 202-408-4600
Fax: 202-408-4699
[email protected]
[email protected]

Proposed Lead Counsel

TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC

/s/ Nancy A. Pacharzina
Kim D. Stephens, WSBA #11984
Nancy A. Pacharzina, WSBA #25946
1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98101-4416
Tel: 206-682-5600
Fax: 206-682-2992
[email protected]
[email protected]

Proposed Liaison Counsel








REPLY MEMO OF LAW IFSO APPOINT. OF LEAD PLTF. & APPROVAL
OF LEAD COUNSEL & IN OPP. TO COMPETING MOTION
No. C09-1557-MJP

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 16, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk

of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all the

registered users of the CM/ECF system for this case.















/s/ Nancy A. Pacharzina,
Kim D. Stephens, P.S., WSBA #11984
Email: [email protected]
Nancy A. Pacharzina, WSBA # 25946
Email: [email protected]
Counsel for Plaintiffs
TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC
1700 Seventh Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, Washington 98101-4416
Tele: 206.682.5600
Fax: 206.682.2992


REPLY MEMO OF LAW IFSO APPOINT. OF LEAD PLTF. & APPROVAL
OF LEAD COUNSEL & IN OPP. TO COMPETING MOTION
No. C09-1557-MJP

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