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EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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THE HONORABLE JAMES L. ROBART











UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON and
STATE OF MINNESOTA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD TRUMP, in his official
capacity as President of the United
States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; JOHN
F. KELLY, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; REX W.
TILLERSON, in his official capacity
as Secretary of State; and the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.


STATE OF OREGON,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,

v.

DONALD TRUMP, et al.,

Intervenor-Defendants.



Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR


EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION


ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Motion Noted: March 14, 2017

Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 1 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

i ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .............................................. 2
A. After President Trump Issued the First Executive Order, this Court and
Other Courts Enjoined Key Provisions on Multiple Grounds ........................... 2
B. The Second Executive Order Adopts “The Same Basic Policy” as the
First and Retains Two Key Provisions Enjoined by this Court ......................... 3
III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 5
A. This Court’s Preliminary Injunction Remains In Effect .................................... 5
B. This Court Has Broad Authority to Enforce Its Injunction ............................... 5
C. Sections 6(a) and 2(c) of the Second Executive Order Are Covered by
This Court’s Prior Injunction ............................................................................. 6
1. Sections 6(a) and 2(c) implement again conduct that this Court
enjoined ...................................................................................................... 6
2. Defendants’ cursory justifications for reinstating these policies in
the face of the Court’s injunction fail ......................................................... 7
a. Renumbering a policy does not allow enjoined conduct .................... 8
b. Exempting permanent residents and visa-holders does not
remove the enjoined provisions from the scope of the
injunction ............................................................................................ 8
c. Possible waivers do not exempt the Second Executive Order
from the injunction............................................................................ 10
d. Defendants’ cited cases do not allow them to ignore the
injunction .......................................................................................... 11
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 12


Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 2 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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I. INTRODUCTION
Injunctions are not suggestions. When a court enjoins a defendant from enforcing
policies, the defendant cannot evade the injunction by announcing that it will continue only
some of the illegal policies. Yet that is what Defendants attempt here. The Court should reject
this attempt to evade its authority and should exercise its broad power to enforce its injunction.
On February 3, this Court enjoined Defendants from enforcing five policies contained
in Executive Order 13769 (First Executive Order). Despite Defendants’ attacks, the Ninth
Circuit refused to modify the injunction in any way. Yet on March 6, President Trump signed
Executive Order 13780 (Second Executive Order), reinstating two of the enjoined policies.
Specifically, although this Court enjoined Section 5(a) of the First Executive Order,
which suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, the Second Executive Order
reinstates a materially identical provision in Section 6(a). This Court also enjoined Section 3(c)
of the First Executive Order, which barred entry of individuals for 90 days from seven Muslim-
majority countries. Yet Section 2(c) of the Second Executive Order largely reinstates this ban.
While the new section differs from the original by excluding Iraqis, lawful permanent
residents, and visa-holders, it bars entry for virtually all other individuals from the listed
countries, including: relatives of U.S. citizens, students who have been admitted to state
universities, prospective employees of state universities and private businesses, and many
others. This Court’s original injunction protected these individuals and institutions, and the
Ninth Circuit rejected Defendants’ request to narrow the injunction to exclude them.
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017).
Defendants have announced that on March 16 they intend to reinstate these policies that
this Court enjoined. But if Defendants wish to implement policies that this Court enjoined, they
must move to modify this Court’s injunction under well-settled rules. Until they do so, they
cannot escape the injunction and continue their illegal conduct. The Court should hear this
motion at its earliest opportunity, enforce its injunction, and uphold the rule of law. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 3 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

2 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. After President Trump Issued the First Executive Order, this Court and Other
Courts Enjoined Key Provisions on Multiple Grounds
President Trump campaigned on the promise of “a total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States.” First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 42-43, Ex. 1, ECF No. 18
(Am. Compl.).1 Although he was repeatedly asked to reconsider this promise, he refused.2 Put
simply, “[the ‘Muslim ban’ was a centerpiece of the president’s campaign for months.” Aziz v.
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-116-LMB/TCB, 2017 WL 580855, at *8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017).
One week after his inauguration, President Trump acted on his campaign promise by
issuing the First Executive Order. Am. Compl. ¶ 49, Ex. 7. He confirmed that the First
Executive Order was meant to “follow[] through” on his campaign promise. See ECF No. 113-
4 at 9 (“I’m here following through on what I pledged to do. That’s all I’m doing.”); see also
id. at 13 (“I keep my campaign promises.”). His advisors confirmed that the First Executive
Order was meant to fulfill the campaign promise. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 61, Ex. 17 (citing
advisor’s statement that the executive order was designed to be a “legal” ban on Muslims).
On February 3, this Court enjoined five sections of the First Executive Order. ECF
No. 52 at IV(1)(a)-(e). The Court found that the States had established: (1) both proprietary
and parens patriae standing; (2) that they were “likely to succeed on the merits of the claims
that would entitle them to relief”; (3) that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an
injunction; and (4) that the equities and public interest tipped in their favor. ECF No. 52 at 4-5.
Defendants sought an emergency stay, but the Ninth Circuit declined to stay the injunction or
alter it in any respect. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151. In particular, the Ninth Circuit

1 Filed concurrently with this motion is a motion seeking leave to file a Second Amended Complaint with
additional allegations and parties. That motion has not been ruled upon, and all citations are therefore to the First
Amended Complaint.
2 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47, Exs. 4-5 (refusing to “pull-back” the Muslim ban; instead, referring to
“extreme vetting” as “an expansion” of his position); ECF No. 113-2 at 18 (declining to “rethink” his position in
the Republican primary debate); ECF No. 113-1 ¶ 4 (responding to a question about his position on Muslims after
being elected: “You know my plans. All along, I’ve been proven to be right”); see also Am. Compl. ¶ 43, Ex. 1
(noting that President Trump’s call for a Muslim ban remains available on his campaign website to this day). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 4 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

3 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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refused Defendants’ request to narrow the injunction to cover only lawful permanent residents
and other previously admitted aliens who wished to travel. Id. at 1166. Defendants have since
abandoned their appeal and it has been dismissed. 9th Cir. ECF Nos. 186-87.
Many other courts agreed with this Court and the Ninth Circuit that the First Executive
Order was likely unconstitutional.3 In particular, the district court for the Eastern District of
Virginia issued a detailed opinion reviewing the history of the President’s statements regarding
the order and holding that the plaintiff State of Virginia was “likely to succeed on an
Establishment Clause claim.” Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *8.
B. The Second Executive Order Adopts “The Same Basic Policy” as the First and
Retains Two Key Provisions Enjoined by this Court
After being restrained from implementing the First Executive Order, President Trump
issued a second. According to his senior staff, the revisions in the Second Executive Order are
intended to address only “very technical issues” and achieve “the same basic policy outcome”
as the first. ECF No. 113-5 at 3 (statements of Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller); see also
ECF No. 113-6 at 16 (statement of White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer on March 6 that,
“if you think about it, the principles of the executive order remain the same”). In the words of
the President’s spokesman: “the goal is obviously to maintain the way that we did it the first
time.” ECF No. 113-7 at 24. President Trump likewise tied the Second Executive Order to his
previous campaign promises, sending a fundraising email the day that he signed the Second
Executive Order citing it as an example of keeping a campaign promise and again emphasizing
its focus on “radical” Muslims. See ECF No. 113-8 at 3.
The Second Executive Order reinstates two key provisions enjoined by this Court.


3 Federal courts in the following other cases have enjoined parts or all of the travel ban: Arab Am. Civil
Rights League v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-10310, ECF 8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017) (order granting permanent
injunction, in part); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, ECF 8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (order granting stay
of removal and TRO); Vayeghan v. Kelly, No. 2:17-cv-00702, ECF 5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017) (granting TRO);
Mohammed v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-00786, ECF 7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (granting TRO). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 5 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

4 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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The first reinstated provision is the 120-day suspension of the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program. Section 6(a) of the Second Executive Order is almost identical to its
predecessor—enjoined Section 5(a)—and differs only cosmetically, such as by modifying the
refugee suspension to exclude those already scheduled for travel. While the Second Executive
Order removes other provisions related to refugees enjoined by this Court (particularly Section
5(c), which indefinitely suspended entry of Syrian refugees, and the explicit preference based
on religious minority status in Sections 5(b) and (e)), removal of those provisions does not alter
the virtually complete overlap between new Section 6(a) and enjoined Section 5(a).
The second reinstated provision is the bar on entry of individuals based on their
national origin. Enjoined Section 3(c) of the First Executive Order barred entry of individuals
for 90 days from seven Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
and Yemen. Section (2)(c) of the Second Executive Order bars entry of individuals for 90 days
from the same Muslim-majority countries, with the exception of Iraq. While the reinstated
section differs from the original by excluding lawful permanent residents and visa-holders
from its travel ban, it bars entry for virtually all others from the listed countries, including:
relatives of U.S. citizens from the listed countries; students who have been admitted to state
universities but not yet received visas; prospective employees of state universities and private
businesses who have been offered positions but not yet obtained visas; students and employees
who need to renew their visas; and many others protected by this Court’s order.
As with the First Executive Order, the Second Executive Order states that the six-
country and refugee bans are subject to possible waivers. For the six-country ban, the Second
Executive Order provides that “case-by-case waivers could be appropriate.” Second Executive
Order § 3(c). This parallels the “national interest” waivers following “case-by-case
determinations” available under Section 3(g) of the First Executive Order. Likewise, the
refugee ban remains subject to waivers on the same terms as the First Executive Order: “[O]n a
case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but only so long as [the Secretaries of State and Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 6 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

5 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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Homeland Security determine” that the refugee’s admission (1) “is in the national interest,”
and (2) does not pose a threat “to the security or welfare of the United States.” First Executive
Order § 5(e); Second Executive Order § 6(c).
In short, retaining these provisions makes clear that President Trump is not backing
down from his campaign pledge. Like their predecessors, new Sections 2(c) and 6(a) ban
people from listed majority-Muslim countries and suspend the Refugee Admissions Program.
III. ARGUMENT
A. This Court’s Preliminary Injunction Remains In Effect
Under settled law, this Court’s preliminary injunction remains in effect unless it is
altered by this Court or an appellate court, or until a final judgment on the merits. See ECF
No. 78 at 4 (“[T]he Court agrees that the Ninth Circuit has construed the TRO as a preliminary
injunction.”); U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he very purpose of a preliminary injunction . . . is to preserve the status quo and the rights
of the parties until a final judgment issues.” (citing Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,
395 (1981))). “The ‘purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo ante litem
pending a determination of the action on the merits.’” Boardman v. Pac. Seafood Grp., 822
F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1023
(9th Cir. 2009)). “‘Status quo ante litem’ refers to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded
the pending controversy.’” Boardman, 822 F.3d at 1024 (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt
Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)). Until then, “neither the plaintiff nor the
court should be subjected to the unnecessary burden of re-establishing what has once been
decided.” Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961).
B. This Court Has Broad Authority to Enforce Its Injunction
“Courts possess the inherent authority to enforce their own injunctive decrees.”
Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056
(1986) (citing United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972); Berry v. Midtown Serv. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 7 of 16

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800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1939)), cited in Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d
1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1995). “[A]n injunction often requires continuing supervision by the
issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf
of the party who obtained that equitable relief.” Sys. Fed’n No. 91, 364 U.S. at 647.
“‘In deciding whether an injunction has been violated it is proper to observe the objects
for which the relief was granted and to find a breach of the decree in a violation of the spirit of
the injunction, even though its strict letter may not have been disregarded.’” Inst. of Cetacean
Research v. Sea Shepherd Conserv. Soc’y, 774 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting John B.
Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 128 F.2d 981, 983 (2d Cir. 1942)). A defendant cannot
escape the district court’s power to enforce its injunction through procedural mechanisms
designed to insulate its actions from review. See, e.g., Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, 494 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[The VA cannot usurp the power of a district
court to construe the provisions of an order it has issued or divest that court of its
authority[.”); Movers Conference of Am. v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 882, 885 (S.D. Cal.
1966) (holding that federal government should have sought modification of injunction rather
than simply adopting revised policy that purported to address court’s prior holding).
C. Sections 6(a) and 2(c) of the Second Executive Order Are Covered by This Court’s
Prior Injunction
The Second Executive Order seeks to reinstate two policies that this Court already
enjoined. Defendants have offered little justification for their attempt to reinstate these policies
without court approval. Their attempts at justification fail, and the Court should enforce its
injunction against Defendants’ attempt to renew their enjoined conduct.
1. Sections 6(a) and 2(c) implement again conduct that this Court enjoined
When a court orders a defendant to stop certain conduct, the defendant cannot proceed
by stopping only some of the enjoined conduct. That is what Defendants attempt here. See, Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 8 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

7 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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e.g., Second Executive Order § 1(c) (stating that it redeploys “critical provisions” of the First
Executive Order).
This Court enjoined Section 5(a) of the First Executive Order, which suspended the
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days. Section 6(a) of the Second Executive Order
reinstates a materially identical suspension of the program. It is true that Defendants responded
to the Court’s injunction by removing from the Second Executive Order three other refugee-
related provisions in the First Executive Order (section 5(c)’s indefinite suspension of entry of
Syrian refugees and the explicit religious preference in sections 5(b) and (e)). But removing
those provisions and halting some of their unlawful conduct does not exempt Defendants from
the injunction as to former Section 5(a).
Similarly, this Court enjoined Section 3(c) of the First Executive Order, which barred
entry of individuals for 90 days from seven Muslim-majority countries. The Second Executive
Order reprises this unconstitutional provision in Section (2)(c). While the Second Executive
Order now excludes Iraqis, lawful permanent residents, and visa-holders from its travel ban, it
bars entry for virtually all other individuals from the listed countries, including: relatives of
U.S. citizens; students who have been admitted to state universities but not yet received visas;
prospective employees of state universities or private businesses who have been offered
positions but not yet obtained visas; and students and employees who may need to renew their
visas. All of these individuals (and the institutions that wish to admit or hire them) are
protected by this Court’s injunction, but are nonetheless targeted and harmed by the Second
Executive Order.
2. Defendants’ cursory justifications for reinstating these policies in the face
of the Court’s injunction fail
Defendants offer little explanation for their claim that “[this Court’s injunctive order
does not limit the Government’s ability to immediately begin enforcing the [Second Executive
Order.” ECF No. 108 at 14. But the bare-bones justifications they do offer fail entirely. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 9 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

8 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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a. Renumbering a policy does not allow enjoined conduct
Defendants first point out that this “Court’s injunctive order, by its terms, applied only
to specific sections of Executive Order No. 13,769.” ECF No. 108 at 14. But injunctions
operate against actions and policies, not against numbers on a page; a defendant cannot evade
the force of an injunction by renumbering the policy enjoined. See, e.g., Inst. of Cetacean
Research, 774 F.3d at 949; Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib., Inc., No. 08-CV-10983,
2013 WL 2145677, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2013) (holding defendants in contempt for
making only “minor changes” to enjoined conduct in an effort “to hide from and avoid [their]
obligations under this Court’s order”), aff’d, 763 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014); Potter v. Dist. of
Columbia, Nos. 01-1189-JR, 05-1792-JR, 2007 WL 2892685, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2007)
(confirming that preliminary injunction of employer’s “grooming policy,” which required
firefighters to be clean-shaven, also enjoined subsequent “safety policy,” which forbade certain
workers to have facial hair); McCarty Corp. v. Rice, No. 89-2668-OG, 1989 WL 201077, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1989) (enforcing preliminary injunction against Defendants’ proposed
actions that were “inconsistent with the injunctive order still in effect”). The key question is
whether some of the enjoined policies or conduct continue, and here they plainly do.
b. Exempting permanent residents and visa-holders does not remove
the enjoined provisions from the scope of the injunction
Defendants next point out that the Second Executive Order “does not apply to legal
permanent residents or to holders of valid visas,” unlike the first order. ECF No. 108 at 14.
Defendants seem to be asserting that this change undermines the holdings of this Court and the
Ninth Circuit as to due process and standing. This argument fails for at least three reasons.
First, as to due process, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Defendants’ argument that
due process protected only lawful permanent residents and visa-holders. Washington, 847 F.3d
at 1166 (noting that even if these groups were excluded from the First Executive Order, “the
States would continue to have potential claims regarding possible due process rights of” Case OWNTJcvJMMN4NJgio aocument NNV ciled MPLNPLNT mage NM of NS

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

9 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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others, including visa “applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident or an institution
that might have rights of its own to assert”). And even if the Ninth Circuit had not made that
clear, Defendants cannot now attack the scope of this Court’s injunction given that a motion to
enforce an injunction “does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order
alleged to have been disobeyed.” Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 441 n.21
(1986).
Second, even if these revisions did undermine the due process claims, those claims
were not the only substantial basis for the injunction. This Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other
courts have all found that states’ Establishment Clause and equal protection claims based on
improper religious intent are quite strong. See, e.g., ECF No. 52 at 4; Washington, 847 F.3d at
1168 (“The States’ [Establishment Clause and Equal Protection] claims raise serious
allegations and present significant constitutional questions.”); Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *8
(same). And Defendants have not shown that the discriminatory motives that played a part in
the First Executive Order somehow disappeared in adopting nearly identical provisions of the
Second Executive Order. See Aziz, 2017 WL 580855, at *8 (“the world is not made brand new
every morning”) (quoting McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005)). Indeed, senior
Administration officials have reiterated that Defendants’ current motivations are no different
than the first time around.4 And the evidence that has appeared since the Court’s initial
injunction only further demonstrates that Defendants’ purported national security motivations
for issuing the executive orders are pretextual.5

4 See ECF No. 113-5 at 3 (Second Executive Order designed to achieve “the same basic policy
outcome”); see also ECF No. 113-6 at 16 (“[I]f you think about it, the principles of the executive order remain the
same.”); Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding “post hoc rationalizations” cannot prevent
a “searching inquiry” into the motives behind alleged constitutional violations).
5 See ECF No. 113-9 at 1 (“Key Finding[]” by Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence
and Analysis that “country of citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity”); ECF
No. 113-10 at 1 (“Key Judgment[]” of same office that “most foreign-born, US-based extremists likely
radicalized several years after their entry to the United States, limiting the ability of screening and vetting officials
to prevent their entry because of national security concerns”). The Administration’s rejection of intelligence
reports that conflict with its preferred outcome only adds to the mountain of motive evidence already present in Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 11 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

10 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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Third, as to standing, state standing to enforce the injunction is plain for multiple
reasons: (a) “A party that obtains a judgment in its favor acquires a ‘judicially cognizable’
interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 712,
(2010) (plurality opinion) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 763 (1984)). (b) Neither this
Court nor the Ninth Circuit found that the States had standing solely to address the claims of
lawful permanent residents or visaholders—both courts found broader standing than that. See
ECF No. 52 at 4-5 (citing “injury to the States’ operations, tax bases, and public funds,” to
“their public universities,” and to the States’ “residents” without reference to their immigration
status); Washington, 847 F.3d at 1159-61 (finding that the States had at least proprietary
standing because “(1) the Executive Order prevents nationals of seven countries from entering
[the States; (2) as a result, some of these people will not enter state universities, some will not
join those universities as faculty, some will be prevented from performing research, and some
will not be permitted to return if they leave,” all of which remains true). (c) Finally, even if a
new standing inquiry were appropriate, the proposed Second Amended Complaint and roughly
fifty new declarations document substantial harms from the Second Executive Order to states’
proprietary, parens patriae, and sovereign interests. States would thus plainly have standing to
challenge the Second Executive Order even if this Court had not already enjoined the
provisions at issue.
c. Possible waivers do not exempt the Second Executive Order from
the injunction
Defendants also seek to treat the Second Executive Order’s waiver provisions as a get-
out-of-jail free card, but materially identical waiver provisions applied to the First Executive
Order. Compare First Executive Order §§ 3(g), 5(e), with Second Executive Order §§ 3(c),
6(a). As before, waivers, if any, will be granted exclusively at Defendants’ discretion. See
Second Executive Order § 3(c) (identifying circumstances where a case-by-case waiver “could

this case. See ECF No. 113-11 at 2 (lamentation by senior Administration official that “[t]his is not the
intelligence assessment the president asked for”). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 12 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

11 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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be appropriate”) (emphasis added). And, unlike almost all other provisions in the Second
Executive Order—which instruct federal agencies to submit detailed reports on their progress,
implement “uniform screening and vetting standards,” and issue appropriate “directives”—the
waiver provisions carry no such procedural requirements.6 Given the overlap between the
waiver provisions in the First and Second orders, there is no basis to revisit the Ninth Circuit’s
rejection of Defendants’ argument that the “waiver provisions are a sufficient safety valve.”
Washington, 847 F.3d at 1169.
d. Defendants’ cited cases do not allow them to ignore the injunction
Defendants cite Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975), and Diffenderfer v. Central
Baptist Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 404 U.S. 412 (1972), for the proposition that the Second
Executive Order “falls outside of this Court’s injunction” because it is substantially different
from the now-revoked First Executive Order. ECF No. 108 at 14. But Fusari and Diffenderfer
provide no authority for that proposition.
In Fusari, a district court held that aspects of Connecticut’s unemployment
compensation scheme violated due process and enjoined the state from denying benefits under
that scheme, but it stayed its injunction pending appeal. While the case was on appeal, the
legislature “completely altered” the challenged system. Fusari, 419 U.S. at 379-80, 384-85.
The Supreme Court expressed no opinion about the injunction, which was stayed in any event.
Instead it declined to rule in the first instance on the constitutionality of the “completely
altered” scheme, remanding to the trial court for “reconsideration in light of the intervening
changes in Connecticut law.” Id. at 389-90. The case is an example of appellate restraint; it
says nothing about a district court’s ability to enforce its own injunction in the face of a
defendant’s attempt to reinstate enjoined policies.

6 Cf. Second Executive Order § 2(b) (report on worldwide review); § 2(e) (recommendations); § 2(g)
(joint report); § 5(a) (“implement a program”); § 5(b) (reports at 60, 100, and 200 days of the order); § 6(a)
(review and implement procedures); § 7 (reconsider certain authority, directives, and guidance); § 8(b) (periodic
reports at 100, 180, 200, and 365 days); § 11(a)-(b) (collect and publish information every 180 days). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 13 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

12 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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Diffenderfer is even less relevant. It did not involve an injunction at all and simply held
that changes to state law while the appeal was pending rendered the case moot, an argument
that Defendants have not advanced and could not plausibly advance here. 404 U.S. at 414-15.7
In short, none of the rationales that Defendants have offered show that Sections 2(c)
and 6(a) of the Second Executive Order should be allowed to evade this Court’s injunction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants unilaterally declare that “[t]his Court’s injunctive order does not limit the
Government’s ability to immediately begin enforcing the New Executive Order.” ECF No. 108
at 14. Defendants are incorrect. The Court should enforce its preliminary injunction and
confirm that it restrains Defendants from implementing Sections 2(c) and 6(a) of the Second
Executive Order, which reinstate provisions of the First Executive Order already enjoined by
the Court. In light of Defendants’ announced plan to implement the Second Executive Order
on March 16, the undersigned respectfully request that the Court order a response and set a
hearing for March 14.






7 To the extent Defendants mean to imply that they have mooted the entire injunction by revising some of
the enjoined provisions, they are mistaken. Compare Second Executive Order § 1(i) (“revoking” and “replacing”
the First Executive Order), with Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 660-62 (1993) (concluding controversy was not moot where City “repealed” and “replaced”
challenged ordinance, though new ordinance differed in certain respects from the prior one, because it
disadvantaged complainants “in the same fundamental way”); see also Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544,
1548 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The Supreme Court has held that where a new statute ‘is sufficiently similar to the repealed
[statute] that it is permissible to say that the challenged conduct continues’ the controversy is not mooted by the
change . . . .”) (alteration in original) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 662
n.3); Smith v. Exec. Dir. of Ind. War Mem’ls Comm’n, 742 F.3d 282, 287 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a challenged
policy is repealed or amended mid-lawsuit—a ‘recurring problem when injunctive relief is sought’—the case is
not moot if a substantially similar policy has been instituted or is likely to be instituted.”) (quoting ADT Sec.
Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 724 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2013)). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 119 Filed 03/13/17 Page 14 of 16

EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

13 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of March 2017.

ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Washington Attorney General

s/ Robert W. Ferguson
ROBERT W. FERGUSON, WSBA #26004
NOAH G. PURCELL, WSBA #43492
Solicitor General
COLLEEN M. MELODY, WSBA #42275
Civil Rights Unit Chief
ANNE E. EGELER, WSBA #20258
Deputy Solicitor General
MARSHA CHIEN, WSBA #47020
PATRICIO A. MARQUEZ, WSBA #47693
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 464-7744
[email protected]


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EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104-3188
(206) 464-7744

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed with the United
States District Court using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are
registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF
system.

March 13, 2017 s/ Noah G. Purcell
NOAH G. PURCELL, WSBA 43492

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