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MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104
206-464-774

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ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General
WSBA #26004
NOAH G. PURCELL
WSBA #43492
Solicitor General
COLLEEN M. MELODY
WSBA #42275
Civil Rights Unit Chief
Office of the Attorney General
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104
206-464-7744
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONALD TRUMP, in his official
capacity as President of the United
States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; JOHN F.
KELLY, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; TOM SHANNON,
in his official capacity as Acting
Secretary of State; and the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER


Motion Noted: January 30, 2017

Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
i ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...................................................................................2
III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................4
A. Standard for Granting Temporary Relief ...........................................................4
B. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits Because the Executive Order is
Illegal in Many Respects ....................................................................................5
1. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates the Equal Protection Clause ..............................5
a. Standard of Review .............................................................................5
b. Strict scrutiny applies ..........................................................................6
c. The Executive Order fails strict scrutiny ............................................8
d. Even Under rational basis review, the Executive Order fails .............9
2. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates the Establishment Clause ................................11
3. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates Due Process .....................................................14
a. The denial of re-entry to and de facto travel ban on certain legal
permanent residents and visaholders violates their due process
rights..................................................................................................14
b. The blanket ban on all refugees violates their due process right to
the fair administration of congressionally enacted policies and
procedures .........................................................................................18
4. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates the Immigration and Nationality Act ..............19
Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
ii ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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C. The State, its Residents, and its Businesses Are Suffering and Will Continue
to Suffer Irreparable Harm Due to the Executive Order ..................................21
D. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Sharply Favor Preliminary
Relief ................................................................................................................23
II. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................24
Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 3 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
1 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have no more sacred role than protecting marginalized groups against
irrational, discriminatory conduct. Over the last 48 hours, federal courts across the country
have exercised this role, ordering President Trump’s administration to release individuals
who were detained pursuant to the President’s Executive Order on immigration and refugees
issued late on Friday, January 27. Each of those courts found a significant likelihood that the
Executive Order violates federal law. Today, the State of Washington asks this Court to make
the same finding and to enter a nationwide temporary restraining order barring enforcement
of portions of the order. This relief is necessary to protect the State, its residents, and its
businesses from ongoing irreparable harm, and is overwhelmingly in the public interest.
President Trump’s Executive Order bans all refugees from entering the country for
120 days, and bans all refugees from Syria indefinitely, whether they be infants,
schoolchildren, or grandmothers. Washington families waiting to be reunited with their loved
ones have had their dreams of reunification destroyed, as their refugee relatives around the
world were taken off airplanes or told they are no longer welcome.
The Order also bans nationals from seven countries from entering the United States
for 90 days. Though the administration’s interpretation of the Order has changed repeatedly
over the last 48 hours, it has applied the Order to block longtime legal permanent residents
from returning to this country, and the Order’s text purports to grant the administration
authority to continue denying entry to such residents. This entry ban is harming legal
permanent residents who live in Washington, Washington businesses that employ residents
from the listed countries, and Washington families whose loved ones are trying to visit them.
In addition to suffering these irreparable harms, the State has a strong likelihood of
success on its claims. The Executive Order has both the intent and effect of discriminating
based on national origin and religion, in violation of the Constitution. Strict scrutiny applies, Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 4 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
2 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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and the order fails utterly. Even if rational basis review applied, the Order would fail because
it is motivated by discriminatory animus and bears no relationship to its purported ends.
While preventing terrorist attacks is an important goal, the order does nothing to further that
purpose by denying admission to children fleeing Syria’s civil war, to refugees who valiantly
assisted the U.S. military in Iraq, or to law-abiding high-tech workers who have lived in
Washington for years. The Order also violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.
In short, the Order is illegal, is causing and will continue to cause irreparable harm in
Washington, and is contrary to the public interest. The Court should fulfill its constitutional
role as a check on executive abuse and temporarily bar enforcement of the Order nationwide.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Donald Trump campaigned on the promise that he would ban Muslims from entering
the United States. Compl. For Decl. & Inj. Relief (“Compl.”) ¶ 28, ECF No. 1. On December
7, 2015, he issued a press release calling for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States.” Compl. ¶ 29. Over the next several months, he defended and
reiterated this promise. Compl. ¶¶ 30-32. On August 15, 2016, Trump proposed an
ideological screening test for immigration applicants, which he referred to as “extreme
vetting.” Compl. ¶ 33.
Following his inauguration, President Trump reaffirmed his commitment to “extreme
vetting.” Compl. ¶ 34. Within one week of taking office, President Trump signed an order
entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”. Compl.
¶ 35. The Order directs a variety of changes to the manner and extent to which non-citizens
may obtain admission to the United States. Id. Among other things, it imposes a 120-day
moratorium on the refugee resettlement program as a whole; indefinitely suspends the entry
of Syrian refugees; and suspends for 90 days entry of all immigrants and nonimmigrants
from seven majority-Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 5 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
3 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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Compl. ¶¶ 36-38. President Trump subsequently stated that the purpose of the Executive
Order was to establish “new vetting measures to keep radical Islamic terrorists out of the
United States.” Compl. ¶ 40. He also confirmed his intent to prioritize Christians in the
Middle East for admission as refugees. Compl. ¶ 39.
The Executive Order has had immediate and significant effects in Washington. Most
urgently, the Order is tearing Washington families apart. Husbands are separated from wives,
brothers are separated from sisters, and parents are separated from their children. Compl.
¶¶ 20-22. Some who have waited decades to see family members had that reunion taken
without warning or reason. Compl. ¶ 20. While the anecdotal stories are heartbreaking, Decl.
of E. Chiang ¶¶ 11-13, the sheer number of people affected is also notable. Over 7,000
noncitizen immigrants from the affected countries reside in Washington. Compl. ¶ 10; Decl.
of N. Purcell ¶ 7; Ex. A. These Washingtonians now face considerable uncertainty about
whether and when they may travel. Compl. ¶ 21. Additionally, an unknown but large number
of Washington residents are originally from these countries but are now U.S. citizens, who
wish to be able to receive visits from overseas relatives or see them move here as refugees or
otherwise.
Washington’s businesses and economy are also impacted. Washington-based travel
company Expedia is incurring costs to assist its customers who are now banned from travel
to the United States. Decl. of R. Dzielak ¶¶ 12-14, 20. Washington companies Amazon,
Expedia, and Microsoft depend on skilled immigrants to operate and grow their businesses.
Compl. ¶¶ 11-12, 14-16; Decl. of A. Blackwell-Hawkins ¶¶ 3-4; Decl. of R. Dzielak ¶¶ 7, 9.
At least 76 Microsoft employees are originally from the affected countries and hold
temporary work visas. Compl. ¶ 14. As a result of the Executive Order, such employees may
be banned from reentering the United States if they travel overseas. Id. The Executive Order
will affect these companies’ ability to recruit and retain talented workers, to the detriment of Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 6 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
4 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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Washington’s economy and tax base. Compl. ¶ 13; Decl. of R. Dzielak ¶¶ 7, 21; see also
Decl. of A. Blackwell-Hawkins ¶¶ 4, 11.
The Executive Order is also harming Washington’s educational institutions. More
than 95 immigrants from the affected countries attend the University of Washington. Compl.
¶ 17; Decl. of J. Riedinger ¶ 5. More than 130 attend Washington State University. Decl. of
A. Chaudhry ¶ 5. The Executive Order is already disrupting students’ personal and
professional lives, preventing travel for research and scholarship, and harming the
universities’ missions. Decl. of J. Riedinger ¶¶ 6-8; Decl. of A. Chaudhry ¶¶ 6-9.
As long as the Executive Order is in place, it will continue to have these serious,
pointless effects on Washington’s families, businesses, and educational institutions.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Granting Temporary Relief
To obtain a temporary restraining order, the State must establish 1) a likelihood of
success on the merits; 2) that irreparable harm is likely in the absence of preliminary relief;
3) that the balance of equities tips in the State’s favor; and 4) that an injunction is in the
public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L.
Ed. 2d 249 (2008); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush &
Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). And while the State can establish all of these
factors, “[how strong a claim on the merits is enough depends on the balance of harms: the
more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can
be while still supporting some preliminary relief.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632
F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John
Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, while the State’s claims on
the merits are extremely strong, temporary relief would be appropriate even if they were less
clearly meritorious given how sharply the balance of harms tips in the State’s favor. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 7 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
5 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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B. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits Because the Executive Order is
Illegal in Many Respects
The Executive Order violates multiple provisions of the Constitution and federal
statutes. As demonstrated below, the State is highly likely to prevail on the merits.
1. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates the Equal Protection Clause
a. Standard of review
The Fifth Amendment has an “equal protection component,” Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 297 (1980), and noncitizens “com[ewithin the ambit of the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause,” Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 974
(9th Cir. 2004). In equal protection analysis, the court first decides whether a challenged
classification burdens a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823
(9th Cir. 2001). “If the statute employs a suspect class (such as race, religion, or national
origin) or burdens the exercise of a constitutional right, then courts must apply strict scrutiny,
and ask whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”
Id. “[Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971) (footnotes omitted); see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(religion is an “inherently suspect distinction”). If no suspect classification is implicated, the
court applies rational basis review, and determines whether the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest. Ball, 254 F.3d at 823.
While courts generally give more latitude to the political branches in the immigration
context, see, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001), this does not mean that the
political branches can act with impunity. In protecting its borders, this country does not set
aside its values or its Constitution. Id. (the political branches’ “power is subject to important Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 8 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
6 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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constitutional limitations”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983) (Congress must
choose “a constitutionally permissible means of implementing” its power over immigration).
Here, the Executive Order cannot pass muster under any standard of review. Its
blunderbuss approach—prompted by irrational fear and blind animus—is at odds with the
fundamental American promise that all are entitled to equal protection under the law.
b. Strict scrutiny applies
The Court should apply strict scrutiny to the Executive Order. While courts often
defer to the political branches’ reasoned judgments on immigration policy, they do not give a
blank check to ignore the law. Here, the State challenges not an act of Congress or a carefully
formulated regulation, but an Executive Order that was written largely by the President’s
political advisers without consultation of legal experts or the National Security Council and
that flatly discriminates on the basis of national origin and religion, in at least three ways.
First, the executive order discriminates based on national origin by singling out
people from seven countries for an outright ban on admission to the United States. Notably,
the Executive Order on its face applies to lawful permanent residents from the listed
countries who live in the United States.1 Lawful permanent residents are accorded the same
constitutional protections as United States citizens. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 (1953); see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (“[Once an alien
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the
First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). The Order’s blatant distinction between green-card holders currently residing
in the United States on the basis of national origin demands strict scrutiny. “[Classifications

1 Although administration officials have since suggested that, despite the plain language of the
Executive Order, the ban might not be fully implemented against lawful permanent residents, the text of the
Executive Order remains in effect regardless of the ever-changing instructions from Defendants. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 9 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
7 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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. . . based on nationality . . . are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny,”
Graham, 403 U.S at 372, and are “odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality.” Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
Second, the executive order singles out refugees from Syria for differential treatment,
indefinitely suspending their entry whether they be toddlers or grandmothers. Syrian-
American families in Washington and across the country awaiting their refugee relatives are
left with no idea when their relatives will be allowed to come, solely based on nationality.
Third and finally, as discussed in more detail in Part B.2, the Executive Order
discriminates based on religion. On its face, the Executive Order requires immigration
officials to “prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based
persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the
individual’s country of nationality.” Sec. 5(b). As detailed below, comments by President
Trump and his advisers make clear that the intent of this provision is to give preference to
Christian refugees while disadvantaging Muslim refugees.2 Compl. ¶ 39; Ex. 8. Importantly,
the State need not show that intent to discriminate against Muslims “was the sole purpose of
the challenged action, but only that it was a ‘motivating factor.’” Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d
968, 977 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)). That standard is plainly met here based on the evidence presented.
There thus can be no dispute that the executive order uses suspect classifications. And
it does so not in furtherance of a congressionally authorized purpose, but rather in direct
violation of federal law (as discussed in Part B.4), which prohibits discrimination “in the
issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s . . . nationality.” 8 U.S.C.

2 See, e.g., https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/825721153142521858;
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-christian-refugees/index.html; Compl. ¶ 29. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 10 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
8 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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§ 1152(a)(1)(A). In short, this is an extraordinary case that falls well outside the run-of-the-
mill immigration context in which deference to the political branches applies. The
President’s decision to adopt suspect classifications in violation of federal law deserves strict
scrutiny.
c. The Executive Order fails strict scrutiny
The Executive Order cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Neither the temporary ban on
admission of aliens from certain countries nor the barring of refugees is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest.
The order cites three rationales to support its temporary ban on admission of nationals
of seven countries: “To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies . . . , to
ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of available resources for the screening of
foreign nationals, and to ensure that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration
by foreign terrorists or criminals.” Sec. 3(c). The first rationale—essentially a desire to
conserve resources by discriminating—is not compelling,3 and in any case the order is not
narrowly tailored to achieve any of these goals.
To begin with, the Order is profoundly overbroad. Section 3(c) bans those from
disfavored countries without any evidence that any individual poses a threat of terrorism. It
sweeps within its ambit infant children, the disabled, long-time U.S. residents, those fleeing
terrorism, those who assisted the United States in conflicts overseas, and many others who
the government has no reason to suspect are terrorists. The government simply cannot
establish any factual basis for presuming that all people from a given country pose such a
great risk that an outright entry ban—rather than less extreme measures—is warranted.

3 Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974) (“a state may not protect the public
fisc by drawing an invidious distinction between classes” of people); Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d
1101, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (simply saving money is not a compelling interest). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 11 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
9 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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At the same time, the order is also underinclusive to achieve its purported ends. By
way of example, the Executive Order recites the tragic events of September 11, 2001, but
imposes no entry restrictions on people from the countries whose nationals carried out those
attacks (Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Decl. N. Purcell ¶8;
Ex. B. As to admission of refugees, the order claims that a temporary prohibition is necessary
“to determine what additional procedures should be taken to ensure that those approved for
refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States.” Sec.
5. Citing no evidence at all, the Order declares that “the entry of nationals of Syria as
refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Sec. 5(c). But assertion is not
evidence, and there is no evidence that refugees pose any unique risk to the United States.4
“[Sict scrutiny requires a direct rather than approximate fit of means to ends.”
Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has emphasized that equal protection
guards against sweeping generalizations about categories of people based on traits such as
national origin or religion.5 Here, there is no “fit” between the rationales advanced to support
the Executive Order and the means used to further those rationales.
d. Even under rational basis review, the Executive Order fails
The State is also likely to prevail on the merits of its equal protection claim should the
Court employ rational basis review.

4 A recent and exhaustive study concluded that the chance of an American being killed by a refugee in
a terrorist attack is 1 in 3.64 billion a year. Alex Nowrasteh, Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis, at 2,
Cato Institute (Sept. 13, 2016) (Cato Institute).
5 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (striking down racial gerrymander because “[i]t
reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (strict scrutiny “ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ [a purported] compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate . . . prejudice or stereotype”). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 12 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
10 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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There are “two versions of the rational basis test—traditional rational basis review
and a more rigorous rational basis standard.” United States v. Wilde, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1092,
1096 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Where “a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class,” the classification must be upheld “so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). When a classification does,
in fact, “adversely affect[ an unpopular group, courts apply a ‘more searching’ rational basis
review.” Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(citing Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2011)).
“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare
[legislative

de
sire

to

ha
r
m
a

poli
tically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment
of that group.” United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting Dep’t of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). Thus, courts cast a more skeptical eye
toward legislation that “has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Accordingly, when legislation
“seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects[, it lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests.” Id. Likewise, the government has no legitimate
interest in catering to “mere negative attitudes, or fears” that some residents may have
against a disfavored minority. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985). Simply put, the government “may not avoid the strictures of [equal
protection
b
y
de
f
e
rr
in
g
t
o the w
ishes or
objec
ti
on
s of some
fr
a
c
ti
on of
the
bod
y
poli
ti
c
.” Id.
There is little doubt that the Executive Order is prompted by animus to those of the
Islamic faith, which was one of the pillars of President Trump’s campaign. On December 7,
2015, President Trump’s Campaign released a statement indicating that “Donald J. Trump is
calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” See
Compl. ¶ 29; Ex. 1. The Campaign’s spokesperson thereafter defended President Trump Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 13 of 27

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against criticism as follows: “So what? They’re Muslim.” See Decl. of N. Purcell ¶ 9; Ex. C.
In the face of significant criticism, President Trump announced that he would “expand” his
proposed blanket ban to “any nation that has been compromised by terrorism” but use
different words to describe it:
I actually don’t think it’s a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s an
expansion. . . . I’m looking now at territory. People were so upset when
I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim.
Remember this. And I’m OK with that, because I’m talking territory
instead of Muslim.
Comp. ¶ 32; Ex. 4. Even after issuing the order, President Trump’s statements confirm that it
is designed to disfavor Muslims. Compl. ¶ 39; Ex. 8. The bottom line is that the Executive
Order is designed to “adversely affect[ an unpopular group,” calling for the “court [ to
apply a ‘more searching’ rational basis review.” Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 996 (citing
Diaz, 656 F.3d at 1012).
Even assuming the absence of animus and the application of ordinary rational basis
review, the Executive Order bears no “rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. There is simply no basis to conclude that existing
screening procedures are uniquely failing as to individuals from the listed countries or as to
refugees. Instead, the Executive Order panders to irrational fears about Muslims and
refugees, and bears no rational relationship to any government interest.
2. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates the Establishment Clause
The Executive Order violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because both its purpose and effect are to favor one religion over another. “The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). Thus, where a law
“grant[s a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as
suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.” Id. at 246. In Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 14 of 27

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Larson, the law at issue did not mention any religious denomination by name, but drew a
distinction between religious groups based on the percentage of their revenue received from
non-members, which had the effect of harming certain religious groups. Id. at 231-32.
Because the law was focused on religious entities and had the effect of distinguishing
between them in a way that favored some, the Court applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 246-47.
The Court should apply the Larson approach here. The Executive Order’s refugee
provisions explicitly distinguish between members of religious faiths, granting priority to
“refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution” only if “the
religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”
Section 5(b). President Trump and his advisers have made clear that the very purpose of this
order is to tilt the scales in favor of Christian refugees at the expense of Muslims. Compl.
¶ 39; Ex. 8. This case thus involves just the sort of discrimination among denominations that
failed strict scrutiny in Larson, and the Executive Order should likewise be invalidated.
Even if the Executive Order did not explicitly distinguish between denominations, the
Court would still need to apply the three-part “Lemon test” to determine whether the
government has violated the Establishment Clause. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” Id. at 612. While the
government must satisfy all three prongs, here it can satisfy none.
First, the Executive Order’s purpose is not “secular” because President Trump’s
purpose in issuing this Order—as confirmed by his own public statements—is to “endorse or
disapprove of religion.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75-76 (1985). In analyzing
government purpose, it is “the duty of the courts” to distinguish a “sincere” secular purpose
from one that is either a “sham” or that is “secondary” to a “predominantly religious” Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 15 of 27

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purpose. McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 865 (2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This duty requires a Court to scrutinize all
“probative evidence,” to exercise “common sense,” and to refuse “to turn a blind eye to the
context in which [the

poli
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a
rose
.” Id. at 866 (alteration in original). In so doing, a court
looks carefully at both the “historical context” of the government’s action and “the specific
sequence of events leading to [its

passage.” Id. (alteration in original). As the Supreme
Court has explained, this inquiry into purpose at times requires invalidation of an action that
otherwise would have been constitutional: “One consequence of taking account of the
purpose underlying past actions is that the same government action may be constitutional if
taken in the first instance and unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage.” Id. at 866 n.14.
In short, given that President Trump’s “actual purpose” in issuing this Order is to “endorse or
disapprove of religion,” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75-76, the Order violates the first prong of the
Lemon test.
The Order also violates Lemon’s second prong, which requires that the “principal or
primary effect . . . be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” Governmental action
violates this prong “if it is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling
denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices.” Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court analyzes this prong “from the point of
view of a reasonable observer who is informed . . . [and

fa
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the
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of

the

government practice at issue.” See id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, the question here is whether an informed, reasonable observer would
perceive this Executive Order as an endorsement of one religion, as disapproval of another,
or both? In light of the evidence cited above, there is little question that the answer to this
question is in the affirmative. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 16 of 27

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As to the third prong, the Order “foster[s ‘an excessive governmental entanglement
with religion” by favoring one religious group over another, which “engender[s a risk of
politicizing religion.” Larson, 456 U.S. at 252-53. Selectively burdening those of the Muslim
faith and favoring those of the Christian faith creates improper “entanglement with religion.”
In short, because the Executive Order fails the Larson test and every prong of the
Lemon test, it emphatically violates the Establishment Clause.
3. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates Due Process
The Executive Order violates the procedural due process rights of immigrants and
non-immigrants from the seven impacted countries, including those who reside and work in
Washington, are professors and students at Washington universities, and want to travel to
Washington to visit their families. First, due process requires that the United States at a
minimum provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before denying re-entry to legal
permanent residents or visaholders with longer term residency rights such as under an H-1B
visa (workers) and f visas (students). Moreover, the United States must provide due process
before restricting their vital liberty interests in travelling across United States borders.
Second, Congress’s grant of a statutory right to seek asylum or protection under the
Convention Against Torture requires that the United States administer those policies and
procedures consistent with due process. The Order’s blanket prohibition on all refugees for
120 days and on Syrian refugees indefinitely contravenes refugees’ due process rights.
a. The denial of re-entry to and de facto travel ban on certain legal
permanent residents and visaholders violates their due process
rights
Section 3(c) of the Executive Order denies entry to the United States to all persons
from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, including visaholders and legal Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 17 of 27

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PO Box 40100
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permanent residents with the legal right to leave and re-enter the United States.6 Under that
policy, legal permanent residents and visaholders travelling abroad will be deported if they
attempt to re-enter the United States, and those who remain will be forced to refrain from
international travel to avoid that devastating result. This draconian restriction violates the due
process rights of those individuals.
The Fifth Amendment protects all persons who have entered the United States “from
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 69, 77 (1976) (internal citation omitted). This protection applies to all persons
within our borders, regardless of immigration status. Id. (Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment extends even to those “whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary,
or transitory”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); United States v. Raya-Vaca,
771 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2014). There is “no exception” to this rule. Id., 771 F.3d at
1203.
A “temporary absence from our shores” does not deprive visaholders and legal
permanent residents of their right to due process. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953)
(holding that denial of re-entry to legal permanent resident must comport with due process
where resident had spent four months abroad); Ricketts v. Simonse, No. 16 CIV. 6662 (LGS),
2016 WL 7335675, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (legal permanent resident who had
spent a few weeks abroad and was caught with drugs upon re-entry entitled to due process).
Due process requires that legal permanent residents and visaholders not be denied re-
entry to the United States without “at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to respond.”

6 The Executive Order excludes from this restriction only “those foreign nationals traveling
on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas for travel to the United
Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 visas).” Executive Order Sec. 3(c). This group is limited
essentially to diplomatic visas. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 18 of 27

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Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d at 1204. “Aliens who have entered the United States—whether legally
or illegally—cannot be expelled without the government following established procedures
consistent with the requirements of due process.” Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 927 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212). Specifically, due process guarantees that
individuals denied re-entry be provided a “full and fair hearing of his [or her claims” and “a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his [or her behalf.” Colmenar v. INS, 210
F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000); Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)
(same). Although Congress has prescribed certain circumstances under which an individual
may be denied re-entry to the United States, those procedures must comport with due
process. See, e.g., Pantoja-Gayton v. Holder, 366 F. App’x 739, 741 (9th Cir. 2010) (legal
permanent resident deemed inadmissible upon re-entry for child smuggling, but entitled to a
full hearing before an immigration judge to contest that finding).
The denial of re-entry to all visaholders and legal permanent residents from the
impacted countries, without an opportunity to be heard, is a prima facie violation of those
due process principles. The Executive Order provides that all individuals from the impacted
countries be denied entry to the United States, irrespective of their immigration status. On its
face, the Order bars legal permanent residents from impacted countries from reentry into the
United States if they travel aboard. The Order also denies the rights of H-1B visa holders
from re-entry if they travel abroad. As noted, there are a significant number of workers at
Washington businesses and students at Washington universities impacted. Similarly, the
Order on its face denies the rights to students here on f visas to reenter if they leave the
country at any time during their studies. The denial of re-entry to legal permanent residents
and such visaholders absent an opportunity to be heard, much less “proceedings conforming
to . . . due process of law,” is patently unconstitutional. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 212. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 19 of 27

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1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
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The Order’s impact on the right to travel also violates due process. In determining
whether a new policy such as the Order violates due process, “courts must consider the
interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through
the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures rather than
additional or different procedures.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). Here, the Executive Order deprives
noncitizens of the right to travel, a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (holding that Secretary of State could not deny passports to
Communists on the basis that right to travel abroad is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest). The right to travel “may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of
what he eats, or wears, or reads,” and is “basic in our scheme of values.” Id. at 126. And for
many noncitizens residing in Washington pursuant to H-1B visas, international travel is a
central component of their work. See id. (noting that “[travel abroad, like travel within the
country, may be necessary for a livelihood”). For visaholders or legal permanent residents
with family abroad, the de facto travel ban also denies the right to connect with their families,
“a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual.” Id. In contrast to these vital
liberty interests, the denial of re-entry to noncitizens with lawful immigration status does
nothing to advance the government’s interest in the “efficient administration of the
immigration laws at the border.” Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. The denial of re-entry to all persons
from the seven affected countries, irrespective of immigration status, and resulting travel ban
violate the due process rights of legal permanent residents and visaholders. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 20 of 27

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b. The blanket ban on all refugees violates their due process right to
the fair administration of congressionally enacted policies and
procedures
Congress has created a statutory right whereby persons persecuted in their own
country may petition for asylum in the United States. U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (“[any alien who
is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States. . . irrespective of
such alien’s status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this section”). Federal law
prohibits the return of a noncitizen to a country where he may face torture or persecution. See
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b); United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), implemented in
the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. G, Title
XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998) (codified as Note to 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
Congress has established procedures to implement those statutory rights, which includes
providing refugees the right to present evidence in support of a claim for asylum or CAT
protection, to move for reconsideration of an adverse decision, and to seek judicial review of
a final order denying their claims. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
In enacting these statutory rights, Congress “created, at a minimum, a constitutionally
protected right to petition our government for political asylum.” Haitian Refugee Ctr. v.
Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. 1982). The constitutionally protected right to petition
for asylum “invoke[s the guarantee of due process.” Id. at 1039; Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180
F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Lanza, 389 F.3d at 927 (“The due process afforded
aliens stems from those statutory rights granted by Congress and the principle that minimum
due process rights attach to statutory rights.”) (internal marks and quotation omitted). Due
process requires at a minimum that refugees seeking asylum receive a “full and fair hearing.”
Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010). It also requires that refugees have the
opportunity to consult with an attorney. Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 21 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
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The Executive Order violates the due process rights of refugees because it provides
no avenue for refugees to have their asylum claims heard. Instead, it explicitly states that the
United States will not entertain asylum claims from certain groups for a specified period of
time, regardless of the merits of individual asylum claims. This contravenes the due process
requirement that refugees receive a “full and fair hearing” on their claims for relief. Zetino,
622 F.3d at 1013. It also denies refugees their constitutionally protected right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, the denial of refugees’ constitutionally protected right to petition for
asylum does nothing to advance the government’s interest in the “efficient administration of
the immigration laws at the border.” Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. That interest is satisfied by the
rigorous procedures already in place to vet requests for asylum. Refugees are subject to “the
highest level of background and security checks of any category of traveler to the United
States,” in a process that often takes years to complete.7 Accordingly, the ban on refugees
violates the due process rights of refugees seeking asylum within the United States.
4. The State is Likely to Prevail on the Merits of Its Claim that the
Executive Order Violates the Immigration and Nationality Act
The State is also likely to establish that Sections 3(c) and 5(c) of the Executive Order
violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Enacted in 1965, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1152(a)(1)(A) clearly states, “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be
discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” By suspending entry of refugees from Syria
indefinitely, and immigrants from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, for

7 U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, USCIS, Refugee Processing and Security Screening (2015),
available at https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening; see also White House, President Barack Obama,
Infographic: The Screening Process for Refugee Entry into the United States (Nov. 2015), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/11/20/infographic-screening-process-refugee-entry-united-
states (noting that “[refugees undergo more rigorous screening than anyone else we allow into the United
States” and are “subject to the highest level of security checks of any category of traveler”). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 22 of 27

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90 days, the Executive Order squarely violates the INA. See U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026 (1989) (holding the “plain meaning of legislation
should be conclusive”). While the INA refers only to discrimination in the “issuance of an
immigrant visa,” the statute would be rendered meaningless if it did not equally prohibit
attempts, like President Trump’s, to deny an immigrant’s entry into the country altogether.
See Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State,, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (holding that Congress, in enacting section 1152, “unambiguously directed that no
nationality-based discrimination shall occur”).
Defendants may argue the President has power to suspend the entry of any class of
aliens when their entry is detrimental to the interests of the United States. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(f). Such an argument, however, is unavailing. Congress enacted Section 1182 in
1952, well before it passed section 1152. Whatever section 1182 meant when it was adopted,
the enactment of the INA amendments in 1965, including section 1152, marked a “profound
change” in the law by abolishing the national origin quota system, establishing a uniform
quota system, and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. Olsen v.
Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) (citingPub. L. No. 89-236). Passed alongside the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the legislative history of the
INA Amendments of 1965 “is replete with the bold anti-discriminatory principles of the Civil
Rights Era.” Olsen, 990 F.Supp. at 37. It is inconceivable that, in enacting anti-discrimination
provisions in 1965, Congress intended to leave the President with the ability to adopt the
same sort of overtly discriminatory measures Congress was outlawing. Accepting the
President’s approach would take us back to a period in our history when distinctions based
on national origin were accepted as the natural order of things, rather than outlawed as the
pernicious discrimination that they are. Cf. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 595, 606
(1889) (sustaining the Chinese Exclusion Act because the Chinese “remained strangers in the Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 23 of 27

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land,” constituted a “great danger [to the country” unless “prompt action was taken to
restrict their immigration,” and were “dangerous to [the country’s peace and security”).
C. The State, its Residents, and its Businesses Are Suffering and Will Continue to
Suffer Irreparable Harm Due to the Executive Order
To obtain preliminary relief, the State must show that irreparable harm is likely
before a decision on the merits can be issued. The State meets this test on several grounds.
First, because the State has shown a likelihood of success on its Establishment Clause
claim, harm is presumed. See, e.g., Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454
F.3d 290, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[Where a movant alleges a violation of the Establishment
Clause, this is sufficient, without more, to satisfy the irreparable harm prong for purposes of
the preliminary injunction determination.”); Parents’ Ass’n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d
1235, 1242 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying same rule).
Second, even aside from the Establishment Clause claim, the State’s complaint,
motion, and supporting evidence demonstrate overwhelming irreparable harm. Irreparable
harm is harm “for which there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages.”
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Arizona Dream Act provides a directly applicable example. Undocumented
persons who qualified for the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program
(DACA) sought a preliminary injunction against Arizona’s policy of denying driver’s
licenses to DACA recipients. Id. at 1057-58. The Ninth Circuit held that irreparable harm
existed because the lack of a driver’s license stopped immigrants from getting to work,
thereby hurting their ability to pursue their chosen professions. Id. at 1068. The same harm is
experienced by workers or students prevented from entering or returning to the United States.
“[A delay, even if only a few months, pending trial represents . . . productive time
irretrievably lost.” Id. (second alteration in original). Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 24 of 27

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22 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
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PO Box 40100
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The injuries to Washington residents and families are not merely professional and
financial, but also profound and irreparable psychological injuries. As detailed in the attached
declarations, the Order is resulting in longtime Washington residents being separated from or
kept apart from their families, often in heartbreaking situations. Decl. E. Chiang ¶¶ 5-7, 11-
13.
Washington businesses are also suffering irreparable injuries. Immigrant and refugee-
owned businesses employ 140,000 people in Washington. Washington’s technology industry
relies heavily on the H-1B visa program. Nationwide, Washington ranks ninth in the number
of applications for high-tech visas. Microsoft, which is headquartered in Washington,
employs nearly 5,000 people through the program. Other Washington companies, including
Amazon, Expedia, and Starbucks, employ thousands of H-1B visa holders. Loss of highly
skilled workers puts Washington companies at a competitive disadvantage with global
competitors. “[Intangible injuries, such as damage to ongoing recruitment efforts and
goodwill, qualify as irreparable harm.” Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Tel. Appliance Rental,
Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Executive Order is also causing irreparable harm to Washington’s college
students and universities. At the University of Washington, more than ninety-five students
are immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen. Decl. of J.
Riedinger ¶ 5. The number at Washington State University is over 135. Decl. J. Riedinger
¶¶ 6-8; Decl. of A. Chaudry 6-10. Because of the Executive Order, these students are missing
out on research and educational opportunities, travel to visit their families, study abroad, and
other irreplaceable activities that cannot be compensated through money damages. [cite decs

The universities also risk losing current and future students, a harm that cannot be remedied
with monetary damages. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 747 F.2d 511, 519-Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 25 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
23 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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20 (9th Cir. 1984) (loss of ability to recruit athletes, loss of national ranking, and dissipation
of alumni goodwill are irreparable harm).
D. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Sharply Favor Preliminary Relief
The Court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect
on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
Since this case involves the government, the balance of equities factor merges with the fourth
factor, public interest. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013).
The balance tips sharply in favor of the State. The balance of equities and public
interest always favor “prevent[ing the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres
v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition,
the State has shown irreparable, concrete harm to Washington residents, businesses, students,
and universities. Meanwhile, as detailed above, the overbreadth and underbreadth of the
order mean that it does little if anything to further its alleged purpose of preventing terrorism.
And the requested relief is narrowly tailored to affect only those parts of the Order causing
the State harm. While the State seeks a nationwide injunction, that relief is appropriate for
two reasons: (1) Congress and the courts have emphasized the importance of uniformity in
applying immigration policies nationwide; and (2) nationwide relief is necessary to ensure
that State residents and those traveling to meet them are not stopped at other ports of entry
around the country or interfered with by officials in Washington, DC, on their way to
Washington State. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 768-69 (5th Cir. 2015)
(affirming nationwide injunction to ensure uniformity and provide full relief).
Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 26 of 27

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
24 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100
Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360) 753-6200

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II. CONCLUSION
Sometimes federal courts are the only entities that can immediately halt abuses by the
executive branch. This is such a case. The State asks this Court to play its constitutional role
and grant a nationwide temporary restraining order until such time as the Court can further
consider the merits.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2017.


Respectfully submitted,

s/ Robert W. Ferguson
ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General
WSBA #26004
NOAH G. PURCELL
WSBA #43492
Solicitor General
COLLEEN M. MELODY
WSBA #42275
Civil Rights Unit Chief
Office of the Attorney General
800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000
Seattle, WA 98104
206-464-7744
noahp@atg.wa.gov
Case 2:17-cv-00141-JLR Document 3 Filed 01/30/17 Page 27 of 27